会计信息失真外文文献翻译译文3300字.docx

会计信息失真外文文献翻译译文3300字.docx

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会计信息失真外文文献翻译译文3300字

文献出处：

BeckT.TheStudyofAccountingInformationDistortioninSmallandMediumEnterprise[J].JournalofBanking&Finance,2014,30（11）:

30-43.

（声明：

本译文归XX文库所有，完整译文请到XX文库。

）

原文

TheStudyofAccountingInformationDistortion

InSmallandMediumEnterprise

Author:

BeckT.

Abstract

Securitymarket,infact,isinformationmarket,andthetimeliness,fairnessandcompletenessofaccountinformationisthefoundationofpublicconfidencetothemarket.Thefalsehoodofaccountinginformationstronglyinfluentswhethersecuritymarketcanworkwell.WithintroducingCoherenceTheoryandProceduralRationality,thearticleredefinesfairnessandfalsehoodofaccountinginformation,thenanalysistheissuefromperspectiveofGameTheory.

Astotheconceptoffairnessofaccountinginformation,thearticleintegratesProceduralRationalitywithCoherenceTheory.Thatis,theaccountinginformationcanbedeemedtrueonlyiftheprocedureandinstitutionofaccountingrule-makingarerationalandtheaccountinginformationisproducedanddisclosedstrictlyaccordingtotherules.

Frompreviousdefinition,thefalsehoodofaccountinginformationcanbedefinedasfollowingtwo:

iftheprocedureandinstitutionofaccountingrule-makingareirrational,theaccountinginformationisinfalsehoodeventhoughitisproduceaccordingtorulesandstandards.Besides,iftherulesandstandardsareofhighquality,butnotobeyed,theaccountinginformationisalsoinfalsehood.

Keywords:

AccountingInformation,GameTheory,ProceduralRationality

Rationalityisoneofpresumptionsineconomics,whichmeanshumanbeingsalwaysmakedecisionwhichcanmaximumhisorherinterests.Andthepresumptionrestrictstheareas,wherethemethodsineconomicscanbeused.Therefore,itisnecessarytorefinethestudyareas.Thearticleistostudyonthefalsehoodofaccountinginformationinducedbyruleconstitutorsandexecutorswhohaveincentivenottofollowtheprocedureofrule-makingandimplementingwheninstitutionandprocedureareirrational.Accordingtocategoriesoffalsehoodofaccountinginformation,thearticleisfocusedonplayer’sactionsandstrategiesunderirrationalinstitutionandprocedurewhichleadtotheinstitutionalandintendedfalsehood.Sothebehavioralfalsehoodandfalsehoodledbyhumane-beings’limitedrationalityareexcluded.

Duringtheprocessofaccountingrule-making,differentgameplayershavedifferentclaimsforaccountinginformationaccordingtotheirowninterests.Theyhavetheirownpayofffunctions,andhavedifferentrequestforaccountingstandards.Thepartieswillmaketherulespartialtothemselvesandadvocatetheirownrequestsfromtheirownpositionandinterest.TheidealmodelforaccountingrulemakingiscooperativegamewithNashequilibriumofsub-gameperfect-nessunderdynamicandcompletely-informativeenvironment.Itismorecostlyforrationalmentobreakingtheequilibriumthankeepingundersuchcircumstances.ThenitbecomesParetoPerfectionwhennobodywantstobreakup.However,theidealmodelishardtoattain.Andconditionsareneededtoprovidetogetclosetotheidealmodel.Thatistosay,asetofrationalinstitutionandproceduremustbesetuptoguaranteeallthedecisionsmadebyeachplayermaximumthewelfareofsociety.Andtherationalityofinstitutionandprocedureshouldbeembodiedbyrepresentationofrule-makersandindependenceofrule-makingorganization.

Thestructureofcorporategovernesscomesfromtheconflictswithinstockholdersandtheonesbetweenshareholderandmanagement.Accountinginformationisthewarrantyforshareholdertosplitupprofits,andthetrackrecordonmanagement’sperformance.Inpractice,itiscommonthatmanagementprovidesaccountinginformation;controllingstockholdersgetmoreinformationatfirstplace;andthepotentialinvestorsdecidestheiractionbywatchingthemovementofstockpriceandcontrollingshareholders.Thefeaturesofthephenomenonareasfollow:

thereisnoperfectinformationbetweenplayers,thegameprocessisdynamic.Basedonthesefeatures,theauthorbuildsupdynamicmodelwithimperfectinformation,andmakestheconclusionthatminorityonlycaresaboutthepayoffofmajority,themajorityconsiderstheirowninterestandthepayoffofthemanagement,themanagementneedstothinkofthepayoffofthemajority,theminorityandtheirown.Thefactorsinfluencingtheiractionsaregiven.Inreality,itisimpossibleforgovernmentregulatorydepartmentandthemanagementtomakeacoalition.Andthesequenceofthegameisnotasclearastheoneinthegamebetweenshareholdersandmanagement.

Therefore,astaticmodelwithimperfectinformationisfounded.Deducingfromthemodel,governmentregulatorydepartmentcanensurethefairnessofaccountinginformationbyenhancingeffortsinsupervising,raisingthesocialbenefitsandrewardsofeffectiveefforts,increasingthepunishmentofdisclosingfalseaccountinginformationandsoon.

Duringthegamebetweenmanagementandauditors,currently,themanagementprovidesinformationatfirst,andthenauditorconductsauditingandpresentauditingstatement.Thereisaclearsequenceinthegame.Andadynamicmodelwithimperfectinformationisbuiltup.Weconcludesthatraisingthepunishment,enhancingtheeffortsininspectingandothermeasurescanbedonetoguaranteethequalityofaccountinginformation.

Bysumminguptheoreticalanalysisabove,wecandealwiththefalsehoodofaccountinginformationinfollowingways:

consummatingtherulemakingprocedures;nurturingmaturemarketofcontrollingshareholders;constructall-roundsupervisingsystem;enhancingfunctionsoftheboard;andraisingtheindependenceandcompetenceofauditors.

TheUnitedStatesofEnron,WorldCom,Xeroxandsoonaseriesofaccountingscandals,questionsaboutaccountinginformationdistortion.Thediscussionoftherestoftheworld.Thesteadydevelopmentofsecuritiesmarket,notonlyrelatedtothecurrentperformanceoflistedcompanies,andinvestorsmoreexpectationsaboutthefutureofthemarketdevelopmentandtheestablishmentoftherelevantinvestmentconfidence.Thekeytoensurethestabilityofthisinformationisthepubliccompanyaccountinginformationdisclosedthequestion,namelydisclosureinformationmustensurethatthesecuritiespricetimely,accurateandcomprehensivetoreflectthefundamentalsofeachlistedcompanymanagementandtheriskofthesecuritiesmarketconditions.Onlyonthisbasis,theinvestorstomakereasonableexpectationsaboutthefuture,andthenmakeyourownrisktoleranceofinvestmentoptions,buysecuritiesfortheirownpreferenceoftheenterprise;Companies,inturn,frominvestorsgetthecorrespondingresourceallocation,inthisway,thefinancingcostsandriskoftheenterpriseandtheprospectofthebusinessperformance,toachievethepurposeofthesecuritiesmarketefficientallocationofresources.Andonthisbasis,theregulatoryagenciesandgovernmentstofindproblemsinatimelymanner,effectivelyprotecttherightsandinterestsofinvestors,andcanpreventmarketsystemrisks.Sothestockmarketis,infact,marketinformation,accountinginformationdisclosureistimely,accurate,comprehensivebuildpublicconfidenceinthesecuritiesmarket.

Ensurethesecuritiesmarketinformationdisclosuretimely,accurateandcomprehensiveisalong-termandcomplicatedsystemengineering,itisnotincludesonlythesecuritiesregulatorinformationdisclosureregulationsystemisperfect,moredependsonwhetherthecorporategovernancestructuretoimprovethestrengtheningthesupervisionofthestakeholders,accountantsandlawyersandotherintermediariescanremainneutralandintegritytoperformtheirduties,investmentbankorbrokerage,conscientious,andsecuritiesmarketregulationlegislationwhethercomplete,toensurefairandeffectiveexerciseofjudicialsupervision,mediaandsocialsupervisionbypublicopinioneffectivelyintime,thegovernmentandcorporaterelationsisanembarrassmentandaseriesofinstitutionalarrangements.

FamouseconomistprofessorSimon,Simonpointedoutinhistheoryof"boundedrationality"duetotheperson'scognitionisLimited,peoplegraspoftheinformationisincomplete,inadequateunderstandingandapplicationofinformationtothepeople,therefore,areBoundedRationality（BoundedRationality）.OnthebasisofboundedRationality,hemakeacleardistinctionbetweentherationalstandardofProceduralandRationalityofnewclassicaleconomicstoSubstantivestandards,distinguishtheProceduralRationality（ProceduralRationality）andtherational（Rationalityofoutcome/product）whichisalsocalledthesubstantialRationality（SubstantiveRationality）.Ifproceduralrationalityreferstothebehavioristheresultofthedueconsideration,thenthebehaviorisproceduralrationality.

Therefore,thebehavioroftheprogramdependsonitsrationalproductionprocess.Resultsrationalisreferstotheestablishedconditionsand,withintheprescribedscopeofwhenbehaviorissuitableforagiventargetitistheresultofrational.Thus,emphasizestheproceduralrationalityofrationalbehaviormechanism,itselfisnotabehaviorresults,becausetheresultisalwaystheresultofacertainbehaviorprogram,programsoifbehaviorisrational,isproperlyconsidered,theresultofthebehaviorisalsoacceptable;Thereason,ontheotherhand,payattentiontobehaviorresultshouldcomplywiththeestablishedgoals,donotpayattentiontoproducethisbehaviorresultsthebehavioroftheprocess.Classicaleconomicsreferstotherational,infact,akindofsubstantiverationality,isacompletelyrational,giventhebehaviorhypoth