POWER.docx
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POWER.docx
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POWER
POWER,TRUST,ANDFAIRNESS:
COMPARISONSOFNEGOTIATEDANDRECIPROCALEXCHANGE
TheAuthors
LindaDMolm,
Abstract
Whileclassicalexchangetheoristsexcludedbargainingfromthescopeoftheirtheories,mostcontemporarytheoristshavedonetheopposite,concentratingexclusivelyonnegotiatedexchangeswithbindingagreements(约束力协议).Thischapterdescribesthetheoreticallogicandempiricalresultsofanewprogramofresearchcomparingtheeffectsofreciprocalandnegotiatedformsofexchange.Astheworkshows,fundamentaldifferencesbetweenthetwoformsofexchangeaffectmanyoftheprocessesaddressedbycurrenttheories.Reciprocalexchangesproduceweakerpoweruse,greaterfeelingsoftrustandaffectivecommitment,andstrongerperceptionsofthepartner’sfairnessthanequivalentnegotiatedexchanges.Idiscusstheimplicationsofthisworkfortheoriesofexchangeandsocialinteraction,andoutlinefuturedirectionsforthenextphaseoftheresearchprogram.
PowerandStatus
INTRODUCTION
Forthepast25years,analysesofpowerhavedominatedresearchonsocialexchange(seeMolm,2000,forareview).Mostofthisworkhasconcentratedonaparticularformofexchangeinwhichactorsjointlynegotiatethetermsofstrictlybindingagreements.Classicaltheorists,incontrast,typicallyexcludedbargainingandnegotiationfromthescopeoftheirtheories.Homans(1974[1961])observedthatexplicitbargainingisrarelypartofenduringrelationships,whileBlau(1964)arguedthattheabsenceofnegotiationiswhatdistinguishessocialfromeconomicexchange.Onlyafewresearchershavestudiedthenon-negotiated,reciprocalexchangesofbenefitsthatwerethefocusoftheseearlyexchangetheorists(e.g.Burgess&Nielsen,1974;Michaels&Wiggins,1976;Molm,1990,1997).
Forthepastseveralyears,mycollaboratorsandIhaveconductedaseriesofexperimentscomparinghowreciprocalandnegotiatedformsofdirectexchangeaffectmajorexchangeoutcomes.Thisworkcomprisestheinitialphaseofalargerresearchprogram,thefirsttosystematicallycomparethesetwoformsofexchange.InthischapterIdescribetheconceptualframeworkfortheproject,thetheoreticalmechanismsproposedtounderlietheeffectsoftheformofexchangeonmajorexchangeoutcomes,andthefirstseriesofexperimentsthatwereconductedtotesttheinitialpredictions.
Theresultsofthisworkhaveimportantimplicationsfortheoriesofexchangeandforthewideuseofnegotiationininstitutionalsettings.Astheyshow,fundamentaldifferencesbetweenthetwoformsofexchangeaffectmanyoftheprocessesaddressedbycurrenttheories:
poweruseandinequality,thedevelopmentoftrustandcommitment,andperceptionsoffairexchange.Moreimportantly,theyinteractwiththestructuraleffectsthatmosttheorieshavefocusedon.Theyalsooffernewinsightsintothelogicalunderpinningsofsocialexchange,includingsuchfundamentalissuesashowriskaffectsactors’willingnesstoengageinexchangeandthestrategiestheyemploy;thetensionbetweencooperativeandcompetitiveincentivesinexchange,andtherelativeimportanceofreciprocity,value,rewardmaximization,andriskreductioninourassumptionsaboutactors’motives.
Empirically,theprevalenceofbothformsofexchangeinsocialliferequiresthatwestudyboth,inwaysthatallowsystematic,controlledcomparisonsoftheirsimilaritiesanddifferences.AlthoughBlauandHomanssuggested,correctly,thatnegotiationismoretypicalofexchangeinsomesettings(e.g.work)thaninothers(e.g.families),bothformsofexchangeareobservedinawiderangeofsocialcontexts.Evenininteractionsamongfamilyandfriends,someexchangesoffavors,householdwork,andchoicesofactivitiesarenegotiated.Similarly,eveninpolitics,business,andinternationalaffairs,unilateralinitiativesarecommonandtheexpectationoffuturereciprocityisoftenleftimplicit(Keohane,1986;Macaulay,1963).Thus,questionsaddressedbythisprojectarerelevantforprocessesinorganizationsandinstitutionsaswellasmicro-interactionalsettings.Manyeconomicexchangesareembeddedinongoingsocialrelationships,andtheformoftheserelationshipsaffectsthesocialbondsthatdevelopbetweenindividualsandthepolitical,economic,andsocialcommercethattheytransact(DiMaggio&Louch,1998;Granovetter,1985).
Ibeginthischapterbyreviewingthebasicconceptsandassumptionsofsocialexchangeandidentifyingthekeyfeaturesthatdistinguishnegotiatedandreciprocalformsofexchange.Ithendescribethreecausalmechanismsoriginallyproposedtoaccountfortheeffectsoftheformofexchangeonpowerandrelatedaffectiveoutcomes,theexperimentsthatwereconductedtotestthepredictions,andthefindingsandpuzzlesthatresulted.Iconcludebydiscussingtheimplicationsofthisworkfortheoriesofexchangeandinteractioninnaturalsettings,andoutlineseveralfuturedirectionsthatthenextphaseofthisresearchprogramwilltake.
THEORETICALBACKGROUND
ConceptsandAssumptionsofSocialExchange
Allformsofexchangeoccurwithinstructuresofmutualdependence,inwhichactorscontrolresourcesthatothersvalue.Followingthebasictenetsofpower-dependencetheory(Emerson,1972a,b),Iassumethatactorsaremotivatedtoobtainmoreoftheoutcomesthattheyvalueandotherscontrol,thatactorsprovideeachotherwiththesevaluedbenefitsthroughexchange,andthatactorsengageinrecurring,mutuallycontingentexchangeswiththesamepartnersovertime.
Themutualdependenceofactorsprovidesthestructuralbasisfortheirpowerovereachother.InanexchangerelationbetweenactorsAandB,B’sdependenceonAincreaseswiththevalueofbenefitsthatAcanprovideforBanddecreaseswithB’saccesstoalternativesourcesofthosebenefits(e.g.alternativedatingpartnersoralternativesourcesofexpertadvice).A’spoweroverBderivesfromB’sdependenceonA,andviceversa.Unequaldependenciesproduceanimbalancedrelationinwhichthelessdependentactorhasastructuralpoweradvantage.
Whenconnectedbyafocalactor,exchangerelationsformlargerexchangenetworksconsistingofthreeormoreactors(e.g.B1-A-B2).IfB1andB2arealternativepartnersforA,thentheB1-AandA-B2relationsarenegativelyconnected:
ThemorefrequentlyAexchangeswithB1,thelessfrequentlyAexchangeswithB2(Emerson,1972b).Innegativelyconnectednetworks,actorswhohavemoreorbetteralternativeshaveapoweradvantageovertheirpartnersthatproducesacorrespondinginequalityinexchangebenefitsintheirfavor.Thus,imbalancesinactors’relativedependenciesononeanothercreatedifferencesinstructuralpowerthat,inturn,affectbehavioralpoweruse.Idefinepoweruseastheinequalityinbenefitsobtainedbymoreandlesspowerfulactorsinanetwork.
Mostexchangetheoriesofnetworkstructureandpowersharepower-dependencetheory’semphasisonhowthestructureofalternativesinexchangenetworksaffectsactorsopportunitiestousepower(Bonacich&Friedkin,1998;Cooketal.,1983;Markovskyetal.,1988;Marsden,1982;Skvoretz&Willer,1993).Threedimensionsofalternativeshavebeenidentified:
number,value,andavailability.Emerson’s(1972a)originalstatementofpower-dependencetheoryproposedthatB’sdependenceonAvariesinverselywiththenumberanddegree(i.e.value)ofB’salternativestoexchangewithA.SinceCookandEmerson’s(1978)firstreportofanegotiatedexchangeexperiment,however,thecharacteristicofalternativepartnersthathasreceivedthemostattentionistheiravailability.Innegativelyconnectednetworks,thekeydeterminantof“availability”isthealternative’sownalternatives;thatis,alternativepartnerswhoseownalternativesarepoorornon-existentaremore“available”thanthosewhosealternativesaregoodorplentiful.Therelationbetweenthesedimensionsofalternativesandpoweruse,however,maydependontheformofexchange.
FormsofExchange
Whileallexchangesarecharacterizedbyreciprocaldependencebetweenthosewhogiveandthosewhoreceivebenefits,theformthatreciprocaldependencetakescanbeeitherdirect(AprovidesvaluetoBandBtoA)orindirect(therecipientdoesnotreturnbenefitdirectlytothegiver,buttoanotheractorinthesocialcircle).Thefirstphaseofthisprogramstudiedonlydirectformsofexchange;futureextensionswillexamineindirect,orgeneralizedexchange.
Indirectexchangerelations,theexchangeofbenefitscantakeoneoftwodistinctforms:
negotiatedorreciprocal(Blau,1964;Emerson,1981;Lévi-Strauss,1969).Innegotiatedexchange,actorsengageinajointdecisionprocess,suchasexplicitbargaining,inwhichtheyseekagreementonthetermsofexchange.Bothsidesoftheexchangeareagreeduponatthesametime,inadiscretetransactionthatgiveseachpartnerbenefitsofequalorunequalvalue.Mosteconomicexchangesotherthanfixed-pricetradesfitinthiscategory,aswellassomesocialexchanges(e.g.agreementsaboutthedivisionofhouseholdlabor).ResearchstudyingnegotiatedexchangeincludestheworkofCookandassociates(Cook&Emerson,1978;Cooketal.,1983),Friedkin(1993),Lawlerandassociates(Lawler,1992;Lawler&Yoon,1993,1996);andWiller,MarkovskyandSkvoretz(Markovskyetal.,1988;Skvoretz&Willer,1993).Inalloftheseprograms,agreementsarealsostrictlybinding;i.e.theyautomaticallyproducethebenefitsagreedupon.
Inreciprocalexchange,actors’contributionstotheexchangeareseparatelyperformedandnon-negotiated.Actorsinitiateexchangesindividually,byperformingabeneficialactforanother(suchasgivingassistanceoradvice),withoutknowingwhether,when,ortowhatextentthe
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