ECON5001MicroeconomicsSemester 1ECON 5001Final exam.docx
- 文档编号:8519426
- 上传时间:2023-01-31
- 格式:DOCX
- 页数:10
- 大小:159.16KB
ECON5001MicroeconomicsSemester 1ECON 5001Final exam.docx
《ECON5001MicroeconomicsSemester 1ECON 5001Final exam.docx》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《ECON5001MicroeconomicsSemester 1ECON 5001Final exam.docx(10页珍藏版)》请在冰豆网上搜索。
ECON5001MicroeconomicsSemester1ECON5001Finalexam
THEUNIVERSITYOFSYDNEY
FacultyofEconomicsandBusiness
ECON5001
Microeconomics
2ndSemester2005
FinalExamination
Friday2December2005
FamilyName:
GivenNames:
StudentID:
Seatnumber:
Instructions
1.Theexamlasts2½hours(plus10minutesreadingtime).Maximummarks=65.
2.PrintyourFamilyName,GivenNames,andStudentID,inthespaceprovidedaboveANDonthemultiplechoiceAnswerSheetANDontheexambooklet(s).
3.Thetestconsistsoftwoparts.YoumustanswerALLquestionsinbothparts.
(i).PartAMultipleChoice:
25questions(1markeach).
UsetheAnswerSheetprovided.
(ii).PartBShortAnswer:
4questions(10markseach).
Usethebooklet(s)provided.
4.Thisisaclosedbookexam:
nonotesareallowed.Non-programmablecalculatorsarepermitted.
5.AttheendoftheTesthandinthisQuestionSheet,themultiplechoiceAnswerSheet,andyouranswersintheexambooklet(s).
PartA:
MultipleChoice(25markstotal)
1.Whichofthefollowingmarketmodelsresultsinthehighestpriceassumingafixednumberoffirmswithidenticalcostsandagivendemandcurve?
a.Cournot
b.monopoly
c.Stackelberg
d.priceisthesameinallthreemodels
2.Assumingahomogeneousproduct,theBertrandequilibriumpriceis
a.independentofthenumberoffirms.
b.equaltothemonopolyprice.
c.independentofthefirm'smarginalcosts.
d.equaltotheCournotequilibriumprice.
3.Thefigurebelowshowsthebestresponse(reaction)functionsfortwopizzashopsinasmallisolatedtown.TheCournotequilibriumisatpoint
a.a
b.b
c.c
d.d
4.Acartelisagroupoffirmsthatattemptsto
a.increaseconsumersurplus.
b.maximizejointrevenue.
c.behaveindependently.
d.maximizejointprofit.
5.TheoptimalbiddingstrategyinaprivatevaluesDutchauction:
a.isadominantstrategy.
b.istowithdrawfromtheauctionbeforethebidder’svaluationisreached.
c.isthesameasunderafirst-pricesealedbidauction.
d.isthesameasunderasecond-pricesealedbidauction.
6.Aneffectivepricefloorcausesalossof
a.producersurplusforcertainandpossiblyconsumersurplusaswell.
b.consumersurplusonly.
c.producersurplusonly.
d.consumersurplusforcertainandpossiblyproducersurplusaswell.
e.neitherproducernorconsumersurplus.
7.Youareasellerinanindependentprivatevaluesauctionwherebiddersarerisk-averse.Whichtypeofauctionwillyieldthegreatestexpectedrevenue?
a.English.
b.Firstpricesealedbid.
c.Secondpricesealedbid.
d.Alloftheabovearerevenueequivalent.
8.Inanon-cooperative,simultaneous-choice,one-periodgame,aNashequilibrium
a.willneverexist
b.willalwaysincludedominantstrategies
c.willalwaysresultinbothplayerstakingthesameaction
d.maynotmaximizethesumoftheplayers'profits
9.IfaCournotduopolistannouncedthatitwilldoubleitsequilibriumoutput
a.theotherfirmdoesnotviewtheannouncementascredible.
b.itbecomestheleader.
c.theotherfirmwilldoubleoutputalso.
d.theotherfirmwillshutdown.
10.Atsomepublicgolfcourses,localresidentspayalowerfeetoplaythanothergolfersdo.Onenecessaryconditionforthegolfcoursetobeabletosuccessfullypricediscriminateaccordingtoresidencyisthat
a.theycanchecktheidentificationcardsofgolfers
b.localresidentgolfersandothergolfershavethesamepriceelasticityofdemandtoplayatthemunicipalcourse
c.therearemanygolfcoursesnearbyfromwhichgolferscanchoose
d.theyrequireallgolferstorentacart
11.ThefigurebelowshowsBob'sutilityfunction.Hecurrentlyhas$100ofwealth,butthereisa50%chancethatitcouldallbestolen.LivingwiththisriskgivesBobthesameexpectedutilityasiftherewasnochanceoftheftandhiswealthwas
a.30.
b.20.
c.50.
d.0.
12.Ifrecklessdriversaremorelikelytobuyautomobileinsurancethansafedriversare,
a.amoralhazardhasoccurred
b.adverseselectionhasoccurred
c.themarketforinsuranceisefficient
d.thenautomobileinsurancewillbefairlypriced
Questions13and14refertothefollowinginformation:
HeidiandLoisaretheonlysellersofusedcarsinasmalltown.Heidisellshighqualitycars,whichcost$10,000eachtosupply.Loissellslowqualitycars,whichcost$6,000tosupply.Ifbuyersknewthequalityofthecarstheywerebuying,theywouldbewillingtopay$15,000forahighqualitycar,or$9,000foralowqualitycar.Heidicanofferawarrantyonhercarsatacostof$1,000Y,whereYisthelengthofthewarrantyinyears.ThecosttoLoistoofferthesamewarrantyis$2,000Y.
13.Supposeneitherselleroffersawarranty.Ifbuyersareriskneutral,donotknowthequalityofeachseller’scars,butfiguretheyhavea50-50chanceofgettingacarofeithertype,then:
a.allofthecarscanbesold.
b.onlythelowqualitycarscanbesold.
c.onlythehighqualitycarscanbesold.
d.noneofthecarscanbesold.
14.IfHeidioffersawarrantyofY=2years,then:
a.thiswouldresultinHeidiincurringaloss.
b.thisislessprofitabletoHeidithannotofferinganywarranty.
c.thiswarrantygeneratesacrediblesignalofquality.
d.Loiswouldfinditprofitabletomatchthiswarranty.
15.Inaprincipal-agentrelationship,efficiencyinriskbearing:
a.requiresthattheprincipalbearsalloftherisk.
b.requiresthattheagentbearsalloftherisk.
c.requiresthattheriskbesplitequallybetweentheparties.
d.cannotbedeterminedwithoutknowingtheirattitudestowardrisk.
16.Thetablebelowshowsapayoffmatrixfortwofirms,AandB,thatmustchoosebetweensellingbasiccomputersoradvancedcomputers.WhichofthefollowingisaNashequilibrium?
a.bothfirmsmakebasiccomputers.
b.therearenoNashequilibria.
c.FirmAmakesbasiccomputersandfirmBmakesadvancedcomputers.
d.bothfirmsmakeadvancedcomputers.
17.Thetableshowsthepayofftotwoairlines,AandB,ofservingaparticularroute.Ifthetwoairlinesmustdecidesimultaneously,whichoneofthefollowingstatementsistrue?
a.SincefirmB'sdecisionisunpredictable,firmA'sdecisionisunpredictable.
b.FirmBwillnotenterbecauseitknowsfirmAwill.
c.SincefirmBhasnodominantstrategy,itsdecisionisunpredictable.
d.NeitherfirmenteringisaNashequilibrium.
18.IfanindividualmakesherinvestmentdecisionsbasedsolelyontheNetPresentValuecriterion,onecanconcludethatsheis,
a.riskaverse.
b.extremelywealthy.
c.riskloving.
d.riskneutral.
19.SupposetwoCournotduopolistfirmsoperateatzeromarginalcost.Themarketdemandisp=a−bQ.Firm1'sbest-responsefunctionis,
a.q1=a/b.
b.q1=(a−2bq2)/2b.
c.q1=a/2b.
d.q1=(a−bq2)/2b.
20.Whensellershavemoreinformationabouttheirproductsthanbuyers,wewouldexpect:
a.Sellersoflowqualitygoodstogetlowerpricesthantheycouldotherwise.
b.Sellersoflowqualitygoodstogethigherpricesthantheycouldotherwise.
c.Allsellerstogetlowerpricesfortheirgoodsthantheycouldotherwise.
d.Allsellerstogethigherpricesfortheirgoodsthantheycouldotherwise.
21.Supposeallindividualsareidentical,andtheirmonthlydemandforInternetaccessfromacertainleadingprovidercanberepresentedasP=5−QwherePispriceindollarsperhourandQishourspermonth.Thefirmfacesaconstantmarginalcostof$1.Theprofitmaximizingtwo-parttariffresultsinthefirmselling
a.4hours
b.10hours
c.5hours
d.8hours
22.Assumethatsteakandpotatoesarecomplements.Whenthepriceofsteakgoesup,thedemandcurveforpotatoes
a.shiftstotheleft.
b.shiftstotheright.
c.remainsconstant.
d.shiftstotherightinitiallyandthenreturnstoitsoriginalposition.
23.Whichofthefollowingstrategiesareusedbybusinessfirmstocaptureconsumersurplus?
a.pricediscrimination.
b.bundling.
c.two-parttariffs.
d.alloftheabove.
Thenext2questionsrefertothefollowingtwoequations:
Thedemandforbooksis:
QD=120−4P
Thesupplyofbooksis:
QS=2P
24.Whatistheequilibriumpriceofbooks?
a.5.
b.10.
c.15.
d.20.
25.Whatistheequilibriumquantityofbookssold?
a.45.
b.40.
c.65.
d.400.
PartB:
ShortAnswer(40markstotal)
1.(10marks)Supposethatamonopolist'smarketdemandisgivenby:
P=180−2Q,
andthatmarginalcostisgivenby:
MC=0.5Q,
wherePisthepriceandQisquantity.
(a)Calculatetheprofitmaximizingmonopolypriceandquantity.Computetheconsumerandproducersurplusatthemonopolypriceandquantity.(4marks)
(b)CalculatethepriceandquantitythatariseunderperfectcompetitionwithasupplycurveP=0.5Q.Computetheconsumerandproducersurplusatthecompetitivepriceandquantity.(4marks)
(c)Compareconsumerandproducersurplusin(a)and(b)aboveandhencedeterminethedeadweightlossduetomonopoly.(2marks)
2.(10marks)UnitedAirlinesandAmericanAirlinesbothflybetweenChicagoandSanFrancisco.Theirdemandcurvesaregivenby:
:
QU=1,000−2PU+PA
QA=1,000+PU−2PA
whereQUandQAstandforthenumberofpassengersperdayforUnitedandAmerican,respectively.Themarginalcostofeachcarrieris$10perpassenger.
(a)WhatisUnited'sprofit-maximizingpricewhenAmerican'spriceis$200?
(3marks)
(b)WhatistheequationofUnited'sbestresponsefunctionforitsprice?
[Hint:
FindUnited'sprofit-maximizingpricewhenAmericansetsanarbitrarypriceofPA.](3marks)
(c)WhatistheequationofAmerican'sbestresponsefunctionforitsprice?
Usethebestresponsefunctionsforthetw
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- ECON5001MicroeconomicsSemester 1ECON 5001Final exam ECON 5001 Final
![提示](https://static.bdocx.com/images/bang_tan.gif)
链接地址:https://www.bdocx.com/doc/8519426.html