科学技术和创新的政策外文翻译.docx

科学技术和创新的政策外文翻译.docx

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科学技术和创新的政策外文翻译

外文翻译

原文

Science,TechnologyandInnovationPolicy

MaterialSource：

InnovationHandbook.（Oxford:

OxfordUniversityPress）.

Pages599-631

Author：

Jan,Mowery,DavidC.andNelson,RichardR

….totechnologypolicy

Technologypolicyreferstopoliciesthatfocusontechnologiesandsectors.Theeraoftechnologypolicyisonewhereespeciallyscience-basedtechnologiessuchasnuclearpower,spacetechnology,computers,drugsandgeneticengineeringareseenasbeingattheverycoreofeconomicgrowth.Thesetechnologiesgetintofocusforseveralreasons.Ontheonehandtheystimulateimaginationbecausetheymakeitpossibletodosurprisingthings-theycombinesciencewithfiction.Ontheotherhandtheyopenupnewcommercialopportunities.Theyarecharacterizedbyahighrateofinnovationandtheyaddressrapidlygrowingmarkets.

Technologypolicymeansdifferentthingsforcatchingupcountriesthanitdoesforhigh-incomecountriesanditmightalsomeandifferentthingsforsmallandbigcountries.Inbighigh-incomecountriesthefocuswillbeonestablishingacapacityinproducingthemostrecentscience-basedtechnologies,aswellasapplyingtheseinnovations.Insmallercountriesitmightbeaquestionaboutbeingabletoabsorbandusethesetechnologiesastheycomeonthemarket.Catching-upcountriesmaymakeeffortstoenterintospecificpromisingestablishedindustriesusingnewtechnologiesintheprocessofdoingso.

Commonforthesestrategiesisthattheytendtodefine‘strategictechnologies’andsometimesthesectorsproducingthemarealsodefinedasstrategicsectors.TheideaofstrategicsectorsmayberelatedtoPerrouxandtoHirschman,bothstudentsofSchumpeter.Perrouxusedconceptssuchas‘industrializingindustries’andgrowthpoleswhileHirschmanintroducedunbalancedgrowthasapossiblestrategyforlessdevelopedcountries（Perroux,1969;Hirschman,1969）.

Intheleadcountries,governmentinitiativesofthetechnologypolicykindweretriggeredwhennationalpoliticaloreconomicinterestswerethreatenedandthethreatscouldbelinkedtothecommandofspecifictechnologies.SputnikgaveextraimpetustoafocusonspacetechnologyandthecoldwarmotivatedthemostambitioustechnologypolicyefforteverintheUS.InEurope,ServanSchreiber’sbook‘LeDefiAmericain’（ServanSchreiber1967）gaveapictureofagrowingdominanceoftheUSmulti-nationalfirmsespeciallyinhightechnologysectors.ItgavethebigEuropeancountriessuchasFrance,theUKandGermanyincentivestodevelopapolicyofpromotingnationalchampionsinspecificsectors.AspecificimportanteventtriggeringFrenchandlateronEuropeaneffortswastheexportembargoofcomputertechnologythatwasseeninFranceasblockingitsprogressinthedevelopmentofnucleartechnology.

ThemotivationbehindthetechnologypolicyinJapan–andlateronincountriessuchasTaiwanandKorea-isdifferent.ItisdrivenbyanationalstrategyaimingatcatchingupandintheJapanesecaseithasrootsbacktotheMeijirevolutionwhenthefirstideasofmodernizationbasedonimitatingthetechnologyoftheWestwereformed.

Onefundamentalquestionintechnologypolicyisifitisatalllegitimateandeffectiveforthestatetointerveneforcommercialreasonspromotingspecificsectorsortechnologies.Oristheonlylegitimatetechnologypolicyonewherenationalsocietalissuesareatstake,includingestablishingnationalmilitarypower?

Itisaparadoxthatinthecountryhavingthemostmassivepublicinterventionintermsoftechnologypolicy,theUS,mostofthepolicyhasbeenmotivatedbynon-commercialargumentsandthediscoursehasbeenanti-state.Japanisthecountrywiththemostexplicitlycommerciallydriventechnologypolicywitharecognitionofaroleforthestateandheretheinterventionhasbeenmuchmoremodest,atleastintermsoftheamountofpublicmoneyinvolved.

Asecondissueconcernswhattechnologiesshouldbesupported.Isitalwaysthecasethathightech-andscience-basedsectorsshouldbegivenfirstpriority?

AgaintheJapanesegovernmentaswellasgovernmentsinsmallercountrieshasbeenmoreapttothinkaboutthemodernizationofoldindustriesthantheUSandthebigEuropeancountries.

Athirdissueisatwhatstagethesupportshouldbegiven.Shoulditbegivenonlyto‘pre-competitive’stagesorshoulditalsobehelpfulinbringingthenewproductstothemarket?

Inthesecondcasetheremightbeacombinationofgovernmentsupportofnewtechnologyandmoreorlessopenprotectionism.

Afourthissueisaboutthelimitsforpublicsectorcompetence.Technologypolicymaybepursuedwithcompetencewheregovernmentoperatesasamajoruserbutwhenitcomestodevelopingnewtechnologiesforthemarket,theroleofgovernmentsmustbemoremodest.Tobemorespecific,thereareseveralhistoricalexamplesofhowgovernmentambitionstomaketechnologicalchoicesthatreducediversityhaveendedinfailure,forexample,the‘minitel’experienceinFrance,andtheHighDefinitionTVpolicyintheEU,bothintheearly1990s.

Afifthissueconcernshowpromotingatechnologyorasectorcanbestbecombinedwithcompetition.TheperiodintheeightiesofpromotingsinglefirmsasnationalchampionsinthebiggerEuropeancountrieswasnotagreatsuccesswhiletheJapanesepublicstrategytopromote‘controlledcompetition’amongahandfuloffirmswasmoresuccessful

Theobjectivesoftechnologypolicyarenotverydifferentfromthoseofsciencepolicybut–atleasttobeginwith–itrepresentedashiftfrombroaderphilosophicalconsiderationstoamoreinstrumentalfocusonnationalprestigeandeconomicobjectives.Technologypoliciesweredevelopedinaneraoftechnologyoptimism.Butlateron–inthewakeofthe1968studentrevolt–morecriticalandbroaderconcernsrelatingtotechnologyassessmentandcitizenparticipationcameontotheagenda（OECD1970）.

Theelementsoftheinnovationsysteminfocusremainuniversities,researchinstitutions,technologicalinstitutesandR&Dlaboratories.Buttheattentionmovesfromuniversitiestowardengineeringandfromtheinternalorganizationofuniversitiestowardhowtheylinktoindustry.Technologypolicymaygoevenfurtherandincludethecommercializationoftechnologies,butthenweapproachwhatwewillcallinnovationpolicy.

InsomecountriessuchastheUS,themaintechnologypolicyactorsinthepublicsectoraresectorministriespromotingandsometimesprocuringtechnologyforpurposesoftelecommunications,defense,health,transport,energyetc.whileinothers,suchasJapan,theyareministriesinchargeofindustryandtrade.Ministriesofeducationandresearchareimportantsincetheyorganizetheeducationandtrainingofscientistsandengineers.Authoritiesinchargeofregulatingcompetitionaswellasotherregulatingauthoritiesmayhaveamajorimpactontechnologypolicyandontechnologicaldevelopment.Publicauthoritiesmay,aselementsoftechnologypolicy,organizetechnologyassessmentandotherwaysofinvolvingcitizens.

Therearemanypossibleinstrumentstobeusedinpromotingspecifictechnologiesandsectors.Mostefficientmaybecombinationsofinstrumentsinfieldswherepublicprocurementisinvolved.Whenthegovernmenthastheleadingusercompetence,itisinabetterpositiontojudgewhatkindofinstrumentswillwork（Edquistetal.2000）.Besidespublicprocurementdirecteconomicincentivesintermsofsubsidiesandtaxreductionsmaybeofferedtofirms.Supportingresearchatuniversitiesinthesciencefieldsinwhichthenewtechnologiesarerootedmaybeanimportantpartofapublicmissionpolicy.Thedangerofthesekindsofpoliciesisthat‘industrialcomplexes’combiningthevestedinterestsofasegmentofpublicuserswiththoseofasegmentofindustryemergeandthatalackoftransparencyisexploitedbyvestedinterests.Amoresubtleproblemisthekindofconvergenceandagreementonthedirectionoftechnologicaltrajectoriesthatmightdevelopinsuchcomplexes,excludingnewandmorepromisingvenues（Lundvall,1985）.

Inareaswherethemainapplicationofthenewtechnologiesiscommercial,thesetofinstrumentsusedmaybeacombinationofsectorortechnologyspecificeconomicincentiveswithmoreorlessprotectionisttradepolicy.AnexamplemightbethehighdefinitionTVpolicyoftheEUintheearly1990s,wheretheattempttodefineacompulsoryanalogicalstandardwouldhavebeenatechnicaltradebarriertoemergingdigitalstandards,combinedwithspecificeconomicincentivesforEuropeanproducers.Suchpackagesmaycreateashelteredatmosphereforthefirmsinvolved.Morepromisingmaybeprojectorganizedsupportbringingdifferentfirmsandknowledgeinstitutionstogetherinordertofocusongenericandcommonandnewtechnologicalproblemswhilemakingsurethattheuseofthenewknowledgetakesplaceinaglobalcompetitiveclimate.Experiencealsoshowsthatmakingtheprojectswelldefinedbothintermsofcontentandtimebutopenintermsofwhatspecifictypeoftechnicalsolutionsshouldbeaimedat,limitsthenegativeimpactoncompetition.

Whiletheevaluationofresearchisimportantinsciencepolicytherearesimilargeneralpolicytoolsthatareusefulwhendesigningandredesigningtechnologypolicy.Technologyforecastingisawayofcapturingnewtechnologicaltrends.Askingleadingexpertiseamongscientistsandamongthemostadvancedproducersandusersaboutwhattechnologiesarerisingonthehorizonhelpstoscoutthenextgenerationof‘strategictechnologies’.Inordertolimitthecapturingofpublicinterestbyprivatefirmsindependentpolicyevaluationofspecificinitiativesmaybeuseful.Manyevaluationsendu