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tavares6
LegalandEconomicInterfacesBetweenAntidumpingandCompetitionPolicy
JoséTavaresdeAraujoJr.
December2001
1.Introduction1
Theinteractionbetweenantidumpingandantitrustisapolemicissueineveryintegrationprocessforbothlegalandeconomicreasons.Fromalegalperspective,antidumpingrulesallowpracticessuchaspriceundertakingsandquantitativetraderestrictionsthatmaybeforbiddenbycompetitionlaw,andpunishcertaintypesofpricedifferentiationthatarejustifiableundertheantitrustrules.Fromaneconomicviewpoint,thetwopoliciespursuedifferentobjectivesthateventuallymayleadtoconflictingsituations.Antidumpingisatraderemedyforindustriesinjuredbyimportcompetition.Thefinalgoalofantitrustistopromoteconsumerwelfareandproductiveefficiency,whichinpartdependuponmarketcontestability,whereinimportcompetitionoftenplaysakeyrole.
Theenforcementproceduresofthesepoliciesalsodiffersignificantly.Antidumpingproceduresaredefinedundertheassumptionthatadomesticcompetitiveindustryisfacingaforeignmonopolistoraninternationalcartel,butthisassumptionisnotsupposedtobetestedduringtheinvestigation.Thus,ineachcase,thedatatobecollectedarelimitedtoimportfigures,pricecomparisonsandperformanceindicatorsofthedomesticindustry.Thereisnoroomforanyqueryaboutindustryconfigurations,entrybarriers,marketpowerandotherconditionsofcompetitionathomeorabroad.Incontrast,thestartingpointofeveryantitrustinquiryistheidentificationoftherelevantmarketanditsconditionsofcompetition.
Anotherpeculiarityoftheinterplaybetweenantidumpingandantitrustisthatmanyindustrializedeconomiesareleadingusersofbothpolicies.Thisimpliesaseriesofcompromisingsolutionswithdifferentdegreesofcoherenceandtransparencyforreconcilingthelegalandeconomicinterfacesbetweenthetwopolicies.SomeofthesesolutionsmayprovideusefulguidelinesforthecurrentnegotiationsonthecreationofaFreeTradeAreaoftheAmericas(FTAA),wheretheattainmentofacompromisingsolutionwillrequireanintricateexerciseofeconomicdiplomacy.Besidesthedisparitiesintermsofsizeandlevelofeconomicdevelopmentofthemembercountries,oneadditionalchallengetobefacedbytheFTAAinitiativeresultsfromtheunevendegreeoflawenforcementintheregion.InmostLatinAmericanandCaribbeancountries,antitrustinstitutionsarestillataninfantstageorsimplydonotexist.Ontheotherhand,themainusersofantidumpinginthehemispherearetheUnitedStates,Canada,Mexico,ArgentinaandBrazil.Thesmallereconomiesseldomapplythispolicy(seeTavares,MacarioandSteinfatt,2001).
Thispaperaddressestheaboveissuesfromthreecomplementaryperspectives.Section2summarizesthecurrentdebateaboutantidumpingrulesintheUnitedStates.ThisdebateincludesalargeandgrowingacademicliteraturethathasbeensurveyedrecentlybyBlonigenandPrusa(2001),papersandspeechesbyinfluentialpersonalitiessuchasKennethDam,AlanGreenspanandJosephStiglitz,andtheactiveparticipationofbusinessassociations,lawyers,lobbyistsandpoliticians.Thisdiversecollectionofpolicysuggestionsprovidesanormativebackgroundforthediscussionintherestofthepaper.Section3reviewstheinstrumentsusedbytheEuropeanUnionandtheU.S.governmentforreconcilingastrongenforcementofcompetitionlawswithanintenseuseofantidumpingmeasures.Section4highlightssomepeculiaritiesoftheFTAAprocess.Section5presentsthemainconclusions.
2.TheControversyonAntidumping
Thousandsofpageshavebeenwrittenaboutantidumpingoverthelast25years.Oneremarkablefeatureofthisvastliteratureisthat–atleastwithintheacademiccommunity–mostauthorswouldshareMichaelFinger’sviewthat“antidumpingisatrouble-makingdiplomacy,stupideconomicsandunprincipledlaw”(1993,p.56).Accordingtheexistingmultilateralrules,antidumpingactionsareappliedonadiscriminatorybasisandrequirenoformalcompensationtotheaffectedparties,astheyareundertheblameofunfairbehavior.Yet,inmanycasesthetargetedexportingindustriesarewellrewarded,bysharingtheprotectionrentswiththeircompetitorsfromtheimportingcountry,butthiscompensationisneveracknowledgedbyeitherparty.Thus,antidumpingrulesgenerateunnecessarytensionsamongtradingpartners,becausethereisnoclearrecordofthecostsandbenefitsinvolvedineachcase,noranytransparentrecognitionofwinnersandlosers.Moreover,theempiricalliteraturehasdemonstratedthattheaggregatewelfareresultsofantidumpingmeasuresaresystematicallynegativefortheimportingcountry.Finally,antidumpingruleshaveanotherdiscriminatorycomponent,astheyimposerequirementstoforeignproducersthatarenotapplicabletodomesticfirms.
Inasimilarvein,KennethDam,deputyTreasurysecretaryofthepresentBushAdministration,noted:
“ThefocusofprotectionistargumentsintheUnitedStateshasturnedawayfromdirectcallsforprotectiontoanemphasison‘fairness’.[…]Despitethissmilingfairtradeface,theantidumpingproceedingalwayshasbeenandisincreasinglyaprotectionistdevice,asvariousCongresseshaveamendedtheunderlyingstatutetomaketheproceedingandremedymoreeffective.ThisdarkerfaceofantidumpingproceedingissowellknowninsidetheWashingtonBeltwaythatithasbecomeatritejokeamongtradelawyersthatantidumpingistheprotectionist’sweaponofchoice”2(2001,p.148).
AlanGreenspan,chairmanoftheFederalReserveBoard,pointedoutthehistoricalrootsofthisjoke:
“Generationaftergenerationhasexperiencedepisodesinwhichthetechnologicallyobsolescentendeavoredtoundermineprogress,oftenappealingtotheveryrealshort-termcostsofadjustingtoachangingeconomicenvironment.FromtheLudditestotheSmootsandtheHawleys,competitiveforceswereunderattack.[…]Administrativeprotectionintheformofantidumpingsuitsandcountervailingdutiesisacaseinpoint.Whiletheseformsofprotectionhaveoftenbeenimposedunderthelabelofpromoting‘fairtrade’,oftentimestheyarejustsimpleguisesforinhibitingcompetition”(1999,p.3).”
JosephStiglitz,aNobelPrizewinnerandformerchiefeconomistattheWorldBank,highlightedtheanti-competitiveeffectsoftheselaws:
“Perpetuatingunfairtradelawsthatarethemselvesunfairthusimposessubstantialburdensonourconsumersandonourmostefficientexporterswhileprotectingourleastefficientimport-competingfirms”(1997,p.418).
GreatpartoftheacademicresearchonantidumpinghasbeenfocusedontheAmericaneconomy.OnereasonforthisisthattheU.S.hasmaintainedaleadinginternationalperformanceinregardtothisinstrument,astheprincipaluserandthesecondworldwidetargetofantidumpinginvestigationsduringthelastdecade(seeMiranda,TorresandRuiz,1998).Anotherpossibleexplanationstemsfromthecontrastbetweenthescholars’denigrationofantidumpingandthelongstandingcommitmenttothistraderemedybytheU.S.government.Besides,asBlonigenandPrusa(2001)havereminded,antidumpingcanprovidestimulatingillustrationsforanendlesslistofeconomicconcepts,suchascapture,rent-seeking,moralhazard,adverseselection,contingentprotection,imperfectcompetition,cartelbehavior,transactioncosts,optimaltariffs,comparativeadvantage,regionalintegration,andsoon.
AnotherinterestingaspectofthiscontroversyisthatthemostcompletestudysofaronthewelfareimpactofantidumpingontheU.S.economywasmadein1995bythestaffoftheInternationalTradeCommission(ITC),theinstitutionresponsibleforthistraderemedyinthecountry.Thestudyshowedthatremovingtheantidumpingandcountervailingdutiesthatwereactivein1991wouldhaveallowedawelfaregainofUS$l.6billion,i.e.,about0.03percentofU.S.GDPinthatyear.ThisfindinghadnoeffectontheITCconductinsubsequentyears,forthereasonsbluntlyexplainedbyCommissionersJanetNuzumandDavidRohrintheircommentsonthestudy:
“…whenviewingtheconclusionsofthisreport,itmustberememberedthatthepurposeoftheantidumpingandcountervailingdutylawsisnottoprotectconsumers,butrathertoprotectproducers.Inevitably,somecostisassociatedwiththispurpose.However,unliketheantitrustlaws,whicharedesignedtoprotectconsumerinterests,thefunctionoftheAD/CVDlawsis,indeed,toprotectfirmsandworkersengagedinproductionactivitiesintheUnitedStates.Soitshouldnotcomeasasurprisethattheeconomicbenefitsoftheremediesaccruetoproducers,andtheeconomiccostsaccruetoconsumers.TheUnitedStatesGovernment,throughlegislation,hasmadeaconsciouspolicychoicetoprovidethesetraderemediesinrecognitionoftherealitythatfreeandopentradedoesnotyetexistworldwide.[…]Thealternativetothesetraderemediesismostlikelytobepolitically-drivendecisions,whichmayhaveevenmoreprofoundcoststooureconomicinterests”(ITC,1995,pp.VIII-IX)
InacommunicationtotheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO),theU.S.Governmentpresentedthesameargumentunderamoresophisticatedformat:
"Contrarytotheassumptionsofsomeeconomists,theantidumpingrulesarenotintendedasaremedyforthepredatorypricingpracticesoffirmsorasaremedyforanyotherprivateanti-competitivepracticestypicallycondemnedbycompetitionlaws.Rather,theantidumpingrulesareatraderemedywhichWTOMembershaveagreedisnecessarytothemaintenanceofthemultilateraltradingsystem.Withoutthisandothertraderemedies,therecouldhavebeennoagreementon
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