venture capital backed growth.docx
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venture capital backed growth.docx
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venturecapitalbackedgrowth
Abstract(DocumentSummary)
Thepaperproposesasimpleequilibriummodelofventurecapital,start-upentrepreneurshipandinnovation.Venturecapitalistsnotonlyfinancebutalsoadvisestart-upentrepreneursandtherebyaddvaluetonewfirms.Thepapershowshowaproductiveandactiveventurecapitalindustryboostsinnovationbasedgrowth.Italsodemonstratesthepotentialoftaxpolicytopromoteinnovationandgrowthbystrengtheningincentivesformoreintensiveventurecapitalsupport.[PUBLICATIONABSTRACT]
FullText (11039 words)
CopyrightKluwerAcademicPublishersJun2004
[Headnote]
Thepaperproposesasimpleequilibriummodelofventurecapital,start-upentrepreneurshipandinnovation.Venturecapitalistsnotonlyfinancebutalsoadvisestart-upentrepreneursandtherebyaddvaluetonewfirms.Thepapershowshowaproductiveandactiveventurecapitalindustryboostsinnovationbasedgrowth.Italsodemonstratesthepotentialoftaxpolicytopromoteinnovationandgrowthbystrengtheningincentivesformoreintensiveventurecapitalsupport.
Keywords:
Venturecapital,doublemoralhazard,innovation,growth
JELclassification:
D82,G32,016,O40
(ProQuestInformationandLearning:
...denotesformulaeomitted.)
1.Introduction
Creationofinnovativeyoungfirmsisanimportantsourceofinnovationandgrowth.ItiswidelyclaimedamongeconomiststhattheexistenceofasophisticatedventurecapitalindustryisamajorfactorbehindAmerica'sabilitytoencourageandsustaintechnologicalinnovationandgrowth.Theargumentisthatventurecapital(VC)makesyoungfirmsgrowfaster,createmorevalueandgeneratemoreemploymentthanotherstart-ups.EmpiricalresearchintheUnitedStateshasshownindeedthatVCcanimportantlyenhancetheabilityofnewfirmstocreatewealthandjobs.1AccordingtoKortumandLerner(2000),VCbackedfirmsaremoreinnovativeandproducemoreandmorevaluablepatents.HellmannandPuri(2000,2002)showthattheyaimatmoreradicalinnovations,aresignificantlyfasterinintroducingtheirproductstothemarketandpursuemoreaggressivemarketstrategiesthanotherstart-upfirms.Theyarefoundtohaveahigherrateofexecutiveturnoverandtobefasterinhiringaspecializedmarketingdirector.ItseemsthattheexistenceofanactiveVCsectorcanshowupinsuperiormacroeconomicperformance.Recently,WasmerandWeil(2000)econometricallyinvestigatedpaneldataof20OECDcountriesovertheyears1986-1995.TheyfoundthatanincreaseintheGNPshareofVCby0.075wouldreducetheshort-rununemploymentrateby0.25percentagepointswhilethelong-runeffectwouldamounttoareductionof0.9to2.5percentagepoints.2
TheempiricalstudybyBottazziandDaRin(2002)suggeststhatEuropeanVChasgrownvigorouslyintermsofvolumeinvestedbut,incontrasttotheUSevidence,apparentlyhadnotmuchinfluenceongrowthandemploymentofportfoliofirms.ThisraisesthequestionwhattherealcontributionofVCexactlyisandhowincentivesinVCinvestingaredetermined.VentureCapitalists(VCs)carefullyscreenfirms,structurecontractstostrengthenincentives,andmonitorfirms(KaplanandStromberg2001).Theyaddvaluetonewfirms,promotetheirprofessionalization,andinducethemtobehavemoreaggressively.ItisoftenstatedthattheUnitedStateswithanactiveVCsectorisfasterinadoptingnewtechnologies.KortumandLerner(2000)estimateindeedthatadollarofVCseemsaboutthreetimesmorepotentinstimulatingpatentingthanadollaroftraditionalcorporateR&D.Theyalsoconcludedthatby1998,venturefundingaccountedforabout14percentofUSinnovativeactivity.Yet,thisliteraturehasleftunspecifiedtheprecisetransmissionchannelsthroughwhichVCinvestingaffectstheeconomy'sequilibriumrateofinnovation.
ThemaincontributionofthispaperistomodeltherealeffectsofVCasadeterminantofinnovationdrivengrowth.WeshowhowanactiveVCsectorwithexperiencedandsophisticatedinvestorscanenhancethesuccessofstart-upentrepreneursandcantherebyraisetheequilibriumrateofinnovation.ThemodelexploreshowthejointinputsofbothentrepreneursandVCsinteracttodeterminetheprospectsofstart-upfirms.Whileentrepreneurscontributethekeytechnologicalidea,theytendtobecommerciallyinexperienced.VCssupportthefirmwithmanagerialadvicethatdrawsontheirindustryknowledgeandcommercialexpertise.WestudyanalyticallyhowcertainstructuralparametersdeterminethequalityofVCfinanceandhowthisaffectsentrepreneurshipandinnovationingeneralequilibrium.Forexample,GompersandLerner(1999,p.4)pointedtothefactthattheskillsneededforsuccessfulVCinvestingaredifficultandtimeconsumingtoacquireandarelikelytobeanimportantconstraintinthedevelopmentofanactiveVCindustry.WethusstudyhowanincreaseininvestorsophisticationraisesthequalityofVCfinancingandhowthistranslatesintoahigherrateofinnovationingeneralequilibrium.WealsoexploretheconsequencesofotherstructuralparametersandofpolicyinitiativesaimingatVCbackedgrowth.
IndevelopingamodelofVCwithdoublemoralhazard,weexplainnotonlytheincentivesofentrepreneursbutalsothoseofVCstoaddvalue.TheanalysisimportantlydrawsonHolmstrom(1982),AghionandTirole(1994),RepulloandSuarez(1999),Casamatta(2002),InderstandMueller(2002)andSchmidt(2003),tomentiononlyafew.Thisliteratureinfinance,however,ismostlyconfinedtoananalysisofcontractsandtheassociatedincentivesforagents'effortsinpartialequilibrium.AccordingtoGompersandLerner(2001),ananalysisoftherealeffectsofVCislargelymissing.3Themaincontributionofthispaperistoprogresstowardsthisendbyintegratingfinancialcontractingandadvisingintoageneralequilibriummodelthatendogenouslyexplains(i)theincentivesofentrepreneurstostartafirm(occupationalchoicewithanendogenouslydeterminedoutsidewage),(ii)thewillingnessofVCstoaddvaluetostart-upfirms,(iii)theequilibriumventurereturns,ormarketvalueofnewfirms,asakeydeterminantofentry,and(iv)theequilibriumrateofinnovation.AcomparativestaticanalysisshowshowsomedeepstructuralparametersoftheVCsectoraswellastaxpolicyaddressedtotheVCindustryaffectstart-upentrepreneurshipandinnovationbasedgrowth.
Thefollowingsectionintroducestheanalyticalframework.ItextendsthetwoperiodoverlappinggenerationsmodelpioneeredbyDiamond(1965)anditsapplicationtogrowththeorybyGrossmanandYanagawa(1993)byincludingoccupationalchoiceofpotentialentrepreneursanddoublemoralhazardintherelationbetweenentrepreneursandVCfirms.Start-upentrepreneursifsuccessfulproducenewcapitalgoodswhichboostthefactorproductivityinfinalgoodsproduction.Basedoncomparativestaticanalysis,Section3showshowkeycharacteristicsoftheVCsectordeterminethequalityandquantityofstart-upinvestmentbyyoungentrepreneurialfirmsandtheequilibriuminnovationrate.WealsoconsiderhowtaxpolicycanpromotegrowthbystrengtheningincentivesforincreasedVCsupporttostart-upfirms.Thefinalsectionconcludes.
2.TheModel
2.1.Life-CycleofFirms
Anoverlappinggenerationsmodelofentrepreneurshipandinnovationisproposed.Productionofafinalgoodusesspecializedcapitalgoodswhichareintroducedbyinnovativestart-upfirms.Entrepreneurshaveideasbutnoowncapital.Inaddition,theyarecommerciallyinexperienced.VCshavemanagerialknowhowandaccesstocapital.Theycollectsavingsandfinanceaportfolioofstart-upfirms.Theynotonlyprovidefinancebutalsoaddvalueingivingmanagerialadvice.ThesuccessofthecompanyindevelopingamarketablecapitalgoodcriticallydependsontheeffortoftheentrepreneurbutisfurtherenhancedbythemanagerialsupportoftheVC.TheeffortsofboththeentrepreneurandtheVCarenotcontractible,givingrisetodoublemoralhazard.Ifthefirmsuccessfullymaturestoproductionstage,aspecializedcapitalgoodisproducedandsuppliedtofinalgoodsproducers.Thepresentvalueofmonopolisticprofitsmustcovertheexpectedstart-upcostofthefirm.
Theprocessofbusinesscreationstartingwiththeentrepreneur'sinitialideatothefirm'ssuccessfulmarketintroductionandproductionofthegoodinvolvesanaturalsequenceofevents.First,anagentdecidesforentrepreneurshiporelseforaworker'scareer.Whenstartingafirm,shemustovercomethelackofcapitalandhercommercialinexperience.ShethuscontactsaVCtoobtainfinanceandadvice.Second,theentrepreneursellsaconcentratedequitystakeinthefirmforapricethatcoversthephysicalstart-upcostandmayalsoincludeapossibleprofitupfront.TheVCacceptsthisofferorotherwiseturnstootherinvestmentopportunities.Third,afterthedealisfinalized,boththeentrepreneurandVCexpendefforttodevelopthefirm.Jointeffortisconditionalontheincentivesprovidedbythetermsofcontract.Fourth,riskisresolvedandfirmswhichhavesuccessfullymaturedtoproductionstage,introduceaspecializedcapitalgoodsvarietyonthemarket.Atthispointintime,thefirmissoldatacompetitivepriceandrevenuesaredistributedaccordingtotheagreedequitystakes.Finally,giventheirincome,allagentschooseconsumptionandsavings.
Thepaperembedsthistypeofinnovationfinanceinagrowthmodelwithoverlappinggenerations.Followingtheprincipleofbackwardinductioninsolvingthemodel,thesubsequentsectionsfirstconsiderconsumptionandsavingsandthenturntotheproductionsidewhichdeterminesventurereturns.Withthesepreliminar
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