审计师的独立性行为和道德外文文献.docx
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审计师的独立性行为和道德外文文献.docx
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审计师的独立性行为和道德外文文献
文献出处
FalkH,LynnB,MestelmanS,etal.Auditorindependence,self-interestedbehaviorandethics:
someexperimentalevidence[J].JournalofAccountingandPublicPolicy,2000,18(4):
395-428.
Auditorindependence,self-interestedbehaviorandethics:
someexperimentalevidence
FalkH,LynnB,MestelmanS
Abstract
Ourpaperpresentstheresultsobtainedinalaboratoryenvironmentinwhichsubjectsrevealedtheirbeliefsaboutanuncertainstateoftheworldandthenparticipatedinasimpletaskwhichrequiredthemtoreportonwhetherthereportofasecondpartyisconsistentwiththesubjects’beliefs.Becausemaintainingpriorjudgements(auditindependence)whichwereindisagreementwiththesecondparty’sdecision(apotentialforaqualifiedauditopinion)werecostlytothesubject,asituationwascreatedinwhichthesubjectmightcompromiseherbeliefsataprice.Theresultssuggestthatamoral,self-interestedprofit-maximizingbehaviordoesnotgenerallycharacterizethesubjectsinthisexperiment.Furthermore,subjectscompromisetheirbeliefslessoften,i.e.,breachindependence,thehighertheirscoresonaDefiningIssuesTest,butmoreoften,thegreaterthecostofadheringtotheirbeliefs.
1.Introduction
Therequirementofauditorindependencearisesfromtheneedtoestablishtheindependentauditorasanobjectiveandtrustworthyarbiterofthefairpresentationoffinancialresults.Indeed, MautzandSharaf(1961,pp.204–231)and Berryman(1974,p.1)positthatindependenceisthecornerstoneoftheauditprofessionandanessentialingredientofusers’confidenceinfinancialstatements.Sinceindependentauditorsoccupyapositionoftrustbetweenthemanagementofthereportingentityandusersofitsfinancialstatements,theymustbeperceivedtobeoperatingindependentlyonthebasisofsoundauditingstandardsandstrongethicalprinciples.
Examinationsoftheindependenceissueoverthelastthreedecades,suchasthe UnitedStatesSenateetal.,1976, UnitedStatesSenate(MossCommittee),1978 and TheCommissiononAuditors’Responsibilities(CohenCommission),1978,and Treadway(1987) Commissionsandthe AdvisoryPanelonAuditorIndependence(1994) haveallemphasizedtheimportanceofindependenceasacriticalfactorofprofessionalconduct.Moreover,theUSSupremeCourt,in UnitedStatesv.ArthurYoung&Co.etal.1984(1986,p.818),hasruledthattheindependentauditormust“maintaintotalindependencefromtheclientatalltimes”.
Codesofprofessionalconduct,suchasthoseoftheAmericanInstituteofCertifiedPublicAccountants(AICPA),theCanadianInstituteofCharteredAccountants,andtheInstituteofCharteredAccountantsofOntariorequirethatamember“inpublicpracticebeindependentinfactandinappearance…” (PanyandWhittington,1994,p.94).1 Whereastheliteratureisrepletewithstudiesthatmodelauditors’decisionsofwhethertopreserveorcompromisetheirindependenceundervariouscircumstances Antle,1984,DeAngelo,1981, GoldmanandBarlev,1974, KanodiaandMukherji,1994, MageeandTseng,1990,Yoon,1990, PennoandWatts,1991 and Yost,1995,studiesthatattempttoobserveindependencedirectlyarequitesparse.2 Furthermore,researchwhichtriestolinkauditindependenceandethicalpropensityisrare PonemonandGabhart,1990 and WindsorandAshkanasy,1995.Wereportonactualobservations,obtainedviaacontrolledlaboratoryexperimentconcerningdecisionstocompromiseorpreserveindependenceinthecaseofclient–auditordisagreementsaboutareportingdecision.Outsidethiscontrolledenvironmenttheseinconsistentdecisionsorbreachesofindependenceareunobservableand,hence,theoriesabouttheiroccurrencearelargelyuntestableusingfielddata.Furthermore,wecombineandextendtwoimportantstreamsintheauditliterature:
(1) Magee'sandTseng's(1990) andAntle's(1984) analyticalmodellingofauditindependenceand
(2) Ponemon'sandGabhart's(1990) andWindsor'sandAshkanasy(1995) empiricaltestsoftherelationbetweenmoraldevelopmentandauditorindependence.
Weassumethe MageeandTseng(1990,pp.318–320)auditframeworkanddeviseanexperimentalaudittaskwhichfocusesonatestofwhethersubjectsexerciseindependentjudgementbasedontheirpriorbeliefs.Becauseourcontrolledlaboratoryenvironmentincludesexplicitmonetaryincentives(economicmotivation)bothaspositivepayoffsandnegativepenalties,wefeelthatthemethodallowsustomakeamoredirectevaluationofsubjects’behavioranditsrelationtotheirmoraldevelopmentthaneither PonemonandGabhart(1990) or WindsorandAshkanasy(1995) wereabletodousingtheirhypotheticalauditcaseexperiments.While Ponemon(1993) didattempttolinkaneconomicdecision(afreerider/Prisoner’sDilemmasituation)withmoraldevelopmentandethicaleducation,3 hisclassroomsettingdidnothavetheformalcontrolsavailableinthelaboratoryenvironment.Essentially,ourstudyusesaproxyvariableformoraldevelopmenttocontrolforthepotentialimpactofmoralchoiceonwhatislargelyatestofeconomicrationalityinanauditsetting.Ourresultsshowthat:
1.Astheprobabilityoflosingaclientbydisagreeingwiththeclient’sdecisionincreases,thefrequencyofindependenceviolationsincreases.Thisresultisindependentofwhethertheindependentauditors’behaviorismonitored.
2.Monitoringandpenalizingindependentauditors’behaviorreducethefrequencyofindependenceviolationswhentheprobabilityoflosingaclientissmall,butthefrequencyofviolationsisnotreducedwhentheprobabilityofthelossofaclientishigh.
3.Onaverage,subjectswithlowmoraldevelopmentscoresviolateindependencemorefrequentlythanthosewhohavehigherscores.
Theseresultssuggestthatwhileexternalreviewandpotentialpenalties(litigationcosts,lossofreputation,directfinesorlicencesuspension)mayreduceviolationsofauditorindependencesomewhat,thepositivereinforcementoftheattributemaycomefromincreasingindependentauditors’awarenessoftheethicaldimensionsoftheirdecisions.Usingadifferentresearchmethod,ourresultsalsovalidatePonemonandGabhart's(1990,pp.240–247)and Windsor’sandAshkanasy’s(1995,pp.715–717)findingsonthesignificanceofmoraldevelopmenttoauditorindependence.
Thenextsectionprovidesareviewoftheresearchonethicsandauditing,includingadiscussionofthemoraldevelopmentliteraturefromdevelopmentalpsychologywhichisusedinthepresentstudy.Wethenprovideageneralframeworkforourstudy,describetheresearchdesignandhypotheses,anddiscusstheresultsoftheexperiment.Finally,wedrawconclusionsfromtheresultsandidentifyopportunitiesforextendingtheresearch.
2.Auditingandethicalbackground
Priorresearchonauditorindependencehaslargelyconcentratedeitheronmodellingtheindependentauditor’sjudgementoronsituationswhereauditorsmaybreachtheirrequiredindependence.Studiessuchas DopuchandKing,1991 and Schatzberg,1990 and SchatzbergandSevcik(1994) haveattemptedtostudytheconceptofindependenceinauditsettings,butdonotprovidedirectobservationsofsubjects’independenceasdoesthepresentstudy.4 Inthestudiescited,auditindependence(orlackthereof)isrevealedbyagreementordisagreementwithmanagement’sportrayalofafinancialreportingdilemmaofsomedescription.Whilethestudiesuseexperimentaltechniques,noneofthemattempttoassesstheindependentauditor’spriorbeliefsorexpectationsvisàvisthesituation.Suchanassessmentiscentraltoourpresentexperimentaltreatmentandformsthebasisofdeterminingwhetherasubjecthasbehavedindependentlyorhascompromisedpriorbeliefs.
Thesuggestionthatwhenexternalauditorsexerciseindependentjudgementaboutfinancialstatements,theyareengaginginwhatistantamounttoanethicalact,isnotanovelidea.CodesofethicssuchasthoseusedbytheAmericanInstituteofCertifiedPublicAccountantsandtheCanadianInstituteofCharteredAccountantsarenormallydesignedtomotivatemembersofprofessionalorganizationstooperateinanethicalmanner.Priorstudiessuggest,however,thattheunderlyingpsychologythatgovernsprofessionalbehaviorismorecomplicatedthansimplyhopingthatprofessionalsadheretotheorganization’scodeofconduct.Forexample, LampeandFinn(1992,pp.34–55)comparedtheauditors’ethicaldecisionprocessmodeltheydevelopedtoanAICPACodedecisionmodelandconcluded(pp.55–56)thatthelatterisinsufficienttomotivateaccountantstopursueethicalbehavior.Similarly, Ponemon(1988, 1990, 1992a, b, 1993, 1995), PonemonandGabhart(1993) and PonemonandGlazer(1990)utilizedtheoriesofcognitive-developmentalpsychology(describedbelow)toelucidatetheethicaldimensionsofaccountants’judgementproceduresandgenerallyconcludedthattheethicalcultureofthefirmanddomain-specificexperiencecoupledwithethicalreasoningaresignificantlyrelatedtoaccountants’ethicalbehavior.
Morespecifically, PonemonandGabhart(1990,pp.240–247)and WindsorandAshkanasy(1995,pp.709–714)haveestablishedthatthedegreeofmoraldevelopmenthelpstoexplainexternalauditors’independencebehavior. Cushing(1990,p.254)expressedconcernabout Ponemon’sandGabhart’s(1990) chosenscenario(amanagementadvisorytaskofwhethertheindependentauditorsshouldhelptohireafinancialofficerforafirmforwhomtheyprovideauditservice)becauseitdidnotimplyexplicit,measurableeconomicconsequences. WindsorandAshkanasy(1995,p.702)triedtoanswerCushing’scommentsbyconstructinganauditingcaseinvolvingamaterialitydilemmaaboutanerrorinanaccountingbalancetobereportedonthefinan
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