演讲稿了解中国的崛起演讲稿.docx

演讲稿了解中国的崛起演讲稿.docx

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演讲稿了解中国的崛起演讲稿

　　　　XX（XX）/演讲稿范文/演讲稿

了解中国的崛起演讲稿

　　Theworldischangingwithreallyremarkablespeed.Ifyoulookatthechartatthetophere,you'llseethatin2025,theseGoldmanSachsprojectionssuggestthattheChineseeconomywillbealmostthesamesizeastheAmericaneconomy.Andifyoulookatthechartfor2050,it'sprojectedthattheChineseeconomywillbetwicethesizeoftheAmericaneconomy,andtheIndianeconomywillbealmostthesamesizeastheAmericaneconomy.AndweshouldbearinmindherethattheseprojectionsweredrawnupbeforetheWesternfinancialcrisis.

　　Acoupleofweeksago,IwaslookingatthelatestprojectionbyBNPParibasforwhenChinawillhavealargereconomythantheUnitedStates.GoldmanSachsprojected2027.Thepost-crisisprojectionis2020.That'sjustadecadeaway.Chinaisgoingtochangetheworldintwofundamentalrespects.Firstofall,it'sahugedevelopingcountrywithapopulationof1.3billionpeople,whichhasbeengrowingforover30yearsataround10percentayear.

　　Andwithinadecade,itwillhavethelargesteconomyintheworld.Neverbeforeinthemodernerahasthelargesteconomyintheworldbeenthatofadevelopingcountry,ratherthanadevelopedcountry.Secondly,forthefirsttimeinthemodernera,thedominantcountryintheworld--whichIthinkiswhatChinawillbecome--willbenotfromtheWestandfromvery,verydifferentcivilizationalroots.

　　NowIknowit'sawidespreadassumptionintheWestthat,ascountriesmodernize,theyalsoWesternize.Thisisanillusion.It'sanassumptionthatmodernityisaproductsimplyofcompetition,marketsandtechnology.Itisnot;itisalsoshapedequallybyhistoryandculture.ChinaisnotliketheWest,anditwillnotbecomeliketheWest.Itwillremaininveryfundamentalrespectsverydifferent.Nowthebigquestionhereisobviously,howdowemakesenseofChina?

HowdowetrytounderstandwhatChinais?

AndtheproblemwehaveintheWestatthemomentby-and-largeisthattheconventionalapproachisthatweunderstanditreallyinWesternterms,usingWesternideas.Wecan't.NowIwanttoofferyouthreebuildingblocksfortryingtounderstandwhatChinaislike--justasabeginning.

　　Nowwhatisextraordinaryaboutthisis,whatgivesChinait'ssenseofbeingChina,whatgivestheChinesethesenseofwhatitistobeChinese,comesnotfromthelasthundredyears,notfromthenationstateperiod,whichiswhathappenedintheWest,butfromtheperiod,ifyoulike,ofthecivilizationstate.I'mthinkinghere,forexample,ofcustomslikeancestralworship,ofaverydistinctivenotionofthestate,likewise,averydistinctivenotionofthefamily,socialrelationshipslikeguanxi,Confucianvaluesandsoon.Theseareallthingsthatcomefromtheperiodofthecivilizationstate.Inotherwords,China,unliketheWesternstatesandmostcountriesintheworld,isshapedbyitssenseofcivilization,itsexistenceasacivilizationstate,ratherthanasanationstate.Andthere'soneotherthingtoaddtothis,andthatisthis:

OfcourseweknowChina'sbig,huge,demographicallyandgeographically,withapopulationof1.3billionpeople.Whatweoftenaren'treallyawareofisthefactthatChinaisextremelydiverseandverypluralistic,andinmanywaysverydecentralized.Youcan'trunaplaceonthisscalesimplyfromBeijing,eventhoughwethinkthistobethecase.It'sneverbeenthecase.

　　SothisisChina,acivilizationstate,ratherthananationstate.Andwhatdoesitmean?

WellIthinkithasallsortsofprofoundimplications.I'llgiveyoutwoquickones.ThefirstisthatthemostimportantpoliticalvaluefortheChineseisunity,isthemaintenanceofChinesecivilization.Youknow,2,000yearsago,Europe:

breakdown,thefragmentationoftheHolyRomanEmpire[RomanEmpire].Itdivided,andit'sremaineddividedeversince.China,overthesametimeperiod,wentinexactlytheoppositedirection,verypainfullyholdingthishugecivilization,civilizationstatetogether.

　　Thesecondismaybemoreprosaic,whichisHongKong.DoyourememberthehandoverofHongKongbyBritaintoChinain1997?

YoumayrememberwhattheChineseconstitutionalpropositionwas.Onecountry,twosystems.AndI'lllayawagerthatbarelyanyoneintheWestbelievedthem."Windowdressing.WhenChinagetsit'shandsonHongKong,thatwon'tbethecase."13yearson,thepoliticalandlegalsysteminHongKongisasdifferentnowasitwasin1997.Wewerewrong.Whywerewewrong?

Wewerewrongbecausewethought,naturallyenough,innationstateways.ThinkofGermanunification,1990.Whathappened?

Well,basicallytheEastwasswallowedbytheWest.Onenation,onesystem.Thatisthenationstatementality.Butyoucan'trunacountrylikeChina,acivilizationstate,onthebasisofonecivilization,onesystem.Itdoesn'twork.SoactuallytheresponseofChinatothequestionofHongKong--asitwillbetothequestionofTaiwan--wasanaturalresponse:

onecivilization,manysystems.

　　Nowthegreatadvantageofthishistoricalexperiencehasbeenthat,withouttheHan,Chinacouldneverhaveheldtogether.TheHanidentityhasbeenthecementwhichhasheldthiscountrytogether.ThegreatdisadvantageofitisthattheHanhaveaveryweakconceptionofculturaldifference.Theyreallybelieveintheirownsuperiority,andtheyaredisrespectfulofthosewhoarenot.Hencetheirattitude,forexample,totheUyghursandtotheTibetans.

　　Orletmegiveyoumythirdbuildingblock,theChinesestate.NowtherelationshipbetweenthestateandsocietyinChinaisverydifferentfromthatintheWest.NowweintheWestoverwhelminglyseemtothink--inthesedaysatleast--thattheauthorityandlegitimacyofthestateisafunctionofdemocracy.TheproblemwiththispropositionisthattheChinesestateenjoysmorelegitimacyandmoreauthorityamongsttheChinesethanistruewithanyWesternstate.Andthereasonforthisisbecause--well,therearetworeasons,Ithink.Andit'sobviouslygotnothingtodowithdemocracy,becauseinourtermstheChinesecertainlydon'thaveademocracy.Andthereasonforthisis,firstly,becausethestateinChinaisgivenaveryspecial--itenjoysaveryspecialsignificanceastherepresentative,theembodimentandtheguardianofChinesecivilization,ofthecivilizationstate.ThisisascloseasChinagetstoakindofspiritualrole.

　　Andthesecondreasonisbecause,whereasinEuropeandNorthAmerica,thestate'spoweriscontinuouslychallenged--ImeanintheEuropeantradition,historicallyagainstthechurch,againstothersectorsofthearistocracy,againstmerchantsandsoon--for1,000years,thepoweroftheChinesestatehasnotbeenchallenged.It'shadnoseriousrivals.SoyoucanseethatthewayinwhichpowerhasbeenconstructedinChinaisverydifferentfromourexperienceinWesternhistory.Theresult,bytheway,isthattheChinesehaveaverydifferentviewofthestate.Whereaswetendtoviewitasanintruder,astranger,certainlyanorganwhosepowersneedtobelimitedordefinedandconstrained,theChinesedon'tseethestatelikethatatall.TheChineseviewthestateasanintimate--notjustasanintimateactually,asamemberofthefamily--notjustinfactasamemberofthefamily,butastheheadofthefamily,thepatriarchofthefamily.ThisistheChineseviewofthestate--very,verydifferenttoours.It'sembeddedinsocietyinadifferentkindofwaytowhatisthecaseintheWest.

　　AndIwouldsuggesttoyouthatactuallywhatwearedealingwithhere,intheChinesecontext,isanewkindofparadigm,whichisdifferentfromanythingwe'vehadtothinkaboutinthepast.KnowthatChinabelievesinthemarketandthestate.Imean,AdamSmith,alreadywritinginthelate18thcenturysaid,"TheChinesemarketislargerandmoredevelopedandmoresophisticatedthananythinginEurope."And,apartfromtheMaoperiod,thathasremainedmore-or-lessthecaseeversince.Butthisiscombinedwithanextremelystrongandubiquitousstate.ThestateiseverywhereinChina.Imean,it'sleadingfirms,manyofthemarestillpubliclyowned.Privatefirms,howeverlargetheyare,likeLenovo,dependinmanywaysonstatepatronage.Targetsfortheeconomyandsoonaresetbythestate.Andthestate,ofcourse,itsauthorityflowsintolotsofotherareas--aswearefamiliarwith--withsomethinglikethetheone-childpolicy.

　　Moreover,thisisaveryoldstatetradition,averyoldtraditionofstatecraft.Imean,ifyouwantanillustrationofthis,theGreatWallisone.Butthisisanother,thisistheGrandCanal,whichwasconstructedinthefirstinstanceinthefifthcenturyB.C.andwasfinallycompletedintheseventhcenturyA.D.Itwentfor1,114miles,linkingBeijingwithHangzhouandShanghai.Sothere'salonghistoryofextraordinarystateinfrastructuralprojectsinChina,whichIsupposehelpsustoexplainwhatweseetoday,whichissomethingliketheThreeGorgesDamandmanyotherexpressionsofstatecompetencewithinChina.SotherewehavethreebuildingblocksfortryingtotounderstandthedifferencethatisChina--thecivilizationstate,thenotionofraceandthenatureofthestateanditsrelationshiptosociety.

　　Andyetwestillinsist,by-and-large,inthinkingthatwecanunderstandChinabysimplydrawingonWesternexperience,lookingatitthroughWesterneyes,usingWesternconcepts.IfyouwanttoknowwhyweunerringlyseemtogetChinawrong--ourpredictionsaboutwhat'sgoingtohappentoChinaareincorrect--thisisthereason.UnfortunatelyIthink,IhavetosaythatIthinkattitudetowardsChinaisthatofakindoflittleWesternermentality.It'skindofarrogant.It'sarrogantinthesensethatwethinkthatwearebest,andthereforewehavetheuniversalmeasure.Andsecondly,it'signorant.Werefusetoreallyaddresstheissueofdifference.Youknow,there'saveryinterestingpassageinabookbyPaulCohen,theAmericanhistorian.AndPaulCohenarguesthattheWestthinksofitselfasprobablythemostcosmopolitanofallcultures.Butit'snot.Inmanyways,it'sthemostparochial,becausefor200years,theWesthasbeensodominantintheworldthatit'snotreallyneededtounderstandothercultures,othercivilizations.Because,attheendoftheday,itcould,ifnecessarybyforce,getitsownway.Whereasthosecultures--virtuallytherestoftheworld,infact--whichhavebeeninafarweakerposition,vis-a-vistheWest,havebeentherebyforcedtounderstandtheWest,becauseoftheWest'spresenceinthosesocieties.Andtherefore,theyare,asaresult,morecosmopolitaninmanywaysthantheWest.

　　Imean,takethequestionofEastAsia.EastAsia:

Japan,Korea,China,etc.--athirdoftheworld'spopulationlivesthere,nowthelargesteconomicregionintheworld.AndI'lltellyounow,thatEastAsianers,peoplefromEastAsia,arefarmoreknowledgeableabouttheWestthantheWestisaboutEastAsia.Nowthispointisverygermane,I'mafraid,tothepresent.Becausewhat'shappening?

Backtothatchartatthebeginning--theGoldmanSachschart.Whatishappeningisthat,veryrapidlyinhistoricalterms,theworldisbeingdrivenandshaped,notbytheolddevelopedcountries,butbythedevelopingworld.We'veseenthisintermsoftheG20--usurpingveryrapidlythepositionoftheG7,ortheG8.Andtherearetwoconsequencesofthis.First,theWestisrapidlylosingitsinfluenceintheworld.Therewasadramaticillustrationofthisactuallyayearago--Copenhagen,climatechangeconference.Europewasnotatthefinalnegotiatingtable.Whendidthatlasthappen?

Iwouldwageritwasprobablyabout200yearsago.Andthatiswhatisgoingtohappe