股利政策外文及翻译.docx
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股利政策外文及翻译.docx
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股利政策外文及翻译
目录
Dividendpolicy2
股利政策8
Dividendpolicy
Profitablecompaniesregularlyfacethreeimportantquestions:
(1)Howmuchofitsfreecashflowshoulditpassontoshareholders?
(2)Shoulditprovidethiscashtoshareholdersbyraisingthedividendorbyrepurchasingstock?
(3)Shoulditmaintainastable,consistentpaymentpolicy,orshoulditletthepaymentsvaryasconditionschange?
Whendecidinghowmuchcashtodistributetoshareholders,financemanagermustkeepinmindthatthefirm’sobjectiveistomaximizeshareholdervalue.Consequently,thetargetpayrateratio—defineasthepercentageofnetincometobepaidoutascashdividends—shouldbebasedinlargepartoninvestors’preferencefordividendsversuscapitalgains:
doinvestorsprefer
(1)tohavethefirmdistributeincomeascashdividendsor
(2)tohaveiteitherrepurchasestockorelseplowtheearningsbackintothebusiness,bothofwhichshouldresultincapitalgains?
Thispreferencecanbeconsideredintermsoftheconstantgrowthstockvaluationmodel:
Ifthecompanyincreasesthepayoutration,theraises
.Thisincreaseinthenumerator,takenalone,wouldcausethestockpricetorise.However,if
israised,thenlessmoneywillbeavailableforreinvestment,thatwillcausetheexpectedgrowthratetodecline,andthatwilltendtolowerthestock’sprice.Thus,anychangeinpayoutpolicywillhavetwoopposingeffects.Therefore,thefirm’soptimaldividendpolicymuststrikeabalancebetweencurrentdividendsandfuturegrowthsotomaximizethestockprice.Inthissection,weexaminethreetheoriesofinvestorpreference:
(1)thedividendirrelevancetheory,
(2)the"bird-in-the-hand"theory,and(3)thetaxpreferencetheory.
DIVIDENDIRRELEVANCETHEORY
Ithasbeenarguedthatdividendpolicyhasnoeffectoneitherthepriceofafirm’sstockoritscostofcapital.Ifdividendpolicyhasnosignificanteffects,thenitwouldbeirrelevance.TheprincipalproponentsofdividendirrelevancetheoryareMertonMillerandFrancoModigliani(MM).Theyarguedthatthefirm’sisdeterminedonlybyitsbasicearningpoweranditsbusinessrisk.Inotherwords,MMarguedthatthevalueoffirmdependsonlyontheincomeproducedbyitsassets,notonhowthisincomeissplitbetweendividendsandretainedearnings.
TounderstandMM’sargumentthatdividendpolicyisirrelevance,recognizethatanyshareholdercanintheoryconstructhisorherowndividendpolicy.Ifinvestorscouldbuyandsellsharesandthuscreatetheirowndividendpolicywithoutincurringcosts,thenthefirm’sdividendpolicywouldtrulybeirrelevant.Note,though,thatinvestorswhowantadditionaldividendsmustincurbrokeragecosttosellshares,andinvestorswhodonotwantdividendsmustfirstpaytaxesontheunwanteddividendsandthenincurbrokeragecosttopurchaseshareswiththeafter-taxdividends.Sincetaxesandbrokeragecostscertainlyexist,dividendpolicymaywellberelevant.
Indevelopingtheirdividendtheory,MMmadeanumberofassumptionsespeciallytheabsenceoftaxesandbrokeragecosts.Obviously,taxandbrokeragecostsdoexist,sotheMMirrelevancetheorymaynotbetrue.However,MMarguedthatalleconomictheoriesarebasedonsimplifyingassumptions,andthatthevalidityofatheorymustbejudgedbyempiricaltest,notbytherealismofitsassumptions.
BIRD-IN-THE-HANDTHEORY
TheprincipalconclusionsofMM’sdividendirrelevancetheoryisthatdividendpolicydoesnotaffecttherequiredrateofreturnonequity,Ks.Thisconclusionhasbeenhotlydebatedintheacademiccircles.Inparticular,MyronGordonandJohnLintnerarguedthatKsdecreasesasthedividendpayoutisincreasebecauseinvestorarelesscertainofreceivingthecapitalgainswhicharesupposedtoresultfromretainingearningsthantheyareofreceivingdividendpayments
MMdisagreed.TheyarguedthatKsindependentofdividendpolicy,whichimpliesthatinvestorsareindifferentbetweenD1/P0andgand,hence,betweendividendsandcapitalgains.MMcalledtheGordon-Lintnerargumentthebird-in-the-handfallacybecause,inMM’sview,mostinvestorsplantoreinvesttheirdividendsinthestockofthesameorsimilarfirms,and,inanyevent,theriskinessofthefirm’scashflowstoinvestorsinthelongrunisdeterminedbytheriskinessofoperatingcashflows,notbydividendpayoutpolicy.
TAXPREFERENCETHEORY
Therearethreetax-relatedreasonsforthinkingthatinvestorsmightpreferalowdividendpayouttoahighpayout:
(1)RecallfromChapterIIthatlong-termcapitalgainsaretaxedatarateof20percent,whereasdividendincomeistaxedateffectiverateswhichgoupto39.6percent.Therefore,wealthyinvestorsmightprefertohavecompaniesretainandplowearningsbackintothebusiness.Earningsgrowthwouldpresumablyleadtostockpricesincreases,andthuslow-taxedcapitalgainswouldbesubstitutedforhigher-taxeddividends.
(2)Taxesarenotpaidonthegainsuntilastockissold.Duetotimevalueeffects,adollaroftaxespaidinthefuturehasalowereffectivecostthanadollarpaidtoday.(3)Ifastockisheldbysomeoneuntilheorshedies,nocapitalgainstaxisdueatall-thebeneficiarieswhoreceivethestockcanusethestock’svalueonthedeathdayastheircostbasisandthuscompletelyescapethecapitalgainstax.
Becauseofthesetaxadvantages,investorsmayprefertohavecompaniesretainmostoftheirearnings.IFso,investorswouldbewillingtopaymoreforlow-payoutcompaniesthanforotherwisesimilarhigh-payoutcompanies.
Therethreetheoriesoffercontradictoryadvicetocorporatemanagers,sowhich,ifany,shouldwebelieve?
Themostlogicalwaytoproceedistotestthetheoriesempirically.Manysuchtestshavebeenconducted,buttheirresultshavebeenunclear.Therearetworeasonsforthis
(1)Foravalidstatisticaltest,thingsotherthandividendpolicymustbeheldconstant;thatis,thesamplecompaniesmustdifferonlyintheirdividendpolicies,and
(2)wemustbeabletomeasurewithahighdegreeofaccuracyeachfirm’scostofequity.Neitherofthesetwoconditionsholds:
Wecannotfindasetofpubliclyownedfirmsthatdifferonlyintheirdividendpolicies,norcanweobtainpreciseestimatesofthecostofequity.
Therefore,noonecanestablishaclearrelationshipbetweendividendpolicyandthecostofequity.Investorsintheaggregatecannotbeseentouniformlyprefereitherhigherorlowerdividends.Nevertheless,individualinvestorsdohavestrongpreferences.Somepreferhighdividends,whileotherspreferallcapitalgains.Thesedifferencesamongindividendshelpexplainwhyitisdifficulttoreachanydefinitiveconclusionsregardingtheoptimaldividendpayout.Evenso,bothevidenceandlogicsuggestthatinvestorspreferfirmsthatfollowastable,predictabledividendpolicy.
Becausewediscusshowdividendpolicyissetinpractice,wemustexaminetwoothertheoreticalissuesthatcouldaffectourviewtowarddividendpolicy:
(1)theinformationcontent,orsignaling,hypothesisand
(2)Theclienteleeffects.MMarguedthatinvestors’reactionstochangeindividendpolicydonotnecessarilyshowthatinvestorspreferdividendstoretainedearnings.Rather,theyarguedthatpricechangefollowingdividendactionssimplyindicatethatthereisanimportantinformation,orsignaling,contentindividendannouncements.
Theclienteleeffectstotheextentthatstockholderscanswitch,afirmcanchangefromonedividendpayoutpolicytoanotherandthenletstockholderswhodonotlikethenewpolicyselltootherinvestorswhodo.However,frequentswitchingwouldbeinefficientbecauseof
(1)brokeragecosts,
(2)thelikelihoodthatstockholderswhoaresellingwillhavetopaycapitalgainstaxes,and(3)apossibleshortageofinvestorswholikethefirm’snewlyadopteddividendpolicy.Thus,managementshouldbehesitanttochangeitsdividendpolicy,becauseachangemightcausecurrentstockholderstoselltheirstock,forcingthestockpricedown.Suchapricedeclinemightbetemporary,butitmightalsobepermanentiffewnewinvestorsareattractedbythenewdividendpolicy,thenthestockpricewouldremaindepressed.Ofcourse,thenewpolicymightattractanevenlargerclientelethanthefirmhadbefore,inwhichcasethestockpricewouldrise.
Inmanyways,ourdiscussionofdividendpolicyparallelsourdiscussionofcapitalstructure:
wepresentedtherelevanttheoriesandissues,andwelistedsomeadditionalfactorsthatinfluencedividendpolicy,butwedidnotcomeupwithanyhard-and-fastguidelinesthatmanagercanfollow.Itshouldbeapparentfromourdiscussionthatdividendpolicydecisionsareexercisesininformedjudgment,notdecisionsthatcanbebasedonprecisemathematicalmodel.
Inpractice,dividendpolicyisnotanindependentdecision–thedividenddecisionsismadejointlywithcapitalstructureandcapitalbudgetingdecisions.Theunderlyingreasonforthisjointdecisionsprocessisasymmetricinformation,whichinfluencesmanagerialactionsintwoways:
1,Ingeneral,managersdonotwanttoissuenewcommonstock.First,newcommonstockinvolvesissuancecost---commissions,fees,andsoon-andthosecostscanbeavoidedbyusingretainedearningstofinancethefirm’sequityneeds.Also,asymmetricinformationcausesinvestorstoviewcommonstockissuesasnegativesignalsandthuslowersexpectationsregardingthefirm’sfutureprospects.Theendresultisthattheannouncementofanewstockissueusuallyleadstoadecreaseinthestockprices.Consideringthetotalcostsinvolved,includingbothissuanceandasymmetricinformationcosts,managersstronglyprefertouseretainedearningsastheirprimarysourceofnewequity.
2,Dividendch
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