Waluchow Legal Positivism Inclusive versus Exclusive.docx
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Waluchow Legal Positivism Inclusive versus Exclusive.docx
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WaluchowLegalPositivismInclusiveversusExclusive
Legalpositivism,inclusiveversusexclusive
Modernlegalpositivismviewslawasahumancreation;theexistenceandcontentoflaware,fundamentally,mattersofsocialfact.Thisisusuallytermed‘thesocialthesis’.AsecondthesisintegraltothepositivisttraditionisJohnAustin’sfamous‘separationthesis’:
‘theexistenceoflawisonething,itsmeritordemeritanother…’–thereisnothinginthenatureoflawasasocialinstitutionthatguaranteesitsmoralworth.Despiteasharedcommitmenttothesocialandseparationtheses,defendersoflegalpositivismdiffersignificantlyintheirunderstandingofthesefundamentaltenets.InresponsetoRonaldDworkin’sclaimthatmoralprinciplespartlydeterminethecontentoflegalsystems,positivistshavedividedintotwomajorcamps.Inclusivepositivistsassertthatitisconceptuallypossible,butnotnecessary,thatthelegalvalidityofanormshoulddependonitsconsistencywithmoralprinciplesorvalues.Exclusivepositivistsasserttheopposite:
thelegalvalidityofanormcanneverbeafunctionofitsconsistencywithmoralprinciplesorvalues.Recentdebatesamongpositivistshavefocusedonwhetherinclusivepositivismisconsistentwiththelaw’sclaimtoauthorityandwiththeroleitpurportstoplayinguidingourconduct.Wherethesedebateswillleadis,atthisstage,anopenquestion.
1Legalpositivismandnaturallawtheory
2Dworkin’schallenge
3Inclusiveandexclusivepositivism
4Raz’sauthorityargument
5Thepracticaldifferencethesis
Howtocitethisarticle:
WALUCHOW,WILFRID(2001).Legalpositivism,inclusiveversusexclusive.InE.Craig(Ed.),RoutledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.London:
Routledge.RetrievedSeptember18,2008,from.libaccess.lib.mcmaster.ca/article/T064
1Legalpositivismandnaturallawtheory
Amongphilosophy’slong-standingtraditionsistheclassicdebatebetweentwojurisprudentialschools:
naturallawtheoryandlegalpositivism.Initstraditionalform,naturallawtheoryassertsthathumanlawisanattempttoexpressauniversalmorallaw,decreedbyGodanddiscernibleviahumanreason(seeNaturallaw).Validhumanlawsareallinvariouswaysderivedfromthenaturallaw;andthosewhicharenotsoderivedaredeemed‘corruptionsoflaw’(Aquinas,Question95,Article2)or‘actsofviolence’(Aquinas,Question96,Article4).Solawandmoralityare,forproponentsoftraditionalnaturallawtheory,deeplyandnecessarilyconnectedwithoneanother;andthenotionofanevil,butvalid,humanlawisasincoherentasthatofasquarecircle.
Initstraditionalform,legalpositivismassertsthathumanlawisessentiallyasocialinstitutiontheexistenceandcontentofwhichis,fundamentally,amatternotofGod’slawbutofhumanwillandpower.AccordingtotheEnglishlegaltheoristJohnAustin,anycivillawisthecommandofahumansovereign.Lawexists,thatis,whensomeonewhoaloneenjoysthehabitualobedienceofthebulkofapopulationhasexpressedthewillthatothersactorforebearfromactinginprescribedways,andhascoupledtheseexpressionsofwillwiththethreatofsanctionsshouldtheirwishesbeunfulfilled.ModernpositivistsuniformlyrejectAustin’scommandtheory,substitutingforthecommandsofthesovereignasetofnorms(e.g.,rules,principlesandvariablestandards)whoselegalvaliditydependsonfundamentalconventionsorsocialrules.Nevertheless,thoughtheemphasisisnowonconventionratherthanoncommand,everymodernpositivistviewslawasamatterofhumancreation;itsexistenceandcontentare,fundamentally,mattersofsocialfact.Thisbasiccommitment,sharedbyallproponentsoflegalpositivism,isusuallytermed‘thesocialthesis’(Raz1979).
AsecondthesisintegraltothepositivisttraditionisAustin’sfamous‘separationthesis’,that‘theexistenceoflawisonething,itsmeritordemeritanother…’(Austin1832,Lecture5).Anyconnectionstheremightbebetweenlawandmoralityarecontingentonly.Thereisnothinginthenatureoflaw–asasocialinstitutiongroundedinthewillofasovereignorinfundamentalsocialconventions–thatguaranteesitsmoralworth.Itisthereforepossibletohaveprofoundlyimmorallawsandwickedlegalregimes.Aquinas’s‘actsofviolence’mayyetbevalidlawonthepositivistmodel.
Despiteasharedcommitmenttothesocialandseparationtheses,defendersoflegalpositivismdiffersignificantlyintheirunderstandingofthesefundamentaltenets.WehavealreadynotedthesplitbetweenAustinandhispositivistdescendantsonthetenabilityofthecommandtheoryasaproperaccountofthesocialthesis.SinceH.L.A.Hart’sdevastatingcritiqueofAustin,mostpositivistsassertthatthetruetestoflegalvalidityliesnotinthewillofasovereignbutinsomethinglikeHart’s‘ruleofrecognition’,thefundamentalsocialrulewhosecriteriadeterminethelawsvalidwithinaparticularlegalsystem(Hart1961)(seeHart,H.L.A.).TheconnectionbetweenHart’sruleofrecognitionandthesocialthesisisevidentintheformer’sconventionalnature:
itsexistenceandcontentaremattersofpuresocialfact–mattersofthecriteriathatareinfactacceptedbylegalofficialsintheirpracticeofestablishinglegalvalidity.Theconnectionwiththeseparationthesisislikewiseevident.Thereisnothinginthebarenotionofasocialruleofrecognitionthatguaranteesthemoralworthinessofthelawsitvalidates.Moreimportant,thereisnothingwhichrequiresthatmoralworthinessbeincludedasaconditionoflegalvalidity.Theacceptedcriteriacanbeassimpleandmorallyneutralas‘WhatevertheQueeninParliamentenactsislaw’,or‘SupremeCourtrulingsconstitutevalidlaw’.
2Dworkin’schallenge
Althoughcontemporarypositivistslargelyagreeonhowbesttointerpretthesocialthesis,thesamecannotbesaidoftheseparationthesis.InresponsetoRonaldDworkin’scritiqueofHart’spositivism(Dworkin1978)(seeDworkin,Ronald),defendersoflegalpositivismhavedividedintotwomajorcamps:
‘inclusivelegalpositivism’(sometimesreferredtoas‘softpositivism’or‘incorporationism’)and‘exclusivelegalpositivism’(sometimesreferredtoas‘hardpositivism’or‘thesourcesthesis’).DefendersofthelatterincludeJosephRaz,AndreiMarmorandScottShapiro;defendersoftheformerincludeHart,JulesColeman,MatthewKramerandWilWaluchow.AmongDworkin’sprincipalcriticismsofHartwasthatthelatter’s‘modelofrules’lacksthetheoreticalcapacitytoaccountforthewidespreaduseofprincipleswithinlegaladjudication(Dworkin1978).Notonlyaresuchprincipleswidelyused,Dworkinmaintained,buttheyaretreatedbyjudgesasbindinglaw.Yetaprincipleistreatedasbindinglawnotbecauseitsatisfiescriteriaofvaliditycontainedwithinaconventionalruleofrecognition,butbecause(intheviewofthejudgewhoemploysit),itexpressesanidealofjustice,fairnessordueprocess–anidealwhichclearlycannotbeestablishedindependentlyofsubstantive,andcontestable,moralargument.SoboththeseparationthesisandHart’srenderingofthesocialthesisintermsofhisconventionalruleofrecognitionareincompatiblewithtreatinglegalprinciplesasbindingnorms.Hartmustinsteadrelegateprinciplestotherealmofnon-legalstandardstowhichjudgesmayappeal,butneednotappeal,astheyexercisetheirdiscretiontofillingapsleftbyvalidlaw(e.g.,whenarelevantstatuteisindeterminateandnootherlegalsourcecanbeinvokedtoresolvetheindeterminacy).Butthisrelegation,Dworkinurges,issomethingtobeavoided.WemustthereforerejectHart’smodelofrules–andtheseparationandsocialtheses–infavourofDworkin’sinterpretivetheoryoflaw,withinwhichlegalityispartlydeterminedbymoralprincipleswhichplacelegalpracticesintheirbestmorallight(Dworkin1978,1986).
3Inclusiveandexclusivepositivism
InresponsetoDworkin’scritiqueofHart,defendersoflegalpositivismhaveemployedawidevarietyofstrategies.Most,however,havefocusedonDworkin’sconstrualoftheseparationthesis,arguingthatDworkinfailstodistinguishtwoverydifferentclaims:
A.Asamatterofconceptualnecessity,thelegalvalidityofanormcanneverbeafunctionofitsconsistencywithmoralprinciplesorvalues.
B.Itisconceptuallypossible,butinnowaynecessary,thatthelegalvalidityofanormisinsomewayafunctionofitsconsistencywithmoralprinciplesorvalues.
AccordingtopropositionA,whichwemightcallthestrongseparationthesis,legalityandmoralityarenecessarilyseparatefromoneanother;moralargumentcanneverbeusedtodeterminewhatthelawis,butonlywhatitoughttobe.AccordingtopropositionB,whichwemightcalltheseparabilitythesis,legalityandmoralityareonlyseparable,notnecessarilyseparate.Thetwocanbebroughttogetheriftherightconditionsprevail,if,e.g.,asociety’sruleofrecognitionincludesconformitywithamoralprinciplelikefairnessasaconditionoflegalvalidity(seeJustice§5).Inclusivepositivistsrejectthestrongseparationthesisbutfullyendorsetheseparabilitythesis.InresponsetoDworkin’sclaimthatsometimesmoralargumentsfigureinattemptstodeterminebindinglaw,defendersofinclusivepositivismreply:
Yes,butthisisnotnecessarilyso.Althoughthereisnothinginthenatureoflaw(ascharacterizedbythesocialandseparabilitytheses)requiringtheuseofmoralargumentstodeterminelegality,thereisnothingwhichprohibitstheiruseeither–asHarthimselfrecognized.Hartwasclearthattheruleofrecognitioncanbeasaustereas‘WhatevertheQueeninParliamentenactsisla
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