世界各地强制使用国际财务报告准则关于经济后果的早期证据外文翻译.docx
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世界各地强制使用国际财务报告准则关于经济后果的早期证据外文翻译.docx
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世界各地强制使用国际财务报告准则关于经济后果的早期证据外文翻译
外文文献翻译
原文:
MandatoryIFRSReportingaroundtheWorld:
EarlyEvidenceontheEconomicConsequences
HolgerDaske,LuziHail,ChristianLeuz,RodrigoVerdi
ABSTRACT
ThispaperexaminestheeconomicconsequencesofmandatoryInternationalFinancialReportingStandards(IFRS)reportingaroundtheworld.Weanalyzetheeffectsonmarketliquidity,costofcapital,andTobin’sqin26countriesusingalargesampleoffirmsthataremandatedtoadoptIFRS.Wefindthat,onaverage,marketliquidityincreasesaroundthetimeoftheintroductionofIFRS.Wealsodocumentadecreaseinfirms’costofcapitalandanincreaseinequityvaluations,butonlyifweaccountforthepossibilitythattheeffectsoccurpriortotheofficialadoptiondate.Partitioningoursample,wefindthatthecapital-marketbenefitsoccuronlyincountrieswherefirmshaveincentivestobetransparentandwherelegalenforcementisstrong,underscoringthecentralimportanceoffirms’reportingincentivesandcountries’enforcementregimesforthequalityoffinancialreporting.Comparingmandatoryandvoluntaryadopters,wefindthatthecapitalmarketeffectsaremost
pronouncedforfirmsthatvoluntarilyswitchtoIFRS,bothintheyearwhentheyswitchandagainlater,whenIFRSbecomemandatory.Whiletheformerresultislikelyduetoself-selection,thelatterresultcautionsustoattributethecapital-marketeffectsformandatoryadopterssolelyorevenprimarilytotheIFRSmandate.Manyadoptingcountriesmakeconcurrenteffortstoimproveenforcementandgovernanceregimes,whichlikelyplayintoourfindings.Consistentwiththisinterpretation,theestimatedliquidityimprovementsaresmallerinmagnitudewhenweanalyzethemonamonthlybasis,whichismorelikelytoisolateIFRSreportingeffects.
1.Introduction
TheintroductionofInternationalFinancialReportingStandards(IFRS)forlistedcompaniesinmanycountriesaroundtheworldisoneofthemostsignificantregulatorychangesinaccountinghistory.Over100countrieshaverecentlymovedtoIFRSreportingordecidedtorequiretheuseofthesestandardsinthenearfutureandeventheU.S.SecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)isconsideringallowingU.S.firmstopreparetheirfinancialstatementsinaccordancewithIFRS(SEC[2007]).RegulatorsexpectthattheuseofIFRSenhancesthecomparabilityoffinancialstatements,improvescorporatetransparency,increasesthequalityoffinancialreporting,andhencebenefitsinvestors(e.g.,ECRegulationNo.1606/2002).Fromaneconomicperspective,therearereasonstobeskepticalabouttheseexpectationsand,inparticular,thepremisethatsimplymandatingIFRSmakescorporatereportingmoreinformativeormorecomparable.Thus,theeconomicconsequencesofmandatingIFRSreportingarenotobvious.
Inthispaper,weprovideearlyevidenceonthecapital-marketeffectsaroundtheintroductionofmandatoryIFRSreportingin26countriesaroundtheworld.Usingatreatmentsampleofover3,100firmsthataremandatedtoadoptIFRS,weanalyzeeffectsinstockmarketliquidity,costofequitycapital,andfirmvalue.Thesemarket-basedconstructsshouldreflect,amongotherthings,changesinthequalityoffinancialreportingandhenceshouldalsoreflectimprovementsaroundtheIFRSmandate.Weemployfourproxiesformarketliquidity,thatis,theproportionofzeroreturns,thepriceimpactoftrades,totaltradingcosts,andbid–askspreads,fourmethodstocomputetheimpliedcostofequitycapital,anduseTobin’sqasaproxyforfirms’equityvaluations.
TheprimarychallengeofouranalysisisthattheapplicationofIFRSismandatedforallpubliclytradedfirmsinagivencountryfromacertaindateon.Thismakesitdifficulttofindabenchmarkagainstwhichtoevaluateanyobservedcapital-marketeffects.Ourempiricalstrategyusesthreesetsofteststoaddressthisissue.First,usingfirm-yearpaneldatafrom2001to2005,webenchmarkliquidity,costofcapital,andvaluationeffectsaroundtheintroductionofIFRSagainstchangesinothercountriesthatdonotyetmandateorallowIFRSreporting.WealsoincludefirmsfromIFRSadoptioncountriesthatdonotyetreportunderIFRSattheendofoursampleperiodbecausetheirfiscalyearendsafterDecember2005,which,exceptforSingapore,isthedateafterwhichoursamplefirmsmustuseIFRS.Bothbenchmarkshelpustocontrolforcontemporaneouscapital-marketeffectsthatareunrelatedtotheintroductionofIFRS.Inaddition,weintroducefirm-fixedeffectstoaccountforunobservedtime-invariantfirmcharacteristics.
Second,stillusingfirm-yearpaneldata,weexaminewhethertheestimatedcapital-marketeffectsexhibitplausiblecross-sectionalvariationwithrespecttocountries’institutionalframeworks.AstheregulatorychangeforcesmanyfirmstoadoptIFRSthatwouldnothavedonesootherwise,weexpectmandatoryIFRSreportingtohaveasmallereffectornoimpactincountrieswithweaklegalandenforcementregimesorwherefirmshavepoorreportingincentivestobeginwith.Moreover,assumingthatmandatoryIFRSreportingisproperlyenforced,theimpactislikelytobesmallerincountriesthatalreadyhavehighreportingqualityorwherelocalgenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciples(GAAP)andIFRSarefairlyclose.
Third,weexploitthatfirmsbeginapplyingIFRSatdifferentpointsintimedependingontheirfiscalyear-endsandthat,asaresult,theadoptionpatterninagivencountryislargelyexogenousoncetheinitialdateforIFRSadoptionisset.Werelatethispatterntochangesinaggregateliquidityinagivencountryandmonth.IftheintroductionofIFRSreportinghasindeeddiscernableeffects,weexpectchangesinaggregateliquiditytobemostpronouncedinmonthswhenmanyfirmsreportunderIFRSforthefirsttime.Thatis,changesinliquidityshouldmirrorcountries’stepwise
transitiontowardsthenewreportingregimeandnotsimplyreflectatimetrendoraone-timeshock.Asthisapproachhasfewerdatarestrictions,weanalyzeliquidityeffectsfor6,500mandatoryadopters,thatis,firmsthatreportunderIFRSforthefirsttimewhenitbecomesmandatory.
Webeginourfirstsetofanalyseswithasimpledifference-in-differencesanalysisandfindthatmandatoryadoptersexhibitasignificantlylargerincreaseinmarketliquiditythanarandomsampleofnonadoptingbenchmarkfirmsfromaroundtheworld.Incontrast,thechangesinTobin’sqformandatoryadoptersareinsignificantandtheircostofcapitalevenincreasesrelativetobenchmarkfirms.Whilethelatterfindingsmaybesurprising,theydonotyetaccountforthepossibilitythatmarketslikelypricetheIFRSmandateaheadoftheactualadoptiondate.
Next,werunfirm-levelpanelregressionsthatcontrolfortime-varyingfirmcharacteristics,marketwidechangesinthedependentvariable,industry-year-fixed,andfirm-fixedeffects.WefindthatmarketliquidityincreasesforfirmsthatadoptIFRSreportingwhenitbecomesmandatory.Inourmainspecification,thepercentageofdayswithouttradesdeclinesby100basispointsformandatoryadopters,whichisclosetoa4%liquidityimprovementrelativetothemedianlevelpriortoIFRSadoption.Totaltradingcostsandthepercentagebid–askspreadsbothdeclineby12basispoints,indicatingliquidityincreasesof3%and6%,respectively,relativetothemedianlevelpriortoIFRSadoption.Theresultsforpriceimpactareinsignificantinthemainspecification.Forparsimonyandtoreducemeasurementerror,weaggregateallfourliquidityproxiesintoasingleliquidityfactorandagainfindastatisticallysignificantincreaseinliquidityformandatoryIFRSadopters.WealsovarythecompositionofthebenchmarksampleusingthecompleteWorldscopepopulationorU.S.firmsonly.Whilethesevariationsdonotchangethetenoroftheresults,theyindicatethatbenchmarkingandthespecificchoiceofthebenchmarkareimportantinevaluatingtheliquidityeffectsaroundtheIFRSmandate.
ThecostofcapitalandTobin’sqresultsaremixed.OurbasespecificationindicatesanincreaseinthecostofcapitalandadecreaseofTobin’sqintheyearwhenIFRSreportingbecomesmandatory,similartothedifference-differencesanalysis.Itispossible,though,thattheseresultsstemfromtransitioneffects,suchastemporarydifficultiesinforecastingearningsunderthenewaccountingregime,whichcanaffecttheimpliedcostofcapital,orchangesinthemeasurementoftotalassets,whichcanaffectTobin’sq.AnotherexplanationisthatmarketsanticipatetheeffectsoftheIFRSmandate,inwhichcaseincludingobservationsofswitchingfirmsbefore
theintroductionofIFRS(asourpanelapproachdoes)likelyworksagainstfindingadecrease(increase)inthecostofcapital(Tobin’sq).Consistentwiththeexistenceofanticipationeffects,wefindthatthecostofcapitaldecreasesby26basispointsandTobin’sqincreasesby7%whenwemeasuretheeffectoneyearbeforethemandatoryadoptiondate.
Whiletheliquidityandthe(anticipation-adjusted)costofcapitalandvaluationeffectsformandatoryadoptersareeconomicallysignificant,theyaregenerallysmallerthanthecorrespondingcapital-marketeffectsofvoluntaryadopters.Thatis,thelattergroupexhibitssignificantliquidity,valuation,andcostofcapitaleffectsaroundtheintroductionofmandatoryIFRSreporting,despitethefactthatthesefirmshavealreadyswitchedtoIFRSpriortothemandate.Thereareseveralwaystointerpretthisfinding.First,itcouldreflectcomparabilitybenefitsthataccruetothevoluntaryadopterswhentheotherfirmsinthecountryhavetoswitchtoIFRS.Weconductsometestsontheroleofcomparabilityeffects,butareuna
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