草根民主和收入分配来自中国乡村选举的证据姚洋1.docx
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草根民主和收入分配来自中国乡村选举的证据姚洋1.docx
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草根民主和收入分配来自中国乡村选举的证据姚洋1
GrassrootsDemocracyandIncomeDistribution:
EvidencefromVillageElectioninChina
YanShen
Assistantprofessor
&
YangYao*
Professor
ChinaCenterforEconomicResearch
PekingUniversity
April9,2006
GrassrootsDemocracyandIncomeDistribution:
EvidencefromVillageElectioninChina
Abstract.Usingvillageandhouseholdsurveydatacollectedfrom48villagesofeightChineseprovincesfortheperiod1986–2002,thispaperstudieshowtheintroductionofvillageelectionaffectsincomedistributionatthevillagelevel.Weestimatebothastaticfixed-effectpanelmodelandadynamicpanelmodelandtakecareoftheendogeneityoftheelection.Theresultofthedynamicpanelmodelshowsthatelectionhasadirect(marginal)effecttoreducethewithin-villageGinicoefficientby0.033,or11.8%ofthesampleaverage.Wealsofindindynamicpanelmodelsthatelectiondoesnotincreasethelevelandtheprogressivenessofnettransferincomereceivedbyhouseholds.Ontheotherhand,wefindthatelectionincreasesper-capitapublicinvestment.Soelection’spositiveroleinreducingincomeinequalityisnotcausedbypro-poorincomeredistribution,butbymorepublicinvestment.
Keywords:
grassrootsdemocracyincomedistributiondynamicpanelmodel
JELclassification:
D63,D72,H41
Democracycouldreduceincomeinequalityfortworeasons.Oneisthatdemocracyleadsthegovernmenttocatertotheinterestsofthemedianvoterwhoingeneralprefersredistributionofincome(AlbertoAlesinaandDaniRodrik,1994;RolandBenabou,1996).Theotheristhatdemocracypressesthegovernmenttospendmoreonpublicfacilitiesthatenhancetheincomecapabilityofthepoorer.Existingstudiesusingcountry-leveldatahavenotprovidedconclusiveresults,though.Thispaperaddsontotheliteraturebyprovidingatestusingmicro-leveldatacollectedongrassrootsdemocracyinruralChina.Oneproblemwithcross-countrystudiesisthatthefunctionofdemocracydependsonacountry’ssocialsettingsandotherinstitutionalarrangements,butcross-sectionalregressionstendtoignorethosefactors.Sincegrassrootsdemocracyoperateswithinthesameinstitutionalframeworkandroughlythesamesetofsocialsettings,amicro-levelstudyhasanadvantageovercross-countrystudies.Toourknowledge,oursisthefirststudyattemptingtotesttherelationshipbetweendemocracyandincomedistributionusingmicro-leveldata.
Existingevidencesuggeststhatgrassrootsdemocracyraisestheresponsivenessofthelocalgovernmentandleadstopro-poorpoliciesatthelocallevel.RaghabendraChattopadhyayandEstherDuflo(2004)foundthattheelectionofawomanvillageheadinIndianvillageshadledtotheintroductionofpro-womanpolicies.AndrewFosterandMarkRosenzwig(2001)foundthatvillageelectioninIndiahadincreasedlocalgovernments’investmentinroadbuildingandreducedtheirinvestmentinirrigationfacilities.Theyinterpretedthisfindingasevidenceforapro-poorpolicybecauseirrigationbenefitedlandlordsandbuildingroadsprovidedjobstothelandless.XiaoboZhang,ShenggenFan,LinxiuZhang,andJikunHuang(2004)foundthatvillageelectionincreasedtheshareofpublicinvestmentinvillageexpendituresusingasamplefromJiangsuprovince,China.LiGan,LixinXu,andYangYao(2005a,2005b)furtherfoundthatvillageelectionhelpedtoreducethenegativeimpactsofhealthshocksonfarmers’incomeandstrengthenfarmers’consumptionsmoothingcapabilities.Allthesefindingssuggestthatgrassrootsdemocracycouldfunctiontoreduceincomeinequalityatthelocallevel.Nevertheless,theydonotprovidedirectevidenceforthestrengthofthatrelationship,nordotheytellusthechannelbywhichdemocracyimprovesincomeequality.Ontheotherhand,decentralizationassociatedwithgrassrootsdemocracycouldalsoleadtoelitecaptureasitmakesiteasierforlocalelitestodominatethelocalpolitics(PranabBardhanandDilipMookherjee,2005),soitistheoreticallyunclearwhetherincomedistributionwouldbeunequivocallyimprovedbygrassrootsdemocracy.
Ourtestmakesuseofauniquepaneldatasetwithasampleof48villagesfrom8Chineseprovincesfortheperiod1986-2002.Chinabegantoexperimentvillageelectionin1987andenactedTheOrganicLawofVillageCommittees(OLVC)toformalizeitin1998.Sincethen,almostallthevillageshaveheldatleastoneelection.Inthemeantime,incomeinequalityrosefrom0.29in1987to0.35in2000inruralChina(CarlRiskin,RenweiZhao,andShiLi,2002).Ourdatathuscoveracriticalperiodofbothelectionandincomedistribution.Toavoidthecomplexitiesarisingfrompoliticalcycles,wefocusontheeffectsoftheintroductionofthefirstelection.Weestimatebothastaticfixed-effectpanelmodelandadynamicpanelmodeltopindownthem.WealsodealwiththeendogeneityofelectionwiththeIVmethod.Theresultofthedynamicmodelshowsthatintheshortrun,theintroductionofelectionhasadirect(marginal)effectofreducingthevillageGinicoefficientby0.033,or11.8%ofthesampleaverageof0.28.Thiseffectisverystrongagainstthebackgroundofrisingincomeinequalityinthesampleperiod.Moreover,weestimateseveraldynamicpanelmodelstostudytheeffectsofelectiononnetincometransferandpublicinvestment.Basedonhousehold-leveldata,wefindthatelectiondoesnotaffecttheamountofnetincometransferreceivedbytheaveragehousehold,nordoesitincreasetheprogressivenessofthetransfer.Ontheotherhand,wefindthatelectionincreasesthelevelofper-capitapublicexpendituresatthevillagelevel.Wefurtherfindwithhouseholddatathatelectionreducestheamountoftotalincometransferreceivedbytheaveragehousehold.Sincetransferincomeandpublicinvestmentaretheonlytwocomponentsofpublicexpenditures,thismeansthatelectionincreasespublicinvestment.Thesefindingssuggestthatelectionimprovesincomedistributionnotbymoreredistributionofincome,butbymorepublicinvestment.
Therestofthepaperisorganizedasthefollows.Section1providesabriefintroductiontovillageelectioninChina.Section2introducesthedataandsomekeydescriptiveresults.Section3presentsthemainresultsconcerningtheimpactofelectiononincomedistribution.Section4iscomprisedoftwoparts.Thefirstpartstudiestheeffectsofelectiononnetincometransferusinghouseholdleveldata,andthesecondpartstudiestheeffectofelectiononpublicinvestment.Section5concludes.
I.ABriefIntroductiontoVillageElectioninRuralChina
TheChinesecommunesystemwasdissolvedintheearly1980s.Thecommuneasanadministrativeunitwasreplacedbythetownship,andtheproductionbrigadeunderthecommunewasreplacedbythevillagecommittee(VC).The1982Constitutiondefinesthevillagecommitteeasaself-governingbodyofthevillagers(Clause111).However,committeemembershadbeenappointedratherthanelectedexceptinafewlocalities.In1987,undertheleadershipofchairmanWanLi,theNationalPeople’sCongress(NPC),theChineselegislativebody,passedatentativeversionoftheOLVCthatrequiredthevillagecommitteebeelected.ThislawtriggeredelectionsinChinesevillages.By1994,halfoftheChinesevillageshadbegunelections.By1997,25ofthe31mainlandprovinceshadadoptedalocalversionofthelaw,and80%ofthevillageshadbegunelections(MinistryofCivilAffairs,1998).In1998,theformalversionoftheOLVCwaspassedbytheNPCandelectionhassincespreadquicklytoalmostallthevillages.
TheVCiscomprisedofthreetosevenmembersdependingonthesizeofthevillage.Thecoremembersarethechairman,vicechairman,andaccountant.Before1998,candidatesforthechairmanwereusuallyappointedbythetownshipgovernmentalthoughpopularnomination,amixtureofgovernmentappointmentandpopularnomination,andnominationbyvillagerrepresentativesalsoexisted.TheformalversionoftheOLVCrequiresthatcandidatesbenominatedbyvillagers,andtheminimumnumberofvillagerstoproposeacandidateisten.Aprimer,then,isheldtoreducethenumberofcandidatestotwo,andtheformalcontestisrunbetweenthesetwofrontrunners.Thisversionofelectionispopularlycalledhai-xuan.Since1998hai-xuanhasbecomemorepopular.Thetermofthecommitteeisthreeyearsbutnotermlimitisrequired.
VillageelectioninChinaoperatesinaweakinstitutionalenvironment.Inatypicalvillage,theelectedVCfacestwomajorchallengesthatmayhinderitsabilitytoservethewillsofthevillagers.Thefirstisitsrelationshipwiththecommunistpartycommitteeinthevillage.Despitethefactthatthepartycommitteeisnotpopularlyelected,theOLVCstipulatesthattheVCworkundertheleadershipofthepartycommittee,reflectingthenatureofChina’sone-partysystem.Sincehe/sheisappointedbythehigherauthority,thepartysecretaryoftenpursuesadifferentagendathantheVC’s.Backedbypopularvotes,however,thechairmanoftheVCoftendefiesthedirectionofthepartysecretary,buttheresultofthecontestisnotalwaysinhisfavor(JeanOiandScottRozelle,2000;ZhenglinGuoandThomasBernstein,2004).ToreconciletheconflictsbetweentheVCandthepartysecretary,thecentralgovernmenthasbeguntoencouragethelattertorunfortheVCchairmaninelections.Whilethiswilleasethetensioninsidethevillage(GuoandBernstein,2004),theVCstillneedstofaceasecondchallengethatcomesfromabove.Sincevillageelectionoperatesinanauthoritarianinstitutionalenvironment,wheretheupper-levelgovernments,thetownshipandcountygovernmentsinparticular,arenotelectedandoftenintrud
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