破#产成本与融资租赁决策.docx

破#产成本与融资租赁决策.docx

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破#产成本与融资租赁决策

破产成本与融资租赁决策[文献翻译]外文题目:

 Bankruptcy Costs and the Financial Leasing Decision出处:

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT作者:

SivaramaKrishnan and CharlesMoyer原文:

Abstract:

 The theoryof financialleasing views financial leasesassubstitutesforsecureddebt.Empiricalstudieshavereportedahighpositivecorrelationbetweenleaseratiosand debtratios and thatlessorsearnhigherratesofreturnthanlenders. Theseresultscontradicttraditional leasing theory. Theyareexplainedinthispaperbyrecognizing the rolebankruptcy costs playin the lease/borrow decision and the natureof the assetstobeacquiredbyafirm. Leasing isshowntoinvolvelower bankruptcy costs thanborrowing.Ourempiricalanalysisshowsthatlesseefirmshavelowerretainedearningsrelativetototalassets,highergrowthrates,lowercoverageratios,higherdebtratios, and higheroperatingriskthannon-lesseefirms.LesseefirmsalsohavesignificantlylowerAltmanZ-scores,ameasureof bankruptcy potential.Overall,ourresultsindicatethatas bankruptcy potentialincreases,leasefinancingesanincreasinglyattractivefinancingoption.Wealsofindevidencetosupportanindustryclienteleeffectin financial leasing.Thispaperre-examines thelease/borrow decision,givingexplicitrecognitionto the rolebankruptcy costs play and to the relativetransactions costs of leasing and borrowing.Ourfocusisonnoncancellable,long-term financial leasesbecause theyaremostnearly theequivalentofdebtfinancing.Welimitourconsiderationof financialleasing tocapitalleases,asdefinedinFASBStatement#13.Becausecapitalleasesgenerallydonotmeetthe leasedefinitionrequirementsof the InternalRevenueService（RevenueProcedure75-21）, theyprovideauniqueopportunitytotestnon-tax theoriesof leasing. The paperemphasizeslesseefirmcharacteristicsthatinducesignificant leasing behavior,ratherthan the characteristicsofspecificleasecontracts.Leasing isshowntohavelowerexpected bankruptcy costs to thelessorthanborrowinghasto the lender,resultinginlowerfinancing costs for the lesseethanthe borrower,ceterisparibus.Offsetting the lowerbankruptcy costs associatedwith leasingare the generallyhighertransactions costs of leasing relativetoborrowing. The tradeoffbetween bankruptcy costs and transactions costs mayexplain the preferenceforborrowingbymorecreditworthyfirms and for leasing bylesscreditworthyfirms.Wefindsupportforthebankruptcy costargumentasanexplanationfor the leaseversusborrow decision.Ourresultsareconsistentwithapeckingorder theoryoffinancingwherefirmswithgreaterfinancial distresspotentialand highdebtleverage,ceterisparibus,mayfindfinancingalternativesto leasing unavailable.Also,wefindthat leasing isasignificantlymonmethodoffinancingforfirmsinmanufacturingindustries,whereassetspecificityisgreater,thanforfirmsinmostothermajorindustrygroupings.1.LiteratureReviewThetheoryof financial leasing （e.g..Bower（1973）,Brealey and Young（1980）,Brick,Fung, andSubrahmanyam（1987）,Lewellen,Long, and McConnell（1976）,Miller and Upton（1976）, and Myers,Dill, andBautista（1976））traditionallyhasfocusedon the differentialtaxpositionof the lessee and the lessorasthe primaryrationalefor leasing.Brick,Fung, andSubrahmanyam（1987）extended the tax-basedanalysistoconsidereconomiesofscaleinStructuringleasecontracts and the costofmanagingcashflowsin thepresenceofdefaultrisk and interestrateuncertainty.DelaTorre and Benjamin（1991）,Krahan andMeran（1987）, and Lease,McConnell, and Schallheim（1990）consider the roleofinformationasymmetriesbetweenthe lessee and the lessorregarding the residualvalueof the leasedassetasafurtherexplanationforleasefinancing.Empiricalstudiesof leasing,includingCrawford,Harper, and McConnell（CHM）（1981）,Gudikunst and Roberts（1978）,Roenfeldt and Henry（1979）,Schallheim,Johnson,Lease,onnell（1987）,and Sorensen and Johnson（1977）havereportedhighexantereturnsforlessors, and byimplication,highleaseratespaidbylessees.Forexample,Crawford,Harper,and McConnellfoundthatlessors'exanteratesofreturnweresignificantlyhigherthan theyieldonBBB-ratedbondsduring the sametimeperiod.Lease,McConnell, and Schallheim（1990）documentedhighrealizedreturnson financial leasing contracts,although the realizedreturnswerelessthan the expectedreturns.Further, theyfoundthatrealizedsalvagevaluestendedtoexceedgreatly the actualsalvagevaluesonwhich the leasecontractwasbased.Inaddition,Ang and Peterson（1984） and Bowman（1980）foundthatdebt and leasefinancingweresignificantly,positivelycorrelated,implyingthatdebt and leasefinancingplementsnotsubstitutes.Ang and Petersonfoundthattaxratedifferencesbetweenleasing and non-leasing firmscannotexplainplementaryrelationshipbetweendebtand leasefinancing.Marston and Harris（1988）provideonepossibleexplanationforthisapparentanomaly. Theystudiedchangesin the debtratio and leaseratioforindividualfirmsovertimeand found themtobeinverselyrelated-confirmingthatdebt and leasefinancingaresubstitutes.Thatis,foreachfirm,debt and leasefinancingaresubstitutes,butfirmsemployingleasefinancingtypicallyusehigherlevelsofparedtofirmsthatdonotuseleasefinancing.Finucane（1988）alsofoundevidenceofapositiverelationshipbetweendebt and leasefinancing.Finucaneshowsthatfirmsincertainindustries,includingairtransportand retailing,relymoreheavilyonleasefinancingthanothers.Across-sectionalanalysisrevealedthattheleaseratio（capitalizedleasestototalassets）isrelatedtoseveralvariables,includingthelevelofmortgagedebtandthebondratingforthefirm.Firmswithlowerbondratingswerefoundtoleasemorefrequently-aresultthatisconsistentwithourexpectedbankruptcycosthypothesis.Tax-relatedfactorswerenotfoundtobeimportantinexplainingthelevelofleasingbyafirm.VoraandEzzell（1991）foundsignificanttaxratedifferencesbetweenlesseesandlessors,althoughtheyfoundthatthelessee'staxrateisnotnecessarilylowerthantherespectivelessor's.SmithandWakeman（1985）offerprehensiveanalysisoftherationaleforleasingthathelpstoexplainmanyoftheseseeminglyanomalousempiricalfindings.Forexample,thehighratesofreturnexpectedandactuallyearnedbylessorsmaybeattributedtoeitheracomparativeadvantageofthelessorindisposingofassetsattheterminationofaleaseortheabilityofthelessortoexercisemarketpowerandtopricediscriminateamongvariousassetusergroups.SmithandWakemanarguefurtherthattheAngandPetersonfindingthatleasingandborrowingplementarycanbeexplainedacrossfirmsbyexaminingthecharacteristicsoffirms'investmentopportunitysets.LewisandSchallheim（1992）modelthedebt/leasefinancingdecisionasasubstitutionbetweendebtandnon-debttaxshields.Intheirmodel,non-debttaxshieldsaresold,vialeasing,therebyreducingthepotentialredundancywithinterestdeductionsandmakingthemarginalvalueofdebtpositive.Thelesseerespondsbyissuingadditionaldebt,ountsforthepositiverelationshipbetweendebtandleasefinancing.Thebenefitfromleasinginthismodelisrealizedevenifthemarginaltaxrateisthesameforthelesseeandlessor.Inthenextsectionwepresentanon-taxrationaleforfinancial（capital）leasingthatoffersadditionalinsightregardingtherelationshipbetweendebtandleasefinancing.II.ANon-TaxRationaleforLeasingBarro（1976）,Benjamin（1978）,JacksonandKronman（1979）,Scott（1977）,andSmithandWarner（1979）suggestthatsecureddebtisafinancialcontractingmechanismaimedatreducingthepotentialagencycostsofdebt.StulzandJohnson（1985）formalizetheearlieranalysisandshowthatsecureddebtreducespotentialrisk-takingbehavioroftheborrowerandthusreducesmonitoringcoststothelender.LeethandScott（1989）foundthatsecureddebtispositivelyassociatedwithloandefaultprobability,assetmarketability,andloansize.RetainingtheoptiontoissuesecureddebtalsocontrolstheunderinvestmentproblemsidentifiedbyMyers（1977）.Manyofthepropertiesofsecureddebtcanbeextendedtofinancial（capital）leasing,becausecapitalleasesimposeconsequencesonafirmthataresimilartosecureddebtfinancing.FollowingLeethandScott（1989）andScott（1977）,itcanbearguedthatleaseshavelowerexpectedbankruptcycostsforthelessorthansecureddebthasforthelender,therebymakingleasingapreferredfinancingalternativeforfirmswithahigherpotentialforfinancialdistress.Thelegaltreatmentoftheclaimsoflessorsisdifferentfromthetreatmentoftheclaimsofsecuredlendersinbankruptcy.Theclaimsofsecuredcreditorsaredilutedconsiderablymoreparableclaimsoflessorsinbankruptciesfollowedanization.AdebtormayfileapetitionforreliefeitherunderChapter11oftheBankruptcyCodeforthepurposeofanizationorunderChapter7forliquidation.Uponfilingthepetition,thedebtorobtainsimmediatereliefintheformofanautomaticstaythatpreventscreditoractionsorenforcementsagainstthedebtor.Whilethestayisinforce,creditors（andlessors）arenotabletoenforceliens.Thestayalsopreventsanyacttoobtainpossessionofanyproperty,regardlessofwhoholdsthetitle.Thestayisterminatedattheendof30daysunlessthebankruptcycourtordersitscontinuance.Thetreatmentoflessorsandsecuredcreditorsappearstobeidenticalatthisstage.Insubsequentstatesofanizationproceedingshowever,therearesignificantdifferences.Theclaimsofthesecuredlenderenjoypriorityinthedistributionoftheproceedsofthecollateral.Ifthevalueofthecollateralislessthantheamountofthedebt,thesecuredlenderisentitledtothevalu