在组奖励中的激励强度的决定因素外文翻译.docx
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在组奖励中的激励强度的决定因素外文翻译.docx
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在组奖励中的激励强度的决定因素外文翻译
外文文献翻译译文
一、外文原文:
原文:
DETERMINANTSOFINCENTIVEINTENSITYINGROUPBASEDREWARDS
THEORYANDHYPOTHESES
AgencyTheoryandIncentiveIntensity
Afundamentalargumentintheagencytheoryliteratureandinmuchofthecompensationliteratureisthattheincentiveintensityofrewards—oftenmeasuredasthevariableportionofpay—enhancesemployeecontributionstoperformance.Incentive-intensivepayincreaseseffortandmayincreasethetalentlevelofthoseattractedtoacompensationplan.Higherincentiveintensityincreasesthemarginalgainsinincomethatemployeesreceivefromincreasedeffort.Ifincreasedefforthasphysicalorpsychologicalcosts,agentswillchooselevelsofeffortwherebythemarginalgainfromeffortequalsitsmarginalcost.Therefore,whenpayplansaremoreincentive-intensive,employeesreachhigherlevelsofeffortbeforedecidingthattheseincreasesfailtocompensatefortheirpersonalcosts.Researchinavarietyoffieldsconfirmsthisrelationshipbetweenincentiveintensityandeffort(e.g.,Ehrenberg&Bognanno,1990;Landau&Leventhal,1976;Zenger,1992).
Higherincentiveintensitymayalsohelpcompanieslureandkeeptalentedworkers(Lazear,1986;Rynes,1987;Zenger,1994).Giventherandomnessofmeasuredperformance,asincentiveintensityrises,sodoestheuncertaintyofanindividual'spay.Thehighertheincentiveintensity,themorelikelyitisthatonlytheverybestperformers(thosewhohavethehighestprobabilityofgeneratingstrongmeasuredperformance)willfinditefficienttoassumetheriskofanincentive-intensivecontract.Assuggestedinempiricalstudies,employeeswithlowerability—thoseunlikelytogeneratehighperformance—willprefercontractsthatplacelessemphasisonperformance(Cable&Judge,1994;U.S.OfficeofPersonnelManagement,1988;Zenger,1994).
Incentive'intensityingrouprewardsshouldfunctionmuchlikeincentiveintensityinindividualrewards:
higherlevelsshouldmotivateeffort,luretalent,andtherebyenhanceperformance.AsKrusearguedinregardtoprofit-sharingplans,"Thesizeoftheprofitshareinrelationtootheremployeecompensationshouldclearlybeanimportantfactorintheimpactofprofitsharinguponworkplacerelationsandperformance.Aprofitsharethat,for
example,averageslessthan1percentofemployeecompensationisunlikelytobetakenseriouslybyemployeesasanincentiveforincreasedeffort,monitoring,andcooperationwithworkers"(1993:
81).Byescalatingtheincentiveintensityofgrouprewards(theincentiveportionofpay),managersenhancetheindividualbenefitfromincreasedgroupeffortandpromotedesirableself-selection.Althoughgroupincentivepayislessattractivetotoptalentthanindividualincentivepay(seeCable&Judge,1994;Weiss,1987),toptalentshouldpreferhighlyincentive-intensivegrouppaytoweaklyincentive-intensivegrouppay.Kruse(1993)providedsomeempiricalevidenceofarelationshipbetweenincentiveintensityandperformanceingrouprewards.Thus,ourmotivationforexploringthedeterminantsofincentiveintensitystemmedfromtheunderlyingassumptionthathigherincentiveintensitytriggershighereffort,luressuperiortalent,andgenerallyyieldshigherperformancelevels.
CostsofIncreasingIncentiveIntensity
Theratherlowincentiveintensitycharacteristicofrewardsinmanyfirmssuggestssignificantimpedimentstoraisingincentiveintensity.Agencytheoristspointtofourimpediments.First,incentiveintensityisconstrainedbyagents'inabilitytocontrolperformancemeasures(Lai&Srinivasan,1993;Milgrom&Roberts,1992;Weitzman,1980).Ifagentscannotcontrolperformancemeasures,thenimposinghighlevelsofincentiveintensityimposessubstantialuncertaintyonemployeesandprovidesrathermodestmotivationalbenefits.
Second,incentiveintensityisconstrainedbytheinaccuracyofperformancemeasures,ortheweaknessofthelinkbetweentrueandmeasuredperformance(Holmstrom&Milgrom,1991;Milgrom&Roberts,1992).Ifmeasuredperformanceisonlyweaklycorrelatedwithtrueperformance,aggressivelyrewardingmeasuredperformancemayencourageagentstoneglectunmeasuredperformancedimensions,therebyloweringtrueperformance.
Third,someagencytheoristsandscholarsoutsideeconomicshavearguedthatprocessesofpaycomparisonconstrainincentiveintensitywithinorganizations(Lazear,1989;Milgrom&Roberts,1988;Pfeffer&Langton,1993;Zenger,1992).Higherincentiveintensitygeneratesgreatervarianceinpayandmagnifiesthenegativeeffectsofcomparisonprocesses(Lazear,1989;Pfeffer&Langton,1993).Employeesreducetheireffort,leaveafirm,orevensabotageitsactivitieswhentheyperceivepaydifferencesasinequitable(Adams,1965;Deutsch,1985).Loweringincentiveintensityreducespayvarianceandthusdiminishestheeffectsofthesecomparisons.
Fourth,incentiveintensityisconstrainedby"intertemporal"problemsofincentiveratchetingandoutputrestriction.Managershaveanincentivetostrategicallyalterincentivestructures,adjustingpayoutsdownward(orperformancehurdlesupward)onceemployeesrevealtheircapacitytoperform(Gibbons,1987;Miller,1992).Recognizingthismanagerialincentive,employeeshaveanincentivetorestrictoutputinanticipationofdownwardratchetingofpayoutsshouldtheyrevealtheircapacityforhardwork(Mathewson,1931;Whyte,1955).Suchconcernsmaypromptthereductionoreliminationofincentiveintensityinrewards.
DeterminantsofIncentiveIntensityinGroup-BasedRewards
Althoughgrouprewardspartiallycircumventtheimpedimentstoincentiveintensitydetailedabove,designersofgrouppayplansnonethelessconfrontsimilarimpediments.
Controlofperformancemeasures.Aprimaryadvantageofgrouprewardsisthecapacitytolinkparticipants'paytoaperformancemeasureoverwhichtheyhaverathercompletecontrol.However,thiscontroliscollective,witheachindividualhavingonlyalimitedcapacitytocontroltheoutcome.Consistentwithagencytheory,thisinabilitytoindividuallycontrolobservableperformancemeasuresencourageslowerlevelsofincentiveintensity(Lai&Srinivasan,1993;Milgrom&Roberts,1992;Weitzman,1980).
Agroup'ssizestronglyinfiuencesitsmembers'capacitytoindividuallycontroltheirgroup'sperformanceandsubsequentindividualpay.Clearly,agroupmemberhasmoredirectcontrolovertheperformanceofasmallgroupthanoverthatofalargegroup.Thus,tomakealargeportionofindividualpaycontingentonalargegroup'sperformanceattachespaytoameasureoverwhichanygivenemployeehaslittlecontrol.Consequently,whengroupsarelarge,incentiveintensitywillbelower,refiectinglowabilitytocontrolmeasuredperformance.
Thedirectincentivestriggeredbygrouprewardsmaydissipateratherrapidlyasgroupsincreaseinsize.However,grouprewardstriggermutualmonitoringand"concertive"control(Barker,1993);employeesmonitorandencouragetheirpeers'performanceandtightlyscreennewapplicants(Welbourne,Balkin,&Gomez-Mejia,1993).Suchmutualmonitoringorconcertivecontrolmayextendtheeffectivenessofgrouprewardstosizelevelsatwhichdirectfinancialperformanceincentivesarequiteminimal.Theeffectivenessofmutualmonitoringshould,nonetheless,remaincloselylinkedtogroupsizeandthelevelofperformancemeasurement.Mutualmonitoringshouldbemostprevalentwithinsmallgroupplanswherethecontributionsofspecificcolleaguesmorepowerfullyaffectindividualpay.Therefore,agreatercapacitytocontrolperformancebothdirectlyandindirectlyenablesplandesignerstoescalateincentiveintensityinsmallgroupswhileimposingmoremodestlevelsofuncertainty.
Theeffectsofgroupsizeonincentiveintensity,however,maydiminishwithsize.Thus,althoughincreasingagroupfrom10to20membershasalargeeffectonmembers'directandindirectcontrolofperformancemeasures,increasingfrom1,000to1,010membershasratherlimitedbearingonsuchcontrol.Hence,Hypothesis1.Increasesingroupsizehaveanegative,butdiminishing,effectontheincentiveintensityofgroup-basedpayplans.
Thecapacitytocontrolgroupperformancemeasuresmayalsobeinfluencedbytheorganizationallevelatwhichperformanceismeasured,inpartbecauseorganizationalleveliscloselyrelatedtounitsize.Ourfocuswasonemployeeincentiveplans,ratherthanmanagerialincentiveplans.Withthelatterexcluded,planswithlower-levelmeasures,suchasworkteamperformance,areclearlymoreeasilycontrolledbyindividualgroupmembersthanplansthatmeasureperformanceathigherorganizationallevels(suchasdivisions).Thus,Hypothesis2.Group-basedpayplanslinkedtoperformancemeasuresatalowerorganizationallevelwillhavegreaterincentiveintensitythanplanslinkedtoperformancemeasuresatahigherorganizationallevel.
Thecompositionofagroupmayalsoinfluencegroupmembers'capacitytocontrolperformancemeasuresandtherebytheoptimallevelofincentiveintensity.Arguably,employeesinmanagerialpositionshavegreaterinfluenceoverindividualperformancethanemployeesinlower-levelpositions(Baiman,Larker,&Rajan,1993;Gerhart&Milkovich,1990).Managersandprofessionalshavetheauthoritytoinfiuenceabroadersetofperformancedeterminingdecisionsthandolower-levelemployees.Similarargumentscanbemadeforprofessionalemployeeshavinggreatercontroloverorganizationaloutcomesthannonprofessional,nonmanagerialemployees.Consistentwitbagencytheoryreasoning,suchincreasedcontroloveroutcomesshouldenableanincreaseinincentiveintensity(Baimanetal.,1993).EmpiricalstudiesofmanagerialpayplansbyGerhartandMilkovich(1990)a
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