《Public Finance》双语课程教学大纲.docx

《Public Finance》双语课程教学大纲.docx

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《PublicFinance》双语课程教学大纲

《PublicFinance》（双语）课程教学大纲

（2003年制订，2006年修订）

课程编号：

110110

中文名：

公共财政

课程类别：

专业主干课

前置课：

西方经济学、财政学、大学英语

后置课：

学分：

3学分

课时：

51课时

主讲教师：

任巧玲、郭晔、毛翠英等

选定教材：

HarveyS.Rosen:

PublicFinance,NewYork:

McGraw-Hill,2002（节选）.

课程概述：

本课程为财政学专业的专业主干课，本大纲适用于财政学本科专业。

当前，我国的公共财政体制正在进一步地发展和完善，在这个过程中，充分了解和有效借鉴西方市场经济国家财政领域的基础理论和实践状况十分必要。

而在财政学专业课程体系中设置相应课程，正体现出与这一现实要求的协调一致。

本课程主要内容包括：

财政学的定义及其主要思想；公共品的定义及其提供等问题；外部性的本质及其影响和对策；公共选择的各种机制的讨论与评估；赤字融资及其相关问题等。

教学目的：

本课程的教学目的在于使学生在已有知识基础上，重点掌握西方财政学体系中的基本理论观点，也可以了解到西方国家（主要是美国）财政运行的一般情况；使学生能够在不同的具体现实条件中思考运用所学到的相应观点和知识；同时，使学生掌握财政学方面术语的英语表达方式。

教学方法：

本课程作为一门双语教学课程，使用的是英文教材，课堂教学过程中的内容讲解采用中英文结合方式，英语使用程度需要参考学生的整体接受程度。

为强化相关理论知识及其实践运用，本课程根据教学内容进程及其侧重点设置了讨论课时段。

同时，本课程大量借助多媒体手段使讲解更加清楚。

各章教学要求及教学要点

Chapter1Introduction

课时分配：

3课时

教学要求：

通过本章的学习使学生掌握财政学的内涵及其主要功能，并以此为基础把握两种主要的财政思想。

本章重点为财政学的基本涵义。

教学内容：

1.1IntroductionofPublicFinance

Publicfinance,alsoknownaspublicsectoreconomicsorpubliceconomics,focusesonthetaxingandspendingactivitiesofgovernmentandtheirinfluenceontheallocationofresourcesanddistributionofincome.

1.2PublicFinanceandIdeology

1.Organicviewofgovernment

Societyisconceivedofasanaturalorganism．Eachindividualisapartofthisorganism，andthegovernmentcanbethoughtofasitsheart.Theindividualhassignificanceonlyaspartofthecommunity，andthegoodoftheindividualisdefinedwithrespecttothegoodofthewhole.Thus，thecommunityisstressedabovetheindividual.

2.Mechanisticviewofgovernment

Governmentisnotanorganicpartofsociety.Rather,itisacontrivancecreatedbyindividualstobetterachievetheirindividualgoals．Theindividualratherthanthegroupisatcenterstage．

思考题：

1.Howispublicfinancedefined?

2.Whataretheideologicalviewsconcerningtherelationshipbetweentheindividualandthestate?

Chapter2PublicGoods

课时分配：

12课时

教学要求：

通过本章学习使学生掌握公共品的界定和内涵，并以此为基础把握公共品的有效提供及其生产方面的基本观点。

本章重点为公共品的定义及其供给的局部均衡模型。

本章难点为非排他性、公共提供与公共生产。

教学内容：

2.1PublicGoodsDefined

1.Publicgoodsareneitherexcludablenorrival.

Thatis,peoplecannotbepreventedfromusingapublicgood,andoneperson’suseofapublicgooddoesnotreduceanotherperson’sabilitytouseit.

2.Publicgoodsarecharacterizedbynon-rivalryandnon-excludabilityinconsumption.

⑴Non-excludability:

thepropertyofagoodwherebyapersoncannotbepreventedfromusingit.

⑵Non-rivalry:

thepropertyofagoodwherebyoneperson’susedoesn’tdiminishotherpeople’suse.

3.Someimportantaspectsofpublicgoods:

⑴Thus,eachpersonconsumesthesameamount,butnotnecessarilythepreferredamount,ofthepublicgood.

⑵Differenttypesofpublicgoods:

pureandimpurepublicgoods;localpublicgoods;congestiblegoods;etc.

⑶Therelationshipbetweenpublicgoodsandpublicprovision:

Publicgoodsarenotnecessarilypubliclyprovided.

Publicgoodsthatarepubliclyprovidedarenotnecessarilypubliclyproduced.

Publicgoodscanbeprovidedprivately,andprivategoodscanbeprovidedpublicly.

2.2EfficientProvisionofPublicGoods

1.EfficientprovisionofpublicgoodsrequiresthatthesumoftheindividualMRSsequaltheMRT,unlikeprivategoodswhereeachMRSequalstheMRT,requiredbyParetoefficiency.

MRS:

marginalrateofsubstitution.

MRT:

themarginalrateoftransformation.

AParetoefficientallocationoccurswhennopersoncanbemadebetteroffwithoutmakinganotherpersonworseoff.

2.Graphically,it’sshownas“horizontalsummation”forprivategoods,whileforpublicgoodsitis“verticalsummation”.

3.Thefreeriderproblem

Afreeriderisapersonwhoreceivesthebenefitofagoodbutavoidspaymentforit.

Becausepublicgoodsarenotexcludable,thefree-riderproblempreventstheprivatemarketfromsupplyingthem.Thegovernment,however,canpotentiallyremedytheproblem.

Casualobservationandlaboratorystudiesindicatethatpeopledonotfullyexploitfreeridingpossibilities.Nonetheless,inthecertaincases,freeridingisasignificantproblem.

Marketmechanismsareunlikelytoprovidenon-rivalgoodsefficiently,eveniftheyareexcludable.

4.Cost-benefitanalysis

Decidingthatthegovernmentmustplayaroleinsupplyingpublicgoodsisonlythefirststep,andthenthegovernmentmustdeterminewhatkindsofpublicgoodstoprovideandinwhatquantities.

Ifthetotalbenefitsexceedthecostsofsupplyingapublicgood,thegovernmentcanprovideitandpayforitwithtaxrevenue,makingeveryonebetteroff.

Cost-benefitanalysis:

astudythatcomparesthecostsandbenefitstosocietyofprovidingapublicgood.

Cost-benefitanalysishasatoughjob.Itdoesnotobserveanypricesignalswhenevaluatingwhetherthegovernmentshouldprovideapublicgood.

Theefficientprovisionofpublicgoodsis,therefore,intrinsicallymoredifficultthantheefficientprovisionofprivategoods.

2.3AboutPrivatization

1.Privatization:

Itmeanstakinggoodsorservicesthataresuppliedbythegovernmentandturningthemovertotheprivatesectorforprovisionand/orproduction.

2.Publicorprivateproductionofpublicgoods.

Evenincaseswherepublicprovisionofagoodisselected,achoicebetweenpublicandprivateproductionmustbemade:

⑴Betweenpublicsectorandprivatesector

Incentivetoimproveinefficiency;

Difficultyinacquiringandmeasuringefficiency;

Outcome:

costsavingandqualityofoutput.

⑵Determiningwhetherpublicorprivateproductionwillbemoreefficient:

Akeyfactoristhemarketenvironment.Publicversusprivateownershipislessimportantthanwhethereffectivecompetitionispresent.

Anotherimportantquestionistheextenttowhichcompletecontractscanbewrittenwithprivatesectorserviceproviders.

思考题：

1.Howarepublicgoodsdefined?

2.Whydoesthefree-riderprobleminducethegovernmenttoprovidepublicgoods?

3.Howshouldthegovernmentdecidewhethertoprovideapublicgood?

4.Whatistherightmixofpublicandprivateprovisionforpublicgoods?

Chapter3Externalities

课时分配：

15课时

教学要求：

通过本章学习使学生在掌握外部性性质和特征的基础上，把握在应对外部性（主要是负外部性，如污染）方面市场和政府的对策。

本章重点和难点为外部性的定义及其特征、科斯定理、对外部性的公共对策。

教学内容：

3.1TheNatureofExternalities

1.Externality:

theuncompensatedimpactofoneperson’sactionsonthewell-beingofabystander.

Whentheactivityofoneentity（apersonofafirm）directlyaffectsthewelfareofanotherinawaythatisoutsidethemarketmechanism,thateffectiscalledanexternality（becauseoneentitydirectlyaffectsthewelfareofanotherentitythatis“external”toit）.

Simply,anexternalityoccurswhentheactivityofonepersonaffectsanotherpersonoutsidethemarketmechanism.

2.Thenatureofexternalities:

Anexternalityisaconsequenceofthefailureorinabilitytoestablishpropertyrights.Namely,externalitiesmaygenerallybetracedtotheabsenceofenforceablepropertyrights.

3.Thecharacteristicsofexternalities:

Theycanbeproducedbyconsumersaswellasfirms;

Externalitiesarereciprocalinnature;

Externalitiescanbepositive;

Publicgoodscanbeviewedasaspecialkindofexternality.

4.Theeffectofexternalities

⑴Externalitiesleadmarketstoallocateresourcesinefficiently.Externalitiescausemarketpricetodivergefromsocialcost,bringingaboutaninefficientallocationofresources:

Inthepresenceofanegativeexternality,suchaspollution,thesocialcostofthegoodexceedstheprivatecost.Thesociallyoptimalquantityisthereforesmallerthanthemarketequilibriumquantity;

Positiveexternalitiesgenerallyleadtounderprovisionofanactivity.

⑵

Alloftheremediessharethegoalofmovingtheallocationofresourcesclosertothesocialoptimum.

3.2PrivateSolutionstoExternalities

1.BargainingandtheCoaseTheorem

⑴Coasetheorem:

thepropositionthatifprivatepartiescanbargainwithoutcostovertheallocationofresources,theycansolvetheproblemofexternalitiesontheirown,ifpropertyrightsareestablished..

⑵Twoimportantassumptionsplayedakeyroleintheprecedinganalysis:

Thecoststothepartiesofbargainingarelow.Transactioncosts:

thecoststhatpartiesincurintheprocessofagreeingandfollowingthroughonabargain;

1.

Theownersofresourcescanidentifythesourceofdamagestotheirpropertyandlegallypreventdamages.

2.Mergers

Itistointernalizeanexternalitybycombiningtheinvolvedparties.

3.Socialconventions

Somesocialconventionscanbeviewedasattemptstoinducepeopletotakeintoaccounttheexternalitiestheygenerate.

3.3PublicPoliciestowardExternalities

1.PigovianTaxes

⑴PigouvianTax:

ataxenactedtocorrecttheeffectsofanegativeexternality.

Thatis,aPigouviantaxisataxleviedoneachunitofapolluter’soutputinanamountjustequaltothemarginaldamageitinflictsattheefficientlevelofoutput.

⑵

Inessence,thePigouviantaxplacesapriceontherighttopollute.Suchataxgivestheproduceraprivateincentivetopollutetheefficientamount.

Justasmarketsallocategoodstothosebuyerswhovaluethemmosthighly,aPigouviantaxallocatespollutiontothosefactoriesthatfacethehighestcostofreducingit.

Thetaxesgivethefactoriesincentivetodevelopcleanertechnologies,becauseacleanertechnologywouldreducetheamountoftaxthefactoryhastopay.

2.Subsidies

⑴Asubsidyforpollutionnotproducedcaninduceproducerstopolluteattheefficientlevel.

However,subsidiescanleadtotoomuchproduction,areadministrativelydifficult,andareregardedbysomeasethicallyunappealing.

⑵Asubsidycancorrecttheunder-provisionofanactivitycausedbypositiveexternalities,butcaremustbetakentoavoidwastefulsubsidies

.

3.TradablePollutionPermits（CreatingaMarket）