平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)13.ppt
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平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)13.ppt
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Fernando&YvonnQuijanoPreparedby:
GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy13CHAPTERCopyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.Chapter13:
GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy2of42Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.CHAPTER13OUTLINE13.1GamingandStrategicDecisions13.2DominantStrategies13.3TheNashEquilibriumRevisited13.4RepeatedGames13.5SequentialGames13.6Threats,Commitments,andCredibility13.7EntryDeterrence13.8AuctionsChapter13:
GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy3of42Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.GAMINGANDSTRATEGICDECISIONS13.1gameSituationinwhichplayers(participants)makestrategicdecisionsthattakeintoaccounteachothersactionsandresponses.payoffValueassociatedwithapossibleoutcome.strategyRuleorplanofactionforplayingagame.optimalstrategyStrategythatmaximizesaplayersexpectedpayoff.IfIbelievethatmycompetitorsarerationalandacttomaximizetheirownpayoffs,howshouldItaketheirbehaviorintoaccountwhenmakingmydecisions?
Chapter13:
GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy4of42Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.GAMINGANDSTRATEGICDECISIONS13.1cooperativegameGameinwhichparticipantscannegotiatebindingcontractsthatallowthemtoplanjointstrategies.noncooperativegameGameinwhichnegotiationandenforcementofbindingcontractsarenotpossible.NoncooperativeversusCooperativeGamesItisessentialtounderstandyouropponentspointofviewandtodeducehisorherlikelyresponsestoyouractions.Chapter13:
GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy5of42Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.GAMINGANDSTRATEGICDECISIONS13.1NoncooperativeversusCooperativeGamesHowtoBuyaDollarBillAdollarbillisauctioned,butinanunusualway.Thehighestbidderreceivesthedollarinreturnfortheamountbid.However,thesecond-highestbiddermustalsohandovertheamountthatheorshebidandgetnothinginreturn.Ifyouwereplayingthisgame,howmuchwouldyoubidforthedollarbill?
Chapter13:
GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy6of42Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.GAMINGANDSTRATEGICDECISIONS13.1YourepresentCompanyA,whichisconsideringacquiringCompanyT.YouplantooffercashforallofCompanyTsshares,butyouareunsurewhatpricetooffer.ThevalueofCompanyTdependsontheoutcomeofamajoroilexplorationproject.Iftheprojectsucceeds,CompanyTsvalueundercurrentmanagementcouldbeashighas$100/share.CompanyTwillbeworth50percentmoreunderthemanagementofCompanyA.Iftheprojectfails,CompanyTisworth$0/shareundereithermanagement.Thisoffermustbemadenowbeforetheoutcomeoftheexplorationprojectisknown.You(CompanyA)willnotknowtheresultsoftheexplorationprojectwhensubmittingyourpriceoffer,butCompanyTwillknowtheresultswhendecidingwhethertoacceptyouroffer.Also,CompanyTwillacceptanyofferbyCompanyAthatisgreaterthanthe(pershare)valueofthecompanyundercurrentmanagement.Youareconsideringpriceoffersintherange$0/share(i.e.,makingnoofferatall)to$150/share.WhatpricepershareshouldyouofferforCompanyTsstock?
Thetypicalresponsetoofferbetween$50and$75pershareiswrong.Thecorrectanswertothisproblemappearsattheendofthischapter.Chapter13:
GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy7of42Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.DOMINANTSTRATEGIES13.2dominantstrategyStrategythatisoptimalnomatterwhatanopponentdoes.SupposeFirmsAandBsellcompetingproductsandaredecidingwhethertoundertakeadvertisingcampaigns.Eachfirmwillbeaffectedbyitscompetitorsdecision.Chapter13:
GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy8of42Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.DOMINANTSTRATEGIES13.2equilibriumindominantstrategiesOutcomeofagameinwhicheachfirmisdoingthebestitcanregardlessofwhatitscompetitorsaredoing.Unfortunately,noteverygamehasadominantstrategyforeachplayer.Toseethis,letschangeouradvertisingexampleslightly.Chapter13:
GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy9of42Copyright2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHallMicroeconomicsPindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.THENASHEQUILIBRIUMREVISITED13.3DominantStrategies:
ImdoingthebestIcannomatterwhatyoudo.YouredoingthebestyoucannomatterwhatIdo.NashEquilibrium:
ImdoingthebestIcangivenwhatyouaredoing.YouredoingthebestyoucangivenwhatIamdoing.TheProductChoiceProblemTwobreakfastcerealcomp
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