强制性会计信息披露外文翻译.docx
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强制性会计信息披露外文翻译.docx
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强制性会计信息披露外文翻译
外文翻译
MandatoryAccountingDisclosure
MaterialSource:
MandatoryAccountingDisclosurebySmallPrivateCompaniesAuthor:
BenitoArrunada
Therearesubstantialdifferencesintheregulationindifferentcountriesonfinancialdisclosurebyprivatecompaniesand,inparticular,onpublicationoftheiraccounts.IntheUSA,Japanandsomeothercountries,mostprivatecompanies,whatevertheirsize,arenotobligedtodisclosefinancialinformation.Incontrast,intheEuropeanUnionallcompaniesarerequiredtofiletheiraccountswithapublicregister.Mostothercountriesalsorequiremanyoftheirprivatecompaniestopubliclyfiletheiraccounts.
Discussionsofthesedisclosureandpublicationrequirementshaveledtodisparaterecommendationstoslightlyexpandpublicationrequirements,maintainthemandreducethem,Singapore.Morerecently,aspartofitsinitiativetosimplifythebusinessenvironmentandlessenadministrativeburdens,theEuropeanCommission(2007)hasalsoproposedtoexemptsmallcompaniessothattheywouldnotnecessarilyberequiredbynationallawtopublishtheiraccounts.TheCommissiongroundsitsproposalontheargumentthatforsuchcompaniespublishingtheaccountscausesconsiderablecostwithnosignificantbenefit.Ontheonehand,accordingtotheCommission,therequirementconstitutesamajoradministrativeburden.Ontheother,itisinconsequentialif—whengivenfreedomtodiscloseornot—smallfirmschoosenottodisclosebecausetheiraccountsareonly“usedbyalimitednumberofstakeholders,suchascreditinstitutionsandsuppliersthathavethepossibilitytorequirefinancialinformationdirectlyfromthecompany”.
Mandatorypublicationofaccountsbyprivatecompaniesrelatestoseveralstrandsoftheeconomic,accountingandfinancialliteratures:
deregulationofbusinessformalities,mandatoryfinancialdisclosure,andinvestorsprotectionandcreditinformation.Findingsinalltheseareasthusprovidecomplementaryinsightsontheissueunderdiscussion.
Sincethe1960s,therehasbeensubstantialcontroversyonthebalanceofcostsandbenefitsandtheoptimalcontentofmandatoryfinancialdisclosure.Inthe
currentregulatoryframeworkoftheUSA,however,mostofthesediscussionshavefocusedonmandatorydisclosurebypubliccompanies—thatis,companiessellingsharesorbondstoindividualinvestorsinstockexchanges.Thesepubliccompaniesarerequiredbylawtonotonlyfilefinancialinformationpubliclyonaperiodicbasisbutalsotodiscloseotherinformationonthecompany,providedetaileddataonnewissuesofsecuritiesandreportanytradebyinsiders.
EventhoughtheEuropeanCommission’sproposalreferstothemandatorypublicationofannualaccountsbysmallprivatecompanies,partofthediscussiononmandatorydisclosurebypubliccompaniesisapplicable.Otherpartsoftheanalysisaresubstantiallydifferent,however,becauseofdifferencesinthegovernancestructure,sizeandavailabilityofinformationofbothtypesofcompanies,aswellasdifferencesinthecontentsoftheinformationbeingmandatorilydisclosed.Inparticular,previousresearchhasfocusedonhowmandatorydisclosureforpubliccompaniesaffectsthevalueoftheirequitybyfacilitatingornottransactionsonsuchequity.Butthemaininterestforprivatecompaniesliesinknowinghowpublishingtheiraccountscouldhelptheirtradingparties(mainlybanksandsuppliers)estimatetheircreditrisk,thusexpandingtheiraccesstocreditandloweringitscost.Themaineffectshouldbetoreduceinformationasymmetryincredit(includingtradecredit)transactionsinsteadofinequitytransactions.
Inaddition,giventhatthesharesofpubliccompaniesaretradedinthestockmarket,itispossibletoestimatetheimpactofmandatorydisclosureonthevalueofthepubliccompanies.However,evenifthereductioninthetransactioncostsofcreditcausedbymandatorypublicationofaccountsalsoincreasesfirmvalue,wecannotmeasurethiseffectbecausewelackmarketpricesforequitysharesinprivatecompanies.Therefore,withoutacomprehensivemetricforevaluatingtheimpactofmandatorypublicationofaccounts,wecanonlyaspiretobuildinganenlightenedqualitativeinventoryofcostsandbenefits.Thevolumeofcreditcontractedinaneconomydependsontwofactors:
informationavailableondebtorsquality,andtherightsthatthelegalsystemgrantstocreditorsincaseofdefault.Fortheavailabilityofinformation,thefactoronwhichwearemostinterested,empiricalevidenceshowsthatthevolumeofcreditgrowswhenbankssharemoreinformationondebtorsandwhenthequalityofcreditregistriesimproves.Itseemsthatthebetterthecreditorsknowthequalityandrecordofpotentialdebtors,thelowerthetransactioncostsofcredit,probablybecauseofbothimproveddebtorsincentivesandeasieravoidanceofadverseselection.Aswewillsee,themainreasonforthe
publicationofaccountsisthatitallowsimprovedassessmentofcreditriskforbothindividualtransactionsandbankandmacroeconomicregulation.
Distortionofcompetition
Publicationofaccountsmightalsocauseprivatecoststothedisclosingfirmbyinformingitscompetitors,whichmightalsodistortcompetition.However,thiseffectseemsunlikelytobesubstantialwhensmallcompaniesareinvolved.Atleast,thesecostsareclearlysmallerthanthoseofthedisclosurenowcommonlyrequiredfrompubliccompanies.Ausefulcomparisonwouldbethatbetweentheimpactofpubliclyfilingtheannualaccountswiththatofannouncing,forinstance,thecancellationofaresearchprogramme.Doubtremainsonthispoint,however,notforthemicroandsmallcompaniesconsideredbytheEuropeanCommissionbutformedium-sizedorevenlargeprivatecompanies,forwhichdisclosuremaybequitesensitive,giventheirsizeandpresenceinconcentratedanddifferentiatedmarkets.
Mappingappropriablebenefits
Publicationofcompanyaccountsalsoprovidesbenefitstothecompaniesinvolved,totheirtradingpartnersandtothirdparties.Thissectionexaminesthosewhichareappropriablebythedisclosingcompany.
Benefitsfordisclosersandtheirpartners
Benefitsfordisclosingcompaniesandtheirtradingpartnersarisefromreducingtheinformationasymmetrybetweenthem:
publishingtheaccountsgrantsaccesstopotentialandcurrenttradingpartnerstothehistoricalrecord,currentfinancialpositionandprofitabilityofthedisclosingfirm.Thisreductionininformationasymmetryisespeciallyvaluableintransactionsthatembodyfutureobligationsforthefirm:
clientspurchasingdurablegoods,allpartiesinvestinginfirm-specificassets,minorityshareholdersand,especially,tradeandfinancialcreditors.Understandably,moretransparentfirmshavebeenfoundtoincurlowercostsofdebtandequitycapital.
Furthermore,publishingtheaccountsmaybemorecredibleandlesscostlythancommunicatingthemindividuallytocontractualpartiesorhandingthemonlytothosepartieswhorequestthemexplicitly.Credibilityisgainedbecausefilingtheaccountswithanindependentthirdparty(theregister)commitsthefirm,asaccountsalreadyfiledcannotbemodifiedandfutureaccountswillhavetobeconsistentwiththosefiledinthepast.Costsarereducedbecauseitisnolongernecessarytodeliverthemtoahighnumberoftradecreditors,andprospectivecreditorsorthirdpartieswillnolongerhavetoaskfortheaccountstobedeliveredtothem.
Individualdisclosureasanalternativetopublicdisclosure
ThealternativesolutionproposedbytheEuropeanCommissionisforthecreditortoaskfortheborrowersfinancialstatements.Thissolutionisproblematic,notleastbecausethereareoftenmorethantwopartiestothetransaction.
Informationprovidedtoapartyinaone-to-oneinteractionisoftenlesscrediblethanthatprovidedtoallpotentialpartiesbyfilingitinapublicregistry.Someevidenceonthisisgivenbythecommonpracticeinbankingof,asafirststep,checkingloanapplications(whichoftenincludespecificallyadaptedfinancialstatements)againstreportspreparedbybusiness.informationagencies.19Onemayassumethatifsomecreditapplicantsmakeuptheiraccountswhendealingwithbanks,theyareevenmorelikelytodosowhendealingwithsuppliers,giventhatsuppliersarenotexpertsincreditevaluation,donothavesuchreadyaccesstoadditionalinformationandarelesslikelytobeapartyinfuturetransactions.
Inaddition,askingcontractualpartiesforsensitiveinformationisnotalwaysasensiblenegotiatingstrategy,becauseitmaydestroytrust,whichmightbeneededtoadaptthetransactioninthefuture.Itmayforcethetransactiontobemoreformalandlegalistic.Thisseemsespeciallyimportantwhenmakingcreditdecisionsasby-productsofcommercialtransactions,manyofwhichneedfutureadaptation.Ontheotherhand,explicitcontractingforsafeguardsisrelativelymorecommonandacceptedforcreditthanforcommercialtransactions,andfeweradaptationsareneeded.
Mappingexternalities
Everytimeacompanypublishesitsaccounts,itbenefitsthirdpartiesinwaysthatcouldhardlycompensatethedisclosingcompanyinanypracticalway.Aggregatedinformationonindividualfirms,evenifverysmall,isvaluableforcreditinformationagencies,toimprovetheaccuracyandpredictivepoweroftheircreditratingmodels;foranalystsandinvestors,asitallowsthemtodocomparativeanalysiswhenallocatingcapitalamongfirmsandindustries;forcompetitorsandcompetitors'investors,whenanalysingtheindustry;forregulatorsandpolicymakers,whenmakingdecisions;forcentralbanks,whenevaluatingthelevelofindebtnessofthe
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