关于管家机构轴的委托代理关系外文翻译.docx
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关于管家机构轴的委托代理关系外文翻译.docx
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关于管家机构轴的委托代理关系外文翻译
外文文献翻译译文
原文:
Principal-AgentRelationshipsonthe
Stewardship-AgencyAxis
Thisarticleprovidesanoverviewoftheliteratureonnonprofitprincipal-agentrelationships.Itdepictsthenatureofagencytheoryandstewardshiptheory,analyzestheoriginoftheirstrugglewithinthenonprofitstructure,andmarksdirectionsforaconciliatoryapproach.Wetherebycontrastitwithstewardshiptheoryandelaborateontheargumentsthatcanaffectthepositionofnonprofitprincipal-agentrelationshipsonthestewardship-agencyaxis.Analysisoftheexistingliteraturepointstoalackofconsensusastowhichtheoryshouldbeapplied.Wearguethatthedivisionofnonprofitprincipal-agentrelationshipsintoboard-managerandmanager-employeeinteractionsmayhelptoclarifythebalancebetweenagencytheoryandstewardshiptheoryandmayleadtotheestablishmentofastronglyfoundedtheoryonnonprofitprincipal-agentrelationships.Weclosewithadiscussionofhowthisarticlemayprovevaluabletononprofitpolicy-makersandotherempiricalresearchers.
WhatIsAgencyTheory?
Inordertoexplainthebasicconceptsuponwhichthefoundationsofagencytheoryarebuilt,westartwithadefinitionofprincipal-agentrelationships.AccordingtoJensenandMeckling(1976),aprincipal-agentrelationshipcanbedefinedas“acontractunderwhichoneormorepersons(theprincipal(s))engageanotherperson(theagent)toperformsomeserviceontheirbehalfwhichinvolvesdelegatingsomedecisionmakingauthoritytotheagent”(p.308).Suchrelationshipsarequitecommon.Forexample,aclient(principal)mighthirealawyer(agent)todefendhiscase.Ahomeowner(principal)mighthireacarpenter(agent)tofixherstaircase.Althoughbothexamplesdescribeinteractionsinaprivatesetting,principal-agentrelationshipsalsocommonlyoccurwithinorganizations.Here,literatureoftenhandstheroleoftheprincipaltotheboardofdirectors,whichcontractsamanagertoruntheorganization
intheinterestoftheshareholders(or,inthecaseofanonprofitorganization,intheinterestofthestakeholders).
Agencytheorytraditionallyassumesthattheseprincipal-agentrelationshipswillbecharacterizedbyaconflictbetweentheinterestsoftheprincipalandthoseoftheagent,andthattheagentwillbemotivatedtopursueherowngoals(Pontes,1995;Lewis,2003).Sowhentheagent’sbehaviorisnotcontrolledorrestrained,thegoalsoftheprincipalareunlikelytobeattained.Tocounteracttheagencyconflictsthatprincipal-agentrelationshipsmaybringabout,mathematicalandtheoreticalresearchhasfocusedonmechanismsthatmayhelptheprincipaltocontrolhisagent.Itdistinguishesbetweentwoframeworksthatstartfromdifferentassumptionsregardingthelevelofinformational(a)symmetrybetweentheprincipalandtheagent.Inthefollowingparagraphs,weelaborateonthesimilaritiesanddifferencesthatbothframeworkshold.
TwoInformationFrameworksWithinAgencyTheory
Agencytheorygenerallydistinguishesbetweenthesymmetricinformationmodelandtheasymmetricinformationmodel(Levinthal,1988).Withinthesymmetricinformationmodel,itisassumedthattheinformationpossessedbytheagentisalsoknowntotheprincipal.Inotherwords,theprincipalisperfectlyinformedastothecharacterofhisagentandisabletoobservetheeffortexertedonthetask.Insuchcase,Levinthal(1988)andPerloff(2003)showthattheprincipalcanelaborateacontractthatisoptimalforboththeagentandhimself(afirst-bestsolution)byfoundingthecompensationschemesupontheexertedeffortlevels.Byattachingthehighestnetutility(utilityfromincomeminusdisutilityfromeffort)totheeffortlevelmostdesiredbytheprincipal,autility-maximizingagentcanalwaysbepersuadedtodedicatethelevelofeffortpreferredbytheprincipal.Sinceincomeiscontingentonlyontheeffortlevelandisindependentofthestateofnatureandoftherealizedoutcome,theagentwillalsonotbeforcedtobearanyunnecessaryrisk.
Withintheasymmetricinformationmodel,theinformationalsymmetrybetweenprincipalandagentisdestabilizedbytheintroductionofmoralhazardoradverseselection.Moralhazardreferstotheeconomicagentstomaximizetheirownutilityatthesametime,damagetheeffectivenessoftheclientorthebehaviorofotheragents.Moralhazardandmoralfactors,economicactivityisessentiallynotmuch,andso,theuseofthewordhavedifferentviews,itwassuggestedtouse"covertactions"toreplaceit.Inamarketeconomy,moralhazardisauniversalphenomenon,itisessentiallyaneconomiconehiddenmessageoftheirownrationalresponseto.
Theintroductionofaninformationalasymmetryisnotnecessarilyaproblem.Iftheagent’sinterestsareperfectlyalignedwiththeprincipal’s,asymmetrywillnotaffectthelevelofbenefitsstreamedtowardtheprincipal.However,oneofagencytheory’sbasicassumptionsisthataconflictexistsbetweentheinterestsoftheprincipalandthoseofhisagent.Theprincipalwilltherebybeforcedtoapplynewwaysofcontractinginordertominimizethedeviationfromthefirst-bestsolution.Inthecaseofmoralhazard,thedeviationfromthefirst-bestsolutioniselicitedbythefactthatcompensationcannolongerbebasedonthelevelofeffort(cloakedfromtheprincipal)exertedbytheagent.Compensationshouldinsteaddependontheoutcome.Outcome-basedcompensationwouldinducetheagenttoexertmorethantheminimumlevelofeffort.Thereasoningbehindthisargumentisthatbecausetheprincipalisunabletoevaluatehisagent’seffortandtheagentdrawsdisutilityfromexertingit,afixedfeewouldonlystimulatetheagenttoperformattheminimumlevel.Raisingthefeeswouldnotalterthissituation.Theagentcanbeexpectedtoaccepthigherwages(sincehigherwagesresultinhigherutility),butalsotominimizehereffort(inordertominimizethedisutilityderivedfromit).Raisingthefixedfeewouldthereforeonlywidenthegapbetweengainsandcostsfacedbytheagent—andfeedherbankaccount—butwouldnotalterherchoiceofeffort.
Becausethebasisofthecompensationschemesmustbealteredfromeffort-basedpay(fixedfees)tooutcome-basedpay(contingentpay)andoutcomesarepartlyinfluencedbystatesofnaturethatarebeyondtheagent’scontrol,theagentwillbeforcedtoacceptariskfactorintohercontractandmaybeheldaccountableforfactorsshecannotcontrol.Suchanarrangementwouldbeinefficient.Whenarisk-neutralindividualentersintoacontractwitharisk-averseindividual,itisefficienttoleavealloftheriskinthehandsoftherisk-neutralparty.Therefore,atrade-offexistswithintheasymmetricinformationmodel,forcingtheprincipaltotradehigherincentivesforhisagentforlessefficiencyintherisk-bearingfeaturesofthecontract(Holmstrom,1979;).
AsnotedbyLevinthal(1988),switchingcompensationschemestooutcome-basedpayisnottheonlypossibleresponsetotheintroductionofaninformationalasymmetryintotheprincipal-agentrelationship.Insteadofattemptingtoimprovetheincentiveswithintheasymmetricinformationmodel,onemightalsotrytopulltherelationshipbacktowardthesymmetricinformationmodel.Whentheasymmetricinformationisrenderedbymoralhazard,suchanattemptmaybegeneratedbyintroducingamonitorintotherelationship,therebyenlargingtheprincipal’sknowledgeoftheagent’seffort.Ifsuchmonitoringcouldbemadeperfect,thesignalsentbythemonitorwouldbeaperfectindicatoroftheagent’seffort,allowingtheprincipaltorevivetheconnectionbetweeneffortandcompensationandtofreetheagentfromtheinefficientrisk-bearingarrangementswithinhercontract.Procuringaperfectmonitorcanbedifficult,especiallywithinnonprofitorganizations,whereaccurateoutputmeasurementisoftenhardtoattain.Itcanalsobecostlyandintroducenewcomplicationsintotheprincipal-agentrelationship.Forexample,themonitoringofficermightpursueintereststhatdepartfromthoseoftheprincipal—ortheofficermightcolludewiththeprincipal’sagent(Mishra,2002).
ASpecialCaseofAgencyTheory:
StewardshipTheory
Stewardshiptheorydiffersfromtraditionalagencytheoryinthatitquestionstheassumptionthataprincipal-agentrelationshipwillalwaysbecharacterizedbyagencyconflicts.Thetheoryembodiestwobranches.Thefirstbranchdepictsarelationshipinwhichthegoalsoftheagentconflictwiththoseoftheprincipal.Unliketraditionalagencytheory,however,thefirstbranchassumesthattheagentwillbemotivatedtoactwithintheinterestsoftheprincipalandthatshewillnotpursueherowngoals(DavisandDonaldson,1997).Thisimpliesthattheagentvaluestheeffectofheractionsontheutilityoftheprincipalandthatpursuingherownobjectivesgenerateshighercosts(inutilityterms)thanbenefits.Insuchcase,theagentcanattainahigherutilitylevelwhenshecooperateswiththeprincipal.Thesecondbranchextendsthetheorybyassumingthattheagent’sgoalsareperfectlyalignedwiththoseoftheprincipal(Lewis,2003).
Althoughpreviousresearchtendstocharacterizestewardshiptheoryascompletelydifferentfromagencytheoryandtoviewbothframeworksasbeingmutuallyexclusive(DonaldsonandDavis,1991;Davis,Schoorman,andDonaldson,1997;Westphal,1999),itisourviewthatstewardshiptheoryshouldbeseenasalimitingcaseoftheagencyframework.Onanaxisofascendingagencyconflictsthatstartfromzeroattheleft-handside,stewardshiptheoryconstitutesthelowerend(Figure1).Allotherpointsresideundertheagencyframework.Sincenumerouspositionscanbeproposed,thequ
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