外文翻译并购支付方式在欧洲的选择.docx
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外文翻译并购支付方式在欧洲的选择.docx
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外文翻译并购支付方式在欧洲的选择
本科毕业论文(设计)
外文翻译
原文:
ThechoiceofpaymentmethodinEuropeanM&A
GlobalM&Aactivityhasgrowndramaticallyoverthelasttenyears,bringingwithitmajorchangesintheorganizationandcontrolofeconomicactivityaroundtheworld.Yet,thereismuchabouttheM&Aprocessthatwedonotfullyunderstand,includingthechoiceofpaymentmethod.GiventhelargesizeofmanyM&Atransactions,thefinancingdecisioncanhaveasignificantimpactonanacquirer’sownershipstructure,financialleverage,andsubsequentfinancingdecisions.Thefinancingdecisioncanalsohaveseriouscorporatecontrol,riskbearing,taxandcashflowimplicationsforthebuyingandsellingfirmsandshareholders.
InmakinganM&Acurrencydecision,abidderisfacedwithachoicebetweenusingcashandstockasdealconsideration.Giventhatmostbiddershavelimitedcashandliquidassets,cashoffersgenerallyrequiredebtfinancing.Asaconsequence,abidderimplicitlyfacesthechoiceofdebtorequityfinancing,whichcaninvolveatradeoffbetweencorporatecontrolconcernsofissuingequityandrisingfinancialdistresscostsofissuingdebt.Thus,abidder’sM&Acurrencydecisioncanbestronglyinfluencedbyitsdebtcapacityandexistingleverage.Itcanalsobestronglyinfluencedbymanagement’sdesiretomaintaintheexistingcorporategovernancestructure.Incontrast,asellercanbefacedwithatradeoffbetweenthetaxbenefitsofstockandtheliquidityandriskminimizingbenefitsofcashconsideration.Forexample,sellersmaybewillingtoacceptstockiftheyhavealowtaxbasisinthetargetstockandcandefertheirtaxliabilitiesbyacceptingbidderstockaspayment.Ontheotherhand,sellerscanprefercashconsiderationtosidesteptheriskofbecomingaminorityshareholderinabidderwithconcentratedownership,therebyavoidingtheassociatedmoralhazardproblems.Unfortunately,duetodatalimitations,thissellertradeoffcannotbeeasilymeasured.
Underexistingtheoriesofcapitalstructure,debtcapacityisapositivefunctionoftangibleassets,earningsgrowthandassetdiversificationandanegativefunctionofassetvolatility.Firmswithgreatertangibleassetscanborrowmoreprivatelyfrombanksandpubliclyinthebondmarket.Sincelargerfirmsaregenerallymorediversified,weexpectthemtohavealowerprobabilityofbankruptcyatagivenleverageratioandthus,greaterdebtcapacity.Thesefinancingconstraintandbankruptcyriskconsiderationscanalsoreducealenderswillingnesstofinanceabidder’scashbid,especiallyinrelativelylargedeals.
InassessingpotentialdeterminantsofanM&Apaymentmethod,ourfocusisonabidder’sM&Afinancingchoices,recognizingthattargetscanalsoinfluencethefinaltermsofanM&Adeal.However,ifatarget’sfinancingchoiceisunacceptabletothebidder,thentheproposedM&Atransactionislikelytobeabortedorelsethebiddercanmakeahostileofferonitsownterms.Foradealtosucceed,thebiddermustbesatisfiedwiththefinancialstructureofthedeal.
Bidderandtargetconsiderations:
*CorporateControl
Bidderscontrolledbyamajorshareholdershouldbereluctanttousestockfinancingwhenthiscausesthecontrollingshareholdertorisklosingcontrol.Assumingcontrolisvaluable,thepresenceofdominantshareholderpositionsshouldbeassociatedwithmorefrequentuseofcash,especiallywhenthecontrollingshareholder’spositionisthreatened.Tocapturethiseffect,weusetheultimatevotingstakeheldbythelargestcontrollingshareholder.
Abidderwithdiffuseorhighlyconcentratedownershipislesslikelytobeconcernedwithcorporatecontrolissues.Inlinewiththisargument,Martin(1996)documentsasignificantlynegativerelationshipbetweenthelikelihoodofstockfinancingandmanagerialownershiponlyovertheintermediateownershiprange.Therefore,weincorporatethepossibilityofanon-linearrelationshipbetweenthemethodofpaymentandthevotingrightsofabidder’scontrollingshareholderbyestimatingbothalinearandcubicspecificationfortheultimatevotingcontrolpercentageofthebidder’slargestshareholder.Inourrobustnessanalysis,wealsoestimateasplinefunctionforthisvariable.
CorporatecontrolconcernsinM&Aactivitycanmanifestthemselvesinmoresubtleways.Concentratedownershipofatargetmeansthatastockfinancedacquisitioncancreatealargeblockholder,threateningthecorporategovernanceoftheacquirer.Iftheselleriscloselyheldorisacorporationdisposingofadivision,thenownershipconcentrationtendstobeveryconcentrated.ThisimpliesthatfinancingtheM&Adealwithstockcancreateanewblockholderinthebidder.Whiletheriskofcreatinganewbidderblockholderwithstockfinancingishigherwhenatargethasaconcentratedownershipstructure,thisisespeciallyturewhenrelativesizeofthedealislarge.Tocapturetheriskofcreatingalargeblockholderwhenbuyingatargetwithstockfinancing,weemployCONTROLLOSS,theproductbetweenthetarget’scontrolblockandthedeal’sralativesize.Therelativedealsizeiscomputedastheratioofoffersize(excludingassumedliabilities)tothesumofabidder’sequitypre-offercapitalizationplustheoffersize.Thetarget’scontrollingblockholderisassumedtohave100%ownershipforunlistedtargetsandsubsidiarytargets.
*Collateral,FinancialLeverageandDebtCapacity
Weusethefractionoftangibleassetsasourprimarymeasureofabidder’sabilitytopaycash,financedfromadditionalborrowing.COLLATERALismeasuredbytheratioofproperty,plantandequipmenttobookvalueoftotalassets.Myers(1977)arguesthatdebtholdersinfirmswithfewertangibleassetsandmoregrowthopportunitiesaresubjecttogreatermoralhazardrisk,whichincreasesthecostofdebt,oftenmakingstockmoreattractive.Hovakimian,OplerandTitman(2001)findthatafirm’spercentageoftangibleassetshasastrongpositiveinfluenceonitsdebtlevel.
Wealsocontrolforabidder’sfinancialconditionwithitsleverageratio,FIN’LLEVERAGE.Sincecashisprimarilyobtainedbyissuingnewdebt,highlyleveredbiddersareconstrainedintheirabilitytoissuedebtandasaconsequenceusestockfinancingmorefrequently.Abidder’sfinancialleverageismeasuredbythesumofthebidder’sfacevalueofdebtpriortotheM&Aannouncementplusthedealvalue(includingassumedliabilities)dividedbythesumofthebookvalveoftotalassetspriortotheannouncementplusthedealvalue(includingassumedliabilities).Thiscapturesthebidder’spost-dealleverageifthetransactionisdebtfinanced.ThismeasurediffersfromMartin(1996)whousesapre-dealbidderleveragemeasureadjustedforindustrymeanandreportsaninsignificanteffect.
Biddersizeislikelytoinfluenceitsfinancingchoices.Largerfirmsaremorediversifiedandthus,haveproportionallylowerexpectedbankruptcycosts.Theyalsohavelowerflotationcostsandarelikelytohavebetteraccesstodebtmarkets,makingdebtfinancingmorereadilyavailable.Thus,cashfinancingshouldbemorefeasibleinthecaseoflargerfirms.Largerfirmsarealsomoreapttochoosecashfinancinginsmallerdealsduetoitseaseofuse,providedtheyhavesufficientunuseddebtcapacityorliquidassets.Further,theuseofcashallowsthebiddertoavoidthesignificantcostsofobtainingshareholderapprovalofpre-emptiverightsexemptionsandauthorizationsandthehigherregulatorycostsofstockoffers.Wemeasurebidderassetssizebythelogofpre-mergerbookvalueofassetsindollars(totalassets).Inadditiontobiddercontrolandfinancingconsiderations,weneedtotakeintoaccountseveralotherbiddercharacteristics.
*RelativeDealSize,BidderStockPriceRunupandAsymmetricInformation
Hansen(1987)predictsthatbiddershavegreaterincentivestofinancewithstockwhentheasymmetricinformationabouttargetassetsishigh.Thisinformationasymmetryislikelytoriseastargetassetsriseinvaluerelativetothoseofabidder.Yet,stockisusedinrelativelylargerdeals,itproducesmoreseriousdilutionofadominantshareholder’scontrolposition.Finally,asbidderequitycapitalizationrises,concernaboutitsfinancingconstraintfalls,sincethereisarelativelysmallerimpactonitsoverallfinancialconditon.WeproxyfortheseeffectswithRELSIZE,whichiscomputedastheratioofdealoffersize(excludingassumedliabilities)dividedbythesumofthedeal’soffersizeplusthebidder’spre-offermarketcapitalizationattheyear-endpriortothebid.
BothMyersandMajluf(1984)andHansen(1987)predictthatbidderswillprefertofinancewithstockwhentheyconsidertheirstockovervaluedbythemarketandprefertofinancewithcashwhentheyconsidertheirstockundervalued.Asuncertaintyaboutbidderassetvaluerises,thisadverseselectioneffectisexacerbated.Martin(1996)findsevidenceconsistentwiththisadverseselectionprediction.Forasampleofpubliclytradedtargets,Travlos(1987)findsthatstockfinancedM&Adealsexhibitmuchlargernegativeannouncementeffectsthancashfinanceddeals.Heconcludesthisisconsistentwiththeempiricalvalidityofanadverseselectioneffect.Weuseasaproxyforbidderovervaluation(orundervaluation),calculatedfromabidder’sbuyandholdcumulativestockreturnovertheyearprecedingtheM&Aannouncementmonth.
Inadditiontobidderconsiderations,weneedtotakeintoaccounttypicaltargetconsiderations.Thesepreferencesarerelatedtorisk,liquidity,asymmetricinformationandhomebias.
T1.UnlistedTargetsandSubsidiaryTargets
Weuseanindicatorvariable,UNLISTEDTARGET,tocontrolforlistingstatuswherethevariabletakesavalueo
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