战略管理连锁店的定价策略文献翻译.docx
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战略管理连锁店的定价策略文献翻译.docx
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战略管理连锁店的定价策略文献翻译
原文:
Chain-StorePricingforStrategicAccommodation
Thechainstorehasbeenoneoftheprincipalfactorsinthemovementtowardsthesimplificationofdistributivefunctions.Assuch,ithascausedpronouncedconcernamongmanufactures,jobbers,andretailers.Ithasbeenthesubjectoflitigation,ofrecrimination,andofendlessdiscussion.Themanufacturerhashesitatedtomakefulluseofthechainstoresystemasanoutlet,becauseofhisdesirenottooffendthemembersofhisregulardistributivesystems.Thejobberhasmadeopenwaruponthechainbecauseithasfranklyattemptedtosupplanthim,andtoindependentretailerhasoftenfailedtorecognizethedecisivelineofdivisionbetweenpricemerchandisingandservicemerchandising.
Everyconcernwhichultimatelymarketsitsproductstotheconsumerisvitallyaffectedbythestatusofchainretailing;moreparticularlywiththepositionwhichitwilloccupyinthefuture.Thefollowingpagescontainabriefresumeofthepresentchainstoresituationinthefieldsofretailingwhereithasbecomewellestablished.
Trendsofdevelopment
Themostrapidgrowthofthechainstorehastakenplaceinthegrocery,drug,drygoods,tobacco,andconfectionerylines.Itisessentialtounderstandthereasonsforthis:
1.Thepublicdemandintheselinesiswelldefined;isnotsubjecttogreatfluctuationintimesofbusinessdepression;andineachcasethereisa“repeatmarket.”
2.Thearticleshandledfallmainlyintheclassofnecessities,orsemi-necessities.Thatis,theyareregardedasessentialbyaproportionofthemarketlargeenoughtoinsureasteadydemand.
3.Becauseofthestandardcharacterofthestocks,andthebroaddemand,ahighrateofturnovermaybemaintained,whichallowsthechaintomakeasmallbutsteadymarginofprofitatfrequentintervals.
4.Buyingorpurchasingisstandardizedandcentralizedatheadquarters.
5.Sincearticlesareofsmallunitvalue,andnotbulkyorheavy,thechainstoreisabletooperateonacashandcarrybasis-afactorofgreatimportanceinchainstoregrowth.
6.Merchandisingislargelyamatterofdisplayandpriceadvertising.
7.Standardizationofmethodshasmadeitpossibletocentralizemanagementatheadquartersandcontrolmemberstoresundermanagerswho,whiletheymayhaveapecuniaryinterestinsalesmadebytheirstores,havenothingtosayabouttheconductingofthem..
Ouranalyticfocusinthispaperisthegeographicscopeofpricing.Specifically,isitbetterforachain-storeretailertosetpricesaccordingtolocalmarketconditions(reflectingdifferencesincost,demandandcompetition)orsetcommonpricesthatapplyacrossallitsstores,i.e.adoptauniformpricingpolicy?
Arelikelyfirmdecisionsonthisinlinewithconsumerpreferences?
IncontrasttotheentrydeterrenceissueconsideredbySelten(1978),MilgromandRoberts(1982)andKrepsandWilson(1982),welooktoseewhetherpricingpolicy,otherthandeterringentry,mightinsteadbeemployedstrategicallytoaccommodateentrywhenitisinevitable.
Thegeographicscopeforpricingisaveryrealissueformultipleretailers.Itisevidentthatinpracticesomechain-storegroupsadoptuniformpricingwhileothersdonot.Insomesectors,allmultipleretailerspriceidenticallyacrosstheirstores,e.g.UKelectricalgoodsretailers(MMC,1997a,b).Whileinothersectors,localpricingispractisedtotheextentthatproductpricesmightvaryconsiderablyfromonestoretoanother,e.g.theFTCfoundthatforofficesupplysuperstoresaveragepricesvariedbyasmuch16%dependingontheextentoflocalcompetitionintheUS.Moreover,thispricingpolicydistinctionappliesnotjusttodifferentsectorsbutcanapplywithinthesamesector,e.g.amongstUKsupermarketswhere,oftheleadingfifteengroups,eightpriceduniformlywhilesevenpricedaccordingtolocalconditions(CompetitionCommission,2000).
Yet,inthesedaysofcomputer-basedpricingsystems,itcanhardlybesaidthatticketingcostsarehigh,orthatlocaldemandandcostconditionscannotbeeffectivelygauged.Hence,choosingauniformpricemustbeseenasaconsciousact.Ofcourse,uniformpricingmightnotbepracticablewhenretailingcostsaresubstantiallydifferentfromoneareatoanother.Nevertheless,formanymultipleretailersbothlocalanduniformpricingmightbefeasiblebutachoicehastobemadeonwhichtoadopt.Thisleadstotwoquestions,firstwhyitmighteverbepreferablefortheincumbenttoimposeaconstraintonitsownbehaviour,andsecondthecircumstancesunderwhichtheconstraintisdesirable.Ourkeyinsightonthefirstquestionisasfollows:
Afirmwillfinditselfmoreundercompetitioninsomemarketsthanothers.Bypracticinguniformpricing,itsoftenscompetitionbetweenitselfandrivalplayers.Thisentailssettingahigherpriceinthosemarketssubjectto(more)competition,attheexpenseoflowerpricesinmarketswhereitisnotsubject(orislesssubject)tocompetition,comparedwithapracticeofmarket-specificpricing.Thehigherpriceinturnmakestheactiononewhichrivalsfindattractive,soitdoesnotrequireagreement.Thusifthemarketsundercompetitionareimportantenoughtothefirm,itsnetgainispositive.Henceourpaper’sprimefocusisontheparametersassociatedwiththenatureandintensityofcompetitionthatmightinfluencethischoice.
Thereissomecommonalityinthisissuewithrelatedquestionsonthird-degreepricediscriminationinoligopoly(e.g.Holmes,1989).Morespecifically,theissuesraisedheretieinwithwhyoligopolisticfirmswouldwishtolimitorevenentirelyavoidpricediscrimination,e.g.Winter(1997)andCorts(1998),oradoptpracticeswhichprovidethesameoutcome,notablycontemporaneousMFCclauses,e.g.DeGraba(1987)andBesankoandLyon(1993).
ThereareobviouslinksbetweenourpaperandCorts(1998)whichalsoconsidersthequestionofuniformversusdiscriminatorypricingunderduopoly(withinaratherdifferentframework).However,inCorts’model,itturnsoutthatitisusuallynotinafirm’sunilateralinteresttopractiseuniformpricing.Therefore,whereuniformpricingisprofitable,strategiccommitmentsnottopricediscriminatearenormallyinvolvedandhencediscussionfocusesontheformthesemighttake.Bycontrast,withinourframework,andforaspecifiedrangeofparameters,wefindthatitisinthefirm’sowninterestnottodiscriminateandthatuniformpricingarisesasanequilibriumstrategy.Thisisimportant,andprovidesanewinsight,becauseitmeansthatuniformpricingneednotbeaccompaniedbyevidenceofstrategiccommitmenttothatpolicyinorderforittobeworthwhileandpractised.
1.Introduction
Ourresultthatfirmscancommonlybebetteroffunderauniformpricingregimecastsaninterestinglightonsomeotherpreviousmodels.Theresultisnotnew-itwasfirstencounteredinHolmes’(1989)“weakmarket-strongmarket”modelofpricediscriminationinoligopoly.However,intheirinvestigationofamodelsimilartoHolmes’,ArmstrongandVickers(2001)findthatifamarketissufficientlycompetitive,profitsalwaysincreasewithdiscrimination.Thisleadsthemtoconcludethat“Holmes’resultthatprofitsmayfallwithdiscriminationrequiresmarketstobereasonablyuncompetitive.”(p.597).Ourmodelshowsthisisnotcompletelytrue.Inourframework,whichineffecthasaweakandastrongmarket,profitsmayfallwithdiscriminationwhateverthedegreeofcompetition.Thatis,howeveruncompetitivethemarket,uniformpricingcanbeprofitable.Whatisrequiredforthisiseachindividualmonopolymarket,inourcontext,tobesufficientlylarge.
Toconsiderhowdifferentcompetitiveconditionsaffectthescope-of-pricingdecision,themodeldevelopedherehasanincumbentmonopolychain-storeoperatingacrossafinitenumberoflocalmarkets,analogoustoSelten’swell-knownchain-storeparadoxanalysis.However,incontrasttoSelten’sframework,theselocalmarketsareassumedtodifferinrespectofthescaleofconsumerdemandandthisinturnaffectsentryconditions.Therearetwomarkettypes.Ineachofthelarger,“affluent”markets,entrybarriersareinsufficienttoprevententrybyanew,independentrival.Yet,insmaller,lessaffluentmarketsthechain-storeistakentohaveaprotectedmonopolyposition(arisingfromnaturalorinstitutionalbarriers).Inthissetting,weshowthatachain-storewouldnotnecessarilyprefertouselocalpricingasaprofit-enhancingpricediscriminationtool.Competitiveconditionsexistintheformofaregiontradingoffthedegreeofsubstitutabilitybetweenentrantandincumbent’sproductsandthedegreetowhichduopolymarketsarelargerthanmonopolymarkets.Undertheseconditions,thechain-storewouldprefertocommittoapolicyofuniformpricingsincethisallowsforsoftercompetitionincontestedlocalmarketsandhenceraisesitsaggregateprofits.
Whiletheprospectofstrategicaccommodationthroughdampeningpricecompetitioninfluencesthepreferencebetweenlocalornationalpricing,achain-store’schoiceisnotinevitablyatvariancewiththatpreferredbysociety.Inparticular,astore’swillingnesstocommittonationalpricingcanincertaincircumstancesnotonlyenhanceitsprofitsbutalsoraisesocialwelfareifnotconsumersurplus.Yetmarketconditionscommonlyexistunderwhichwelfarewouldbeadverselyaffectedbythechain-storefollowingitspreferredchoice.
Althoughourmodelisundoubtedlyspecific,theresultsareconsiderablymoregeneral.Ourgeneralresultsare
(1)thatunderarangeofconditionsincludingverycompetitivemarkets,uniformpricingisprivatelyoptimalbothforincumbentandentrantwithout
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