信用担保机构问题研究外文文献翻译最新译文.docx
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信用担保机构问题研究外文文献翻译最新译文.docx
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信用担保机构问题研究外文文献翻译最新译文
文献出处:
WorthingtonC.Theresearchofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisecreditguaranteeagency[J].InternationalJournalofBusinessandManagement,2015,8(5):
35-45.
原文
Theresearchofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisecreditguaranteeagency
WorthingtonC
Abstract
Introducedintheprocessofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisefinancing,creditguarantee,mortgagecanweakenthesmallandmedium-sizedenterprises,creditrecordsarecongruentcausedbyfinancingobstacles,andthenimprovethesmallandmedium-sizedenterprise'screditrating,sharetheloanriskoffinancialinstitutions.Inpractice,thecreditguaranteeisalsoprovedtobeoneoftheeffectivemeansofgovernmentsupportforthedevelopmentofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.Smecreditguaranteeinstitutionsinsystem,managementandenvironmentappearaseriesofproblems,andthenatureoftheseproblemsissmallandmedium-sizedenterprisecreditguaranteeinstitutionsofsustainablemanagementability.Butfewscholarsfromtheviewpointofsustainablemanagementofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisedevelopmentofguaranteeagencies.Sothethesisonthecharacteristicsofsmallbusinesscreditguaranteeinstitutions,influencefactors,abilityevaluationandpathselectionarediscussedinthispaper.
Keywords:
Creditguaranteeinstitutions;Riskmanagement;Sustainablemanagement
1Introduction
Theroleofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises(SMES)ineconomicandsocialgeneralhasthefollowingaspects:
first,thesmallandmedium-sizedenterprisestoabsorbalargenumberofemployment,torealizesocialfullemploymenthuge;Second,thesmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesinpromotingeconomicgrowtheffectcannotbeignored;Third,thesmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesisthemainforceoftechnologyinnovation;Finally,thesmallandmedium-sizedenterprises(SMES)playtheroleoftheuniquesocialstabilizer.Smallandmedium-sizedenterprisesinsocialproductivitygrowth,intermsofaccesstotechnologyandthecontributionoftechnologyapplication,hasbecomethemostactiveinthesystemofmarketeconomy,themostpotentialenterprisegroups.However,intheprocessofrapiddevelopmentofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesarefacedwiththedifficult,especiallysince2008isaffectedbytheglobalfinancialcrisis,financingdifficultiesmorebecomeacommonobstaclesinthedevelopmentofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.Theimportanceofsmallandmedium-sizedenterpriseshasbeengenerallyrecognizedbytheworld,governmentshavetakenvariousmeasurestosupportthedevelopmentofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.Atpresent,thegovernmenttosupportthedevelopmentofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesathomeandabroadpracticeistheimplementationofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisescreditguaranteesystem(projectorprogram).Throughthegovernmentguidance,acombinationofmarketmechanismandmacro-controltoestablishsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisescreditguaranteesystem,andcanpasson,lowerpartofthebankrisk,improvetheenthusiasmofbankfinancingforsmallandmediumenterprises,improvethefinancingenvironmentofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.
2Literaturereview
AlvaroRuiz(2010)byanalyzingthenationalcreditguaranteesschemethatalthoughtheircharacteristicsanddifferenttypes,thereasonofitsexistenceisthesame:
toalleviatethedifficultyinsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesinfinancing,whileensuringthatreducethebank'sloanlosses.Himthroughthecomparativeanalysisofthecharacteristicsofdifferentcreditguaranteeprojectcaseandguaranteetheproblemofasymmetricinformation,findoutthetheoreticalfoundationofthecreditguaranteeprogram,atthesametime,forthosewhoeitherfororagainstthetworesearchersprovidesanewthinkingoftheplan.
Haines,Canada,theUnitedStates,werecomparativelystudied,andtheBritishgovernment'ssmallandmedium-sizedenterprisecreditguaranteeproject,analysisthedefaultcostandguaranteestheprojectforthebenefitsofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises;theythinkthatthewelfareoftheloanguaranteeprojecthasapositiveeffect.Lee(2002)anditsbackgroundofSoutheastAsiafinancialcrisis,analyzestheguaranteeamplificationmechanismoffinancialcrisisondevelopingcountries.DuetothedevelopmentofChina'shouseholdwithhighgovernmentsubsidiesforhighinvestmentandhighgrowth,thegrowthoftherealestateandthepricelevelisoftenatahigherlevel,thismakestheeconomyissensitivetofluctuationsinreverse.Andreversewaveonceappear,inundertheactionofamplificationmechanism,wouldtriggerassetsshrink.Sharplyandcollateralvalue,thedesiredsecuredloanratioincreasedrapidly,leadingtoforeigninvestmentwithdrawloans,theeconomiccrisis.
MarcandNick(2009)throughthestudy,drivenbythegovernmentloanguaranteeprogramintheearly80sto90softhe20thcenturywassuccessful,greatlysolvethefinancingproblemofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.NigriniandAndrieinthestudyalsoconcludedthatacreditguaranteeplanalthoughthereisaproblem,butforthegovernmentisstillaneffectivewaytoreducetheriskofbanklending,andyoucanusethiswaytoforcethemtobetterservesmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.
KangandAlmas(2008)throughtothe"creditguaranteepolicyimpactonSouthKorea'ssmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesurvivalanddevelopmentof"theresearchsuggeststhatingeneral,oftenusecreditguaranteemakeseffectiveway,andyoucanusethiswaytoforcethemtobetterservesmallandmedium-sizedenterprisestotheinsuredenterprisescanachievegoodresults.Aslongasthecreditguaranteesystemofreasonabledesignisbasedonitsnationalconditions,tosolvethedifficultyofacountry'ssmallandmedium-sizedenterprisefinancingcreditguaranteecanplayeffectiverole.Ascountriesinpractice,thereexistssomewell-runcreditguaranteesystem,themajorityinfavoroftheviewofscholars.
Tosumup,researchmainlyfromthefinancingguaranteeroleinsolvingtheproblemofincentiveconflict,fromtheperspectiveofdebtcontract,etc,inordertobankfinancingguaranteeproblemformediation.Theobjectofstudyismostlymortgageproblems,studyofcreditguarantee.Duetothesmallandmedium-sizedenterprisefinancingproblemismainlysetbythegovernmentguaranteeprogram,theconcreteexecutionpolicyguaranteeagenciestosolve,thecommercialguaranteeagenciesmainlyengagedinthefinancingguaranteebusiness,mutualguaranteeinstitutionsisless,whichleadstothecomparativestudyofthreekindsofguaranteeagenciesdedicatedisless.
3Relatedtheoreticalanalysis
3.1Theasymmetricinformationtheory
Classicaleconomicstheory,informationsymmetrycanensurethepriceonthemarketspontaneousadjustmentmechanism,financialmarkets,too.AccordingtothenewKeynesianview,duetotheunbalanceofmarketinformationdistribution,theachievementofmarketequilibriumcanonlybebasedonthebalanceoftheincompleteinformation,Andpointsoutthatbecauseofthespreadofinformation,andreceivingisgoingtocost,plusthelimitationsofmarketinformationsystemitselfandtheinterferenceofmarketparticipants,thesefactorshaveledtothemarketinformationisnotalwayseffective.Inaddition,thespecializationanddivisionoflabor,makingthedifferentareasoftheeconomyoftheparticipantsonthemasterinformationinadifferentposition,becausetheabilityofobtaininginformationisdifferentbetweentheeconomicsubjectandinformationarenotequal.Inreality,capitalsupplyanddemandbothsidesofthedistributionisofteninastateofasymmetricinformation.Inthecreditmarkets,borrowersduetobetterunderstandtheirownreimbursementabilityandtheriskofprojectinvestment,soastohavemoreinformation,andlendersareoftenaninformationdisadvantage.Atthistime,withtheintroductionofathirdpartycredit,setupthebridgeofinformationcommunication,isawaytosolvethisproblem.Creditguaranteeagenciestousetheirinformationprocessingandfurthercapitaldemandersofadvantage,caneffectivequestionsdon'tmaketherightguaranteeenterprise,thisprocessalsoforbankhoofpickthesuitableborrowers;Passedtheavailableinformationaboutborrowersfromthebank,therealizationofthecreditor'srightsguaranteeofbank.Thisprocessatthesametime,improveenterprisecreditguaranteeagenciescorrespondingfee,belongtoaspecialkindofcreditintermediaryservice,itsproducetoacertainextent,informationasymmetryproblembetweenfixedborrowing.
3.2Thefinancialintermediarytheory
Newfinancialintermediationtheorymainlyfromtheperspectiveofinformationeconomicsandtransactioncost,thefinancialintermediaryservicesprovided,andthefunctionareanalyzed.Asthemarkettransactioncostandinformationcostfactorssuchastheexistenceofininformationacquisitionandtransactionsupervisionhasacomparativeadvantageinaspectsoffinancialintermediationisabletoproduce.Financialintermediationisusingitsspecialization,canachieveeconomiesofscaleandscopeeconomybringbeneficialeffect,achievetheresultofthelowertransactioncosts;Andtransactioncostgeneratedfromavarietyofreasons,includinginformationasymmetryisoneofthem,themainbroughttocollectinformation,supervisionandsoonvariousaspectsofthecost.Directionofcreditguaranteeinstitutionsasathirdpartyguaranteefordebtcreditorstoprovidecreditguarantee,guaranteeborrowerswouldfulfilltheresponsibilityandobligationofcontractorotheragreement.Intheprocessoffinancingguaranteebusiness,creditguarantee
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