Public Reason.docx
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Public Reason.docx
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PublicReason
PublicReason
FromStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy
FirstpublishedMonMay20,2013
Publicreasonrequiresthatthemoralorpoliticalrulesthatregulateourcommonlifebe,insomesense,justifiableoracceptabletoallthosepersonsoverwhomtherulespurporttohaveauthority.ItisanideawithrootsintheworkofHobbes,Kant,andRousseau,andhasbecomeincreasinglyinfluentialincontemporarymoralandpoliticalphilosophyasaresultofitsdevelopmentintheworkofJohnRawls,JürgenHabermas,andGeraldGaus,amongothers.Proponentsofpublicreasonoftenpresenttheideaasanimplicationofaparticularconceptionofpersonsasfreeandequal.Eachofusisfreeinthesenseofnotbeingnaturallysubjecttoanyotherperson'smoralorpoliticalauthority,andweareequallysituatedwithrespecttothisfreedomfromthenaturalauthorityofothers.How,then,cansomemoralorpoliticalrulesberightlyimposedonallofus,particularlyifweassumedeepandpermanentdisagreementamongstpersonsaboutmattersofvalue,morality,religion,andthegoodlife?
Theanswer,forproponentsofpublicreason,isthatsuchrulescanrightlybeimposedonpersonswhentherulescanbejustifiedbyappealtoideasorargumentsthatthosepersons,atsomelevelofidealization,endorseoraccept.Butpublicreasonisnotonlyastandardbywhichmoralorpoliticalrulescanbeassessed:
itcanalsoprovidestandardsforindividualbehavior.Becausewemakemoralandpoliticaldemandsofeachother,ifwearetocomplywiththeidealofpublicreason,wemustrefrainfromadvocatingorsupportingrulesthatcannotbejustifiedtothoseonwhomtheruleswouldbeimposed.Weshouldinstead,someinsist,onlysupportthoseruleswesincerelybelievecanbejustifiedbyappealtosuitablysharedorpublicconsiderations—forexample,widelyendorsedpoliticalvaluessuchasfreedomandequality—andabstainfromappealingtoreligiousarguments,orothercontroversialviewsoverwhichreasonablepeopleareassumedtodisagree.Inthisway,publicreasoncanbepresentedasastandardforassessingrules,laws,institutions,andthebehaviorofindividualcitizensandpublicofficials.
Thisentryisstructuredaroundquestionsaboutthenatureofpublicreasonthatcontinuetobethesubjectofsustaineddebateintheliterature.Section1considerscompetingpositionsregardingtheunderlyingrationaleforpublicreason.Section2identifiesdifferentviewsabouttheappropriatescopeofpublicreason.Doesitapplytoallmoralrules,onlytopoliticalrules,oronlytosomesub-setofpoliticalrules?
Section3considersthequestionofpublicreason'sconstituency:
towhommustourrulesbejustifiableinordertobeconsideredlegitimateorauthoritative?
Thenextquestion,insection4,concernsthecontentofpublicreason;inparticular,towhatextentisthiscontentdeterminedviaaprocessofphilosophicalreflectionasopposedtoactualmoraldeliberation?
Section5considersthestructureofpublicreason,withparticularfocusonwhetherpublicreasonrequiressomesharedperspectiveorsetofconsiderations,orwhetheritcanbeachievedwithoutanycommonmoralorpoliticalperspective.Section6addressesthesiteofpublicreason:
wheredoitsnormsproperlyapplyandwhendotheyregulateindividualconduct?
Section7identifiessomeofthemostinfluentialobjectionsthathavebeenpressedagainsttheideaofpublicreason,andSection8concludeswithasurveyofafewimportant,butunderdeveloped,topics.
∙1.WhyPublicReason?
o1.1RationalityandMorality
o1.2Autonomy
o1.3CoercionandRespect
o1.4CommunityorCivicFriendship
o1.5Justice
∙2.Scope
∙3.Constituency
∙4.Content
∙5.Structure
∙6.SiteandDuties
∙7.Objections
o7.1Self-Defeating
o7.2Truth
o7.3Incompleteness
o7.4Exclusion
o7.5Antidemocratic
∙8.FurtherIssues
o8.1Non-idealConditions
o8.2ProblemsofExtension
o8.3GlobalPublicReason
o8.4Assurance,Stability,andPublicity
∙Bibliography
∙AcademicTools
∙OtherInternetResources
∙RelatedEntries
1.WhyPublicReason?
Theideaofpublicreasonappearstoinhabitamiddlegroundbetweentwomorefamiliarstandardsofevaluationinmoralandpoliticalphilosophy.Ontheonehand,thereis consent.Somepoliticalphilosophers,forexample,arguethatpoliticallegitimacyrequirestheactualorimpliedconsentofthegoverned(Otsuka2003,89–113;Simmons1999).Ontheotherhand,thereis truth:
wecansimplyaskwhetheranyallegedmoralorpoliticalprincipleistrue.Publicreasondoesnotaimeitheratconsentortruth.Publicreasoninsteadrequiresthatourmoralorpoliticalprinciplesbejustifiableto,orreasonablyacceptableto,allthosepersonstowhomtheprinciplesaremeanttoapply.Anaccountofpublicreasonmustfindsomewayofgivingtheperspectiveofindividualpersonsasignificantrole,withoutallowingthistocollapseintoconsent:
publicreasonisnotsimplyawayofidentifyingthoseprinciplestowhichpeoplealreadyconsent.Butequally,publicreasonmustnotdefinethoseprinciplesthatcouldbejustifiedto,orbeacceptableto,eachpersonassimplythoseprinciplesthataretrue.Ineithercase,theideaofpublicreasonwoulddonoindependentwork.
Thisapparentmiddlegroundbetweenconsentandtruthmayseempuzzlinginseveralrespects.Onepuzzleiswhetherthereis,infact,acoherentandstablewayofexplicatingthenotionofreasonableacceptabilityorjustification(Raz1990,46).Butevenifweassumetheideaofpublicreasoniscoherent,wecanplausiblyaskwhyweoughttoacceptthisidea,thatis,whatisthebasisforadoptingpublicreasonastherelevantstandardtoevaluaterulesandtogovernindividualconduct?
Thissectionconsidersfivedifferentanswerstothisquestion(theseanswerscan,ofcourse,alsobecombined).Itishelpfultobeginbyconsideringthesedifferentpositionsregardingthebasisofpublicreason,sincehowonechoosestoanswerthisquestionoftenhasdirectimplicationsforthescope,constituency,content,site,duties,andstructureofpublicreason.
Eachofthepositionsbelowisusuallycombinedwithanassumptionaboutpluralismorreasonabledisagreementoverawiderangeofmoral,ethical,andotherphilosophicalmatters.Thatis,virtuallyallproponentsofpublicreasonassumethatthereisdeepandintractabledisagreementamongstsomepeople,andthisdisagreementisnotsimplytheresultofirrationality,prejudice,orself-interest,butratherarisesasaresultofthenormalfunctioningofhumanreasoningunderreasonablyfavorableconditions.Thisassumptionaboutpluralismordisagreementseemsanessentialpartoftherationaleforpublicreasonsincewithoutit,itmightseemhardtounderstandwhyourmoralorpoliticalprinciplesoughttobejustifiableoracceptabletoothers,asopposedtosimplytrueorcorrect.ThemostinfluentialconceptionofsuchpluralismordisagreementisRawls'saccountof theburdensofjudgment andthesubsequent factofreasonablepluralism (Rawls1996,36–37,55–57),thoughthisaccountiscontroversial,andhasbeensubjecttoextensivecriticism(e.g.Galston2002,46–47;Gaus1996,131–136;Wenar1995,41–48).
1.1RationalityandMorality
Somephilosopherspresenttheideaofpublicreason,orthepublicuseofreason,asanessentialandcentralpartofthenatureofrationaldiscourseaboutmoralnorms.Habermas'sinfluentialaccountofdiscourseethics(Habermas1990;Habermas1996)hasbeenpresentedbysomeasgroundingaconceptionofpublicreasoninthisway.Onthisview,thevalidityofmoralandpoliticalnormscanonlybeestablishedbyanintersubjectiveandidealizedpracticeofargumentation.Onlythroughaninclusiveandnoncoercivediscursiveprocesswhereallparticipantsareequallysituatedcangenuinelyintersubjectivelyvalidnormsemerge.Habermasthusproposesadialogicalprincipleofuniversalization,(U),statingthatamoralnorm“isvalidjustincasetheforeseeableconsequencesandside-effectsofitsgeneralobservancefortheinterestsandvalue-orientationsof eachindividual couldbe jointly acceptedbyall concernedwithoutcoercion”(Habermas1998,42).ForHabermas,thisprinciplefollowsfromthepresuppositionsofrationalmoraldiscourse,andso—atleastononeinterpretation—toengageinreasonedmoralorpoliticalargumentwithothersistocommitoneselftosomethingliketheideaofpublicreason—tocommitoneselftofindingnormsthatcouldbejointlyacceptedbyallconcernedwithoutcoercion.Onthisaccount,publicreasonisgroundedinthenatureofreasonedmoralargument:
onecannot,withoutcontradiction,avoidtheideaofpublicreasoninsofarasonewantstoengageinreasonedmoralorpoliticalargumentwithothers.
AlthoughHabermas'saccountofdiscourseethicshasbeeninfluentialamongstthosewhofavorsomeversionofdiscursiveordeliberativedemocracy(Bohman1996;Dryzek1990;Dryzek2000),itscapacitytoserveasthebasisforpublicreasonisthesubjectofanumberofcriticisms.Perhapsmostimportantly,bygroundingpublicreasoninabroaderaccountoftruth,validity,andrationalargument,publicreasonbecomestiedtoaspecificandcontroversialphilosophicaldoctrine.ButsomeproponentsofpublicreasonbelieveitsroleistoserveasamechanismofjustificationamongstpersonswhoreasonablydisagreeaboutphilosophicalandotherissuestypicallyembeddedinwhatRawlscalls comprehensivedoctrines (Rawls1996,13).Ifonebelievestheideaofpublicreasonshouldstandapartfromanyparticularcomprehensivedoctrineorphilosophicaltheoryoftruthandrationality,theappealtothepresuppositionsofrationaldiscoursewillbeaproblematicbasisforpublicr
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