柠檬的市场质量的不确定性和市场机制外文翻译.docx
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柠檬的市场质量的不确定性和市场机制外文翻译.docx
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柠檬的市场质量的不确定性和市场机制外文翻译
外文翻译
原文
Themarketfor"lemons":
qualityuncertaintyandthemarketmechanism
MaterialSource:
TheQuarterlyJournalofEconomics,1970Author:
GEORGEA.AKERLOF
I.INTRODUCTION
Thispaperrelatesqualityanduncertainty.Theexistenceofgoodsofmanygradesposesinterestingandimportantproblemsforthetheoryofmarkets.Ontheonehand,theinteractionofqualitydifferencesanduncertaintymayexplainimportantinstitutionsofthelabormarket.Ontheotherhand,thispaperpresentsastrugglingattempttogivestructuretothestatement:
"Businessinunderdevelopedcountriesisdifficult";inparticular,astructureisgivenfordeterminingtheeconomiccostsofdishonesty.Additionalapplicationsofthetheoryincludecommentsonthestructureofmoneymarkets,onthenotionof"insurability,"ontheliquidityofdurables,andonbrand-namegoods.
Therearemanymarketsinwhichbuyersusesomemarketstatistictojudgethequalityofprospectivepurchases.Inthiscasethereisincentiveforsellerstomarketpoorqualitymerchandise,sincethereturnsforgoodqualityaccruemainlytotheentiregroupwhosestatisticisaffectedratherthantotheindividualseller.Asaresulttheretendstobeareductionintheaveragequalityofgoodsandalsointhesizeofthemarket.Itshouldalsobeperceivedthatinthesemarketssocialandprivatereturnsdiffer,andtherefore,insomecases,governmentalinterventionmayincreasethewelfareofallparties.Orprivateinstitutionsmayarisetotakeadvantageofthepotentialincreasesinwelfarewhichcanaccruetoallparties.Bynature,however,theseinstitutionsarenonatomistic,andthereforeconcentrationsofpowerwithillconsequencesoftheirowncandevelop.
Theautomobilemarketisusedasafingerexercisetoillustrateanddevelopthesethoughts.Itshouldbeemphasizedthatthismarketischosenforitsconcretenessandeaseinunderstandingratherthanforitsimportanceorrealism.
II.THEMODELWITHAUTOMOBILESASANEXAMPLE
A.TheAutomobilesMarket
Theexampleofusedcarscapturestheessenceoftheproblem.Fromtimetotimeonehearseithermentionoforsurpriseatthelargepricedifferencebetweennewcarsandthosewhichhavejustlefttheshowroom.Theusuallunchtablejustificationforthisphenomenonthepurejoyofowninga"new"car.Weofferadifferentexplanation.Suppose(forthesakeofclarityratherthanreality)thattherearejustfourkindsofcars.Therearenewcarsandusedcars.Therearegoodcarsandbadcars(whichinAmericaareknownas"lemons").Anewcarmaybeagoodcaroralemon,andofcoursethesameistrueofusedcars.
Theindividualsinthismarketbuyanewautomobilewithoutknowingwhetherthecartheybuywillbegoodoralemon.Buttheydoknowthatwithprobabilityqitisagoodcarandwithprobability(1-q)itisalemon;byassumption,qistheproportionofgoodcarsproducedand(1-q)istheproportionoflemons.
Afterowningaspecificcar,however,foralengthoftime,thecarownercanformagoodideaofthequalityofthismachine;i.e.,theownerassignsanewprobabilitytotheeventthathiscarisalemon.Thisestimateismoreaccuratethantheoriginalestimate.Anasymmetryinavailableinformationhasdeveloped:
forthesellersnowhavemoreknowledgeaboutthequalityofacarthanthebuyers.Butgoodcarsandbadcarsmuststillsellatthesamepricesinceitisimpossibleforabuyertotellthedifferencebetweenagoodcarandabadcar.Itisapparentthatausedcarcannothavethesamevaluationasanewcar.ifitdidhavethesamevaluation,itwouldclearlybeadvantageoustotradealemonatthepriceofnewcar,andbuyanothernewcar,atahigherprobabilityqofbeinggoodandalowerprobabilityofbeingbad.Thustheownerofagoodmachinemustbelockedin.Notonlyisittruethathecannotreceivethetruevalueofhiscar,buthecannotevenobtaintheexpectedvalueofanewcar.
Gresham'slawhasmadeamodifiedreappearance.Formostcarstradedwillbethe"lemons,"andgoodcarsmaynotbetradedatall.The"bad"carstendtodriveoutthegood(inmuchthesamewaythatbadmoneydrivesoutthegood).ButtheanalogywithGresham'slawisnotquitecomplete:
badcarsdriveoutthegoodbecausetheysellatthesamepriceasgoodcars;similarly,badmoneydrivesoutgoodbecausetheexchangerateiseven.Butthebadcarssellatthesamepriceasgoodcarssinceitisimpossibleforabuyertotellthedifferencebetweenagoodandabadcar;onlythesellerknows.InGresham'slaw,however,presumablybothbuyerandsellercantellthedifferencebetweengoodandbadmoney.Sotheanalogyisinstructive,butnotcomplete.
B.AsymmetricalInformation
Ithasbeenseenthatthegoodcarsmaybedrivenoutofthemarketbythelemons.Butinamorecontinuouscasewithdifferentgradesofgoods,evenworsepathologiescanexist.Foritisquitepossibletohavethebaddrivingoutthenot-so-baddrivingoutthemediumdrivingoutthenot-so-gooddrivingoutthegoodinsuchasequenceofeventsthatnomarketexistsatall.Onecanassumethatthedemandforusedautomobilesdependsmoststronglyupontwovariablesthepriceoftheautomobilepandtheaveragequalityofusedcarstraded,a,orQ=D(p,A).Boththesupplyofusedcarsandalsotheaveragequalitypwilldependupontheprice,orp=j(p)andS=S(p).Andinequilibriumthesupplymustequalthedemandforthegivenaveragequality,orS(p)=D(p,p(p)).Asthepricefalls,normallythequalitywillalsofall.Anditisquitepossiblethatnogoodswillbetradedatanypricelevel.
Suchanexamplecanbederivedfromutilitytheory.Assumethattherearejusttwogroupsoftraders:
groupsoneandtwo.Givegrouponeautilityfunction
n
U1=M+∑Xi
i=1
whereMistheconsumptionofgoodsotherthanautomobiles,X1isthequalityoftheI.T.Hautomobile,andNisthenumberofautomobiles.Similarly,let
n
U2=M+∑X3/2Xi
i=1
whereM,X1,andNaredefinedasbefore.Threecommentsshouldbemadeabouttheseutilityfunctions:
(1)withoutlinearutility(saywithlogarithmicutility)onegetsneedlesslymiredinalgebraiccomplication.
(2)Theuseoflinearutilityallowsafocusontheeffectsofasymmetryofinformation;withaconcaveutilityfunctionwewouldhavetodealjointlywiththeusualriskvarianceeffectsofuncertaintyandthespecialeffectswewishtodiscusshere.(3)U1andU2havetheoddcharacteristicthattheadditionofasecondcar,orindeedaKTHcar,addsthesameamountofutilityasthefirst.Againrealismissacrificedtoavoidadiversionfromtheproperfocus.
Tocontinue,itisassumed
(1)thatbothtypeonetradersandtypetwotradersareVonNeumannMorgensternmaximizersofexpectedutility;
(2)thatgrouponehasNcarswithuniformlydistributedqualityx,0 Denotetheincome(includingthatderivedfromthesaleofautomobiles)ofalltypeonetradersasY1andtheincomeofalltypetwotradersasY2.Thedemandforusedcarswillbethesumofthedemandsbybothgroups.Whenoneignoresindivisibility,thedemandforautomobilesbytypeonetraderswillbe D1=Y1/pμ/p>l D1=Oμ/p Andthesupplyofcarsofferedbytypeonetradersis S2=PN/2p≤2 withaveragequality i=p/2. (Toderive (1)and (2),theuniformdistributionofautomobilequalityisused.) Similarlythedemandoftypetwotradersis D2=Y2/P3μ/2>p D2=03μ/2 and S2=0. ThustotaldemandD(p,μ)is D(p,μ)=(Y2+Y1)/Pifp<μ D(p,μ)=Y2/pifμ D(p,μ)=0ifp>3μ/2. However,withpricep,averagequalityisp/2andthereforeatnopricewillanytradetakeplaceatall: inspiteofthefactthatatanygivenpricebetween0and3therearetradersoftypeonewhoarewillingtoselltheirautomobilesatapricewhichtradersoftypetwoarewillingtopay. C.SymmetricInformationTheforegoingiscontrastedwiththecaseofsymmetricinformation.Supposethatthequalityofallcarsisuniformlydistributed,O Supply S(p)=Np>1 S(p)=Op<1. Andthedemandcurvesare D(p)=(Y2+May)/Pp<1 D(p)=(Y2/p)l D(p)=0p>3/2. Inequilibrium p=1ifY2 P=Y2/Nif2Y2/3 p=3/2ifN<2Y2/3. IfN Finally,itshouldbementionedthatinthisexample,iftradersofgroupsoneandtwohavethesameprobabilisticestimatesaboutthequalityofindividualautomobilesthoughtheseestimatesmayvaryfromautomobiletoautomobile(3),(4),and(5)willstilldescribeequilibriumwithoneslightchange: pwillthenrepresenttheexpectedpriceofonequalityunit. III.EXAMPLESANDAPPLICATIONS A.Insurance Itisawell-knownfactthatpeopleover65havegreatdifficultyinbuyingmedicalinsurance.Thenaturalquestionarises: whydoesn'tthepricerisetomatchtherisk? Ouransweristhatasthepricelevelrisesthepeoplewhoinsurethemselveswillbethosewhoareincreasinglycertainthattheywillneedtheinsurance;forerrorinmedicalcheck-ups,doctors'sympathywitholderpatients,andsoonmakeitmucheasierfortheapplicanttoassesstherisksinvolvedthantheinsurancecompany.Theresultisthattheaveragemedicalconditionofinsuranceapplicantsdeterioratesasthepricelevelriseswiththeresultthatnoinsurancesalesmaytakeplaceatanyprice.'Thisisstrictlyanalogoustoourauto
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- 关 键 词:
- 柠檬 市场 质量 不确定性 市场机制 外文 翻译
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