赵潮23Patent policy patent pools and the accumulation.docx
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赵潮23Patent policy patent pools and the accumulation.docx
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赵潮23Patentpolicypatentpoolsandtheaccumulation
EconTheory(2012)50:
703–725
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0591-5
RESEARCHARTICLE
Patentpolicy,patentpools,andtheaccumulation
ofclaimsinsequentialinnovation
GastónLlanes·StefanoTrento
Received:
16September2009/Accepted:
22November2010/Publishedonline:
4December2010
(C)Springer-Verlag2010
AbstractWepresentadynamicmodelwheretheaccumulationofpatentsgeneratesanincreasingnumberofclaimsonsequentialinnovation.Wecompareinnovationactivityunderthreeregimes—patents,no-patents,andpatentpools—andfindthatnoneofthemcanreachthefirstbest.Wefindthatthefirstbestcanbereachedthroughadecentralizedtax-subsidymechanism,bywhichinnovatorsreceiveasubsidywhentheyinnovate,andaretaxedwithsubsequentinnovations.Thisfindingimpliesthatoptimaltransfersworkintheexactoppositewayastraditionalpatents.Finally,weconsiderpatentsoffinitedurationanddeterminetheoptimalpatentlength.
KeywordsSequentialinnovation·Patentpolicy·Patentpools·Anticommons
Doublemarginalization·Complementarymonopoly
WearegratefultoMicheleBoldrinforhisguidanceandadvice.WethankAntonioCabrales,
AntonioCiccone,MarcoCelentani,AndresErosa,BelénJerez,GerardLlobet,XavierVives,and
participantsofseminarsatHarvardBusinessSchool,UniversidadCarlosIIIdeMadrid,Universitat
AutònomadeBarcelona,andCenterforAppliedEconomicsofUniversidaddeChileforusefulcommentsandsuggestions.Wearealsogratefultotheeditor,TimothyKehoe,andtwoanonymousreferees,whosecommentsgreatlyimprovedthepaper.WegratefullyacknowledgefinancialsupportfromtheMinistryofEducationofSpain(Llanes,FPUGrantAP2003-2204),theMinistryofScienceandTechnologyofSpain(Trento,GrantSEJ2006-00538),andtheComunidadAutónomadeMadrid(Trento).StefanoTrentoisalsoaffiliatedtoMOVEandBarcelonaGraduateSchoolofEconomics.
G.Llanes
EscueladeAdministración,PontificiaUniversidadCatólicadeChile,
VicunaMackenna4860,Macul,Santiago,Chile
e-mail:
gllanes@uc.cl
S.Trento
DepartmentofEconomicsandEconomicHistory,UniversitatAutònomadeBarcelona,
08193Bellaterra,CerdanyoladelVallès,Spain
e-mail:
stefano.trento@uab.es
1Introduction
Knowledgebuildsuponpreviousknowledge.Thisistrueformostinnovationsnowa-days,especiallyinhigh-techindustriessuchasmolecularbiology,plantbiotechnology,semiconductors,andsoftware.Insomecases,theinnovationconsistsofanimprove-mentofanolderversionofthesamegood.Inothercases,theresearchleadingtothediscoveryofthenewgooddependsontheaccesstoresearchtools,techniques,andinputsthatwerepreviousinnovationsthemselves.
Thesequentialnatureofinnovationintroducestheissueofhowtodividethereve-nuesfromthechainofinventionsamongthedifferentinnovators.Supposetwoinno-vationsmaybeintroducedsequentially.Ifthefirstinnovatorreceivesapatent,shemayobtainaclaimoverpartofthesecondinnovator’srevenues.Then,thepolicymakerfacesanimportanttrade-off:
ifthepatentcoveringthefirstinnovationisstrong,thesecondinnovationmaybecomeunprofitable,butifthatpatentisweak,itmayprovidelowincentivestointroducethefirstinnovation.
Theliteratureonsequentialinnovation,pioneeredbyScotchmer1991,hasstud-iedthisproblemindepth.Usually,thisliteraturehasanalyzedtheoptimaldivisionofprofitsbetweentwosequentialinnovators.Butwhathappenswhenacontinuoussequenceofinnovationsexists,eachbuildingonallpreviousinventions?
Recentresearchhassuggestedthepossibilitythattheaccumulationofclaimsonsequentialinnovationsmaygenerateatragedyoftheanticommons(Heller1998;HellerandEisenberg1998).Whentoomanyagentshaveexclusionrightsovertheuseofacommonresource,thisresourcetendstobeunderutilized,incleardualitywiththetragedyofthecommonsinwhichtoomanyagentsholdrightsofuseandtheresourcetendstobeoverused.
Inourcase,theanticommonscouldariseiftoomanypatentholdershaveexclusiveclaimsonseparatecomponentsofthestate-of-the-arttechnology,creatinganobstacleforfutureresearch.However,theanticommonshypothesishasnotyetbeenstudiedfor-mallyinadynamicmodelwithendogenousinnovation.Inparticular,patentsproduceclaimsonsubsequentinnovationsthatmaymorethancompensateforthenegativeeffectofhavingtopaylicensingfeestopreviousinnovators.Severalinterestingques-tionsarise:
whatistheneteffectofpatentsoninnovationincentives?
Howshouldpolicyparametersbesettomaximizesocialwelfare?
Twostreamsofliteratureprovidepartialanswerstothesequestions.1Thelitera-tureonsequentialinnovationismainlyconcernedwithsubstituteinnovations,wherelaterinnovationsareapplicationsorimprovementsofearlierinnovations.Thissettingallowslittleroomforstudyingtheeffectsoftheaccumulationofclaims.Ontheotherhand,theliteraturesofcomplementarymonopoly,patentthickets,andpatentpoolsstudytheproblemoftheaccumulationofcomplementarypatents,butfromastaticpointofview.AsShapiro(2001)states:
“Thegenericprobleminherentinthepatentthicketiswellunderstoodasamatterofeconomictheory,atleastinitsstaticversion.”
Themaincontributionofourpaperistodevelopadynamicmodeltostudyhowtheaccumulationofcomplementaryclaimsaffectsinnovationincentives.Werelatetheliteratureonsequentialinnovationtothestaticliteraturesofcomplementarymonopolyandpatentpools.Extendingtheanalysisofcomplementarymonopolytoadynamicframeworkallowsustogainrelevantinsightsintotheemergenceofpatentthicketsandtheneteffectofdifferentpatentpolicyregimesoninnovationatdifferentstagesofindustrymaturity.
Wepresentadynamicmodeltostudythedivisionofprofitsbetweensequen-tialinnovatorswheneachinnovationbuildsonseveralpriorinventions.Aninfinitesequenceofinnovationsn=1,2,...exists,whereinnovationncannotbeintroduceduntilinnovationn-1hasbeenintroduced.Eachinnovationhasacommercialvalue(theprofititgeneratesasafinalgood),whichisrandomandprivateinformationoftheinnovator,andrequiresadeterministiccostofR&Dtobedeveloped.
Ourmodelprovidesagooddescriptionoftheinnovationprocessinseveralindus-tries.Forexample,inthesoftwareindustry,thefirstprogramswerewrittenfromscratchandthereforebuiltonlittlepriorknowledge.Asmoreandmoreprogramsweredeveloped,theyprogressivelybecamemoredependentontechnologiesthefirstpro-gramshadintroduced.AccordingtoGarfinkeletal.(1991),modernsoftwareprogramscontainthousandsofpreviouslydevelopedmathematicalalgorithmsandtechniques.Similarexamplescanbefoundinotherhigh-techindustries.
Formally,ourmodelisamulti-stagegameindiscretetimewithanuncertainend.Interestingly,theprobabilityofreachingthenextperiodisdeterminedendogenously.TheequilibriumconceptweuseissubgameperfectequilibriumwithMarkovianstrat-egies(Markovperfectequilibrium).
Inthefirstpartofthepaper,westudyequilibriumdynamicsinthreescenarios:
patents,nopatents,andpatentpools.Withpatents,innovationbecomesharderandharderwithmorecomplexinnovations.Theprobabilityofinnovationgoesto0asn→∞.Theprobabilityofinnovationishigherthaninthestaticcase,butnothighenoughtopreventthetragedyoftheanticommons.Therefore,weshowthatcomple-mentarymonopolyinefficiencies,originallyexploredbyCournot(1838),alsoextend
toadynamicframeworkwhereweremovetheboundonthesocialvaluecomplementarymonopolistsshare,asweexplaininSect.1.1.
Withoutpatents,theprobabilityofinnovationisconstantanddependsonthedegreeofappropriabilityoftheinnovation’scommercialvalueinthefinalgoodssector.Whenpatentsprotectideas,theformationofapatentpoolincreasestheprobabilityofinnovationforallinnovations.Interestingly,theprobabilityofinnovationwithapoolisconstantandhigherthanitwouldbeinthestaticcase.ThisresultstrengthensthefindingsofShapiro(2001),LernerandTirole(2004),andLlanesandTrento(2009)forstaticmodels.
Wefindthatpoolsaredynamicallyunstable:
thetemptationtoremainoutsidethepoolincreasesasthesequenceofinnovationsadvances,whichmeansearlyinnovatorshavemoreincentivesthanlaterinnovatorstoenterthepool.Thedesignofamechanismtosolvethepoolinstabilityproblem,alongthelinesofBrenner(2009),isbeyondthescopeofthispaper.However,wefindthataschemeinwhicheachinnovatorbuysallpatentrightsfromtheprecedinginnovator,insteadofpayingonlyforthepermissiontousetheidea,canreplicatethepatentpooloutcome.Thecompletesaleofpatentrightswillthereforegeneratehigherinnovationthanlicensing.Analternativescheme,leadingtothesameinnovationoutcome,istoallowsubsequentcompetitionbetweenthelicenseeandtheoriginallicensor.Thisalternativeschemeremovesthemonopolypowerofallbutthelastpatent,eliminatingtheanticommonseffect.
Westudytheoptimalinnovationpolicythatmaximizestheexpectedwelfareofthesequenceofinnovationsandfindthatinnovationissuboptimalinthethreepolicyregimes.Intheno-patentsregime,thereisadynamicexternality:
innovatorsdonotconsiderhowtheirdecisionsimpactthetechnologicalpossibilitiesoffutureinnovators.Inthetwootherpolicyregimes,theinefficiencystemsfromasymmetricinformationandmarketpower:
patentholdersdonotknowtheexactvalueof
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