逆向软预算约束一个政府行为的组织分析英文翻译.docx
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逆向软预算约束一个政府行为的组织分析英文翻译.docx
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逆向软预算约束一个政府行为的组织分析英文翻译
InvertedSoftBudgetConstraint:
AnOrganizationAnalysisofGovernmentAction
Inthispaper,the"reversesoftbudgetconstraint"isusedtosummarizeabehaviorthatthebasiclevelgovernmentgettingresourcesontheareaunderthejurisdictionoforganizationsandindividualsfromtoptobottom,andtoexploretheoriginofthesephenomenafromtheperspectiveoforganizationalanalysis:
Onthemicrolevel,mechanismandinformationasymmetryofthecadrepromotionsystemcausingthelowerlevelgovernmentofficialspursuitofshort-terminterestsoftheresourceintensiveperformanceengineering,andprovidingincentivesforgovernmentbehaviorinconstantlybreakingthebudgetconstraintsandpursuingtheextra-budgetaryresources;onthemacro-level,theconstraintmechanismsystemoforganizationfromtoptobottomisdifficulttoeffectivelyrun,becausethejointinterestsoftheupperandlowerlevelsofgovernmentofficials.theboycottofenterpriseorindividualisnoteffectivebecauseoftheasymmetryoftheorganization,andtheseparationoftheright,responsibilityandbenefitintheactualoperationresultinthefailureoftheresponsibilitysystem.Therefore,themacroorganizationalsystemisdifficulttoimplementeffectiverestraintonthebehaviorofgovernmentofficials.
Keywords:
softbudgetconstraint,governmentbehavior,grass-rootsgovernment,organizationanalysis,incentivemechanism
InvertedSoftBudgetConstraint:
TheVariationofTraditionalSoftBudgetConstraintinTransitionalEconomy
Inrecentyears,aphenomenonattractsgovernmentpolicymakersandsocialscienceresearchersgreatattention,whichisthelocalgovernmentapportionstaxesandcontributionstosubordinateunitsandindividualsintheirareaofjurisdiction,inordertoobtainextra-budgetaryresources.Becausetheseactsdirectlyforgeneralproducer(manufacturers)orindividual,thisphenomenonwasparticularlyprominentatthegrassrootslevelgovernment(county,townshiporvillagepolicyimplementation).Inrecentyears,Althoughthecentralgovernmentexplicitlyprohibitsthisevent,It'sgettingmoreandmoreserious.Arepeatingorganizationalbehaviormustbeconstructedonthebasisofthecorrespondingandstableorganizationalsystemandincentivemechanism.Inthispaper,wegiveatheoreticalexplanationofthesegovernmentalbehaviorsfromtheperspectiveoforganizationalanalysis.
Ourtheoreticalanalysisbeginswithaobservationthattheaboveorganizationalbehaviorhasalotofsimilaritieswiththe"softbudgetconstraint"inthetraditionalsocialistplannedeconomy.JanosKornai,aeconomist,noticespublicenterpriseslackofhardbudgetconstraintsineconomicactivities,thatenterprisesinablindpursuitofoutput,donotpayattentiontoefficiency,andtryingtobreakthebudgetlimitintheproductionprocess;Theycancontinuetorequestresourcesfromthehigherauthoritiestomakeuptheshortfallwhenthereisalossorshortageofresources.Inotherwords,these"budget"conditionsoncorporatebehaviordoesnotproduceaneffectiverestraint,andoftenshapedlikeadummy,whichshowsa"softbudgetconstraint"phenomenon.Sincethe1980s,the"softbudgetconstraint"hasbecomeanimportantconceptofanalysisandtheoreticalideastoexplainthesocialistplannedeconomyandcorporatebehavior,Theconceptofeconomicphenomenaareknowntoeveryone.
The"softbudgetconstraint"havebeenimplementedin all governmentof all levelsundertheplannedeconomysystem,whichthesubordinategovernmenthavealreadyexceededthebudgetlimit,achievedtheexpansionofthesizeandpower,andobtainedextra-budgetaryresourcesbylobbyingthehigherauthorities.Thecentralgovernmenttriedtohardenthebudgetthatfortheexpansionofthegovernment'sadministrativesystematalllevelsinthecourseofeconomicreform,whichitlimitstheexpansionofthesizeoflocalgovernmentimpulsebyfinancialcontract,balanceofpayments,financialallocationsandshuntrevenueslinkedtoothermeasures.SoftbudgetconstraintshavebeensignificantlyimprovedInaseriesofreforms,However,theeffectivenessofthesebudgethardeningmeasuresisnotsatisfactoryinthefieldofgovernment.Theimpulseofexpansionoflocalgovernmentemerginginthecycleof"suppression-expansion-thensuppression-thenexpansion".Atthesametime,withthesuperiorgovernmentstrengthensthefinancialconstraintsfromtoptobottom,thegrass-rootsgovernmentgrabsunplannedrevenueorotherresourcesasthesameway.Althoughthisgovernment’sbehaviorhasalwaysexisted,it’shugescaleandcontinuouscharacteristicsareoutstandinginrecentyears.Nowitseemsthat"Hardening"ofthegrass-rootsgovernmentbudgetwassuccessfulinsomerespects,intheadministrativereforminthe1990's,butitledtothecontraryeffectwiththeoriginalintentioninotheraspects,whichItfailedtoDownsizingandBudgethardening,anditinducingorstrengtheningthetendencytograbresourcesfromtoptobottom.
It's not hard to seethatlocalgovernment’sbehaviorofapportioningisdrivenbytheobjectivesofgovernment’sofficialsandabilityoforganize.Theapportioningistocapturingandmobilizingresourcesforprovidingoverbudgetrevenuesandexpansion.Thesegovernment’sbehaviorarenottoobtainresourcesbythehigherauthoritiesfromthebottomup,itfromtoptobottom.Itissimilartothesituationinwhichthetraditionalpatternisdescribedbythestateofthebudgetconstraint,butthedirectionofitsoccurrenceisopposite,Icalledthiskindoforganizationbehavioras"reversesoftbudgetconstraint".
Firstofall,webrieflylistsomeofthemainmanifestationsoftheinversesoftbudgetconstraintsobservedindailylife:
Foremost,themoststrikingisthegrass-rootsgovernmentleviedataxonenterprisesorindividuals,whatthetaxisallkindsofformaltaxbeyondexorbitanttaxlevies,transformingtheresourcesoutsidethegovernmentintoagovernmentdominated(formalorinformal)financialcapacity.Thesepracticesinvolveawiderangeofinfluence,hascausedgreatattentiontopublicopinion,policyresearchanddevelopmentoftheacademiccommunity.Insuchacts,thegovernmentdepartmentsshouldalsoincludeafineproportionoffinestobepunished.Thisisbecauseinthecentralgovernmentorderstononrandomapportionchargespressureunder,manygovernmentdepartmentstoavoiddirectconflictswiththepolicychangethecharge,fromQiaoLitovariousfeesandtaxeschangetoperformfineunderthepretextofobtainingresources.
Second,thegrass-rootsgovernmentforcesorseducesthejurisdictionoftheenterpriseorotherentityfordonorstocontributing,byavarietyofpoliticalpressureorexchangerelations,thatgovernmentinitiatedprojectsorotherpublicworks.Usually,thistypeofsituationinvolvesonlyapartoftheentity,thesepressuresortransactionsarenotpubliclycarriedout,andevenonthesurfacemaynotdirectlylinkedwiththegovernmentdepartments,soitisnotinteresting.Althoughtheseactivitiesaredifficulttoaccuratelymeasure,butitisnotdifficulttospeculatethatthesizeandroleofaveryconsiderable,tobecomeanimportantsourceofgovernmentbudgetfortheacquisitionofresources.
Third,inrecentyears,theotherwaytobreakthebudgetconstraintis"fishing"fromtoptobottom,whichthe"fishing"asopposedtothe"fishing"oftraditionalplannedeconomyasweknow.Thesuperiorgovernmenttookoutasmallpartofthefundsasa"bait"toencouragelowerlevelsofgovernmentorunitsinavarietyofwaystoraisefundstocompleteaproject.Forexample,somegovernmentdepartmentsputforwardiswillingtosupplythelayingofthefundsneededforcementroadinthevillageofthe,androadsneedlotsofothercosts(forexamplerelatestorepairdamages,subgradeconstruction,fundsfortheprocurementofvariousrawmaterials,etc.)mustbebythetowngovernmentorvillageandgrass-rootsunittofindasolution.Inthisway,thegovernmentcanuseverylittlebudgettoluretheprimaryunittothe"additional"resources,soastopromotetheprojecttobecompleted.
Theaboveobservationssuggestthat:
(1)LocalGovernments’financialcapacity(sizeofthebudget)onthebookisnoactualbindingonitsorganizationalbehavior.Itcanbreakthroughtheexistingbudgetconstraintsbygrabbingbehaviorfromtoptobottom;
(2)thegoalsettingandorganizationalbehavioroflocalgovernmentshavebeenbasedonthesoftbudgetconstraint.Itisworthemphasizingisthatweusetheconceptof"reversesoftbudgetconstraint"isnotlimitedtoapportionbehaviorofexorbitanttaxesandlevies,andincludingtheconstraintofgovernmentbudgetexceededotherpractices,suchasthegovernmenttoenterprisesorsocialfinancingtobuildthegovernment'spursuitofpublicworks.Thesebehavioralmotivation,mode,pathwaysareoftendifferent,buttheyexhibitcharacteristicsofsoftbudgetconstraint;inalargeextent,themechanismsandconsequencesofthiskindofbehavioristhesame,soyoucanintoasametheoreticalframetobeanalyzedandexplained.And,onlywhenweputtheseseeminglydifferentsituationsbutessentiallythesamephenomenonputinthesameframeworkshouldunderstand,willitbepossibletotrulyunderstandtheprofoundmeaningofinvertedsoftbudgetconstraint.
Thereisasignificantdifferencebetweenthereversesoftbudgetconstraintandthetraditionalsoftbudgetconstraint.First,themainactorsintraditionalsoftbudgetconstraintistheenterprise,namelytheenterprisebecauseofinefficientproductionbehaviorresultedinaloss.Followedbyabottom-upapproachforthehigherauthoritiesadditionalfunds,s
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