外文翻译资本结构股利政策跨国经营理论与实证研究.docx
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外文翻译资本结构股利政策跨国经营理论与实证研究.docx
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外文翻译资本结构股利政策跨国经营理论与实证研究
中文3677字
外文翻译
原文:
Capitalstructure,dividendpolicy,andmultinational:
Theoryversusempiricalevidence
3.1.Factorsinfluencingcapitalstructureanddividendpolicy
Itisimportanttoexaminethefactorsthatimpactcapitalstructureanddividendpolicysothatappropriatecontrolvariablescanbeincludedintheexaminationoftheimpactofmultinationaloncapitalstructureanddividendpolicy.Thelistofthesecontrolvariablesmustbebasedonextanttheoriesandempiricalevidencerelatedtocapitalstructureanddividendpolicy.TheoriesintheseareasgenerallystartwiththewellknownresultspresentedinModiglianiandMiller(1958)notethatinanefficientmarketsworldwithnotaxesorbankruptcycosts,thevalueofafirmisinvarianttoitscapitalstructure.Thistheoryhassincebeenmodifiedandextendedsothatcapitalstructuredoesmattertoincludenotonlytheimpactoftaxesandbankruptcycosts,butalsotherealworldcostsrelatedtoagencyproblems,asymmetricinformation,moralhazard,andotherfrictionsanddeviationsfromperfectmarkets.
3.1.1.Operatingleverageandotherinfluences
Theoperatingleverageofafirmreflectsitsbusinessrisk.Firmswithhigheroperatingleveragefacehigherbankruptcyprobabilitiesandshouldhavelowerfinancialleverage.However,higheroperatingleverageisgenerallyassociatedwithhigherlevelsoffixedtangibleassets—indeedtheproportionofsuchassetsiswidelyusedintheliteratureasameasureofoperatingleverage.Afirm'sleveloffixedassetsshouldbeassociatedpositivelywithleverageashighlevelsofsuchassetscanbeusedascollateralforloans(Friend&Lang,1988;Long&Malitz,1985).Jensen,Solberg,andZorn(1992)provideempiricalsupportforthepositiveimpactonleverageofassetsavailableforcollateral.Thenon-debttaxshieldvariableisalsoimportantasfirmswithhighlevelsofnon-debttaxshieldsareexpectedtohavelowerdebtlevels(Kim&Sorensen,1986).Duetoinstitutionalpractices,herdingamongmanagers,bankers,andfinanciers,andtheirinfluenceoffirmrisk,capitalstructureanddividendpolicycanalsobeexpectedtovarywithfirmsizeandindustryclassification.
3.1.2.Trade-offtheories
Inthetrade-offtheory,capitalstructuredecisionsoffirmsdependonbenefitsandcostsofusingmoredebt.Lessdebtisusedifthecostofbankruptcyishigherthanthetaxshieldorotherbenefitsofusingdebt(Kim&Sorensen,1986;Graham,2000).Therefore,thetrade-offtheorysuggestsanegativerelationshipbetweenleverageandbankruptcycostsandapositiverelationshipbetweenleverageandfirm'smarginaltaxrate(Lasfer,1995;Cloyd,Limberg,&Robinson,1997).AccordingtoRozeff(1982),riskierfirmspayoutlowerdividendsindicatinganegativerelationshipbetweendividends,bankruptcycosts,andtheamountofdebtusedbyafirm.
3.1.3.Impactofagencycosts
Availabilityoffreecashflowcreatesanagencyproblemsincemanagerscanusesomeofthefreecashavailablefortheirownbenefit,therebydecreasingthevalueofthefirm(Jensen&Meckling,1976).Toprotectagainstthismanagerialsub-optimalbehavior,firmswithhigherlevelofcashflowshouldusehigherleverage.TheasymmetricinformationmodelofRoss(1977)alsonotesthatthereshouldbeapositiverelationshipbetweenusedebtandthefirm'sprofitability.AgencytheoryalsoindicatesthatfirmswithhighergrowthopportunitieswillholdlessdebtcontrollingforprofitabilityandStulz(1990)notesthatduetotheunder-investmentproblem,firmswithhighgrowthopportunitiesshouldholdlessdebt.Chang(1992)contendsthatfirmswithhighprofitabilityusemoredebtinitscapitalstructurecontrollingforinvestmentopportunities.
Theagencyissueindividendpayoutdecisionsissimilartocapitalstructuredecisionsinthepresenceofagencycosts.InagencymodelofJensenandMeckling(1976)andJensen(1986),dividendsanddebthelpcontroltheagencycostsofoverinvestmentifthereareconflictsofinterestsbetweenmanagersandstockholders.Thus,agencycostspredictapositiverelationbetweenfirm'sfreecashflowandpaymentofdividends.AccordingtothesignalinghypothesisofRoss(1977),firmswithhighprofitabilitywillalsopayoutmoredividendsascostlycrediblesignals.However,firmswithhighergrowthopportunitieswillpayoutlessdividendsespeciallywhenthereisanavailablealternative(debt)asamonitoringtechnique(Easterbrook,1984).
3.1.4.Peckingordertheory
Thepeckingordermodel(Myers&Majluf,1984)contendsthatbecauseoftransactioncostsandinformationasymmetry,firmsfinancenewinvestmentsfirstwithretainedearnings,thensuccessivelywithsafedebt,riskydebtandfinallywithequity.Accordingtothispeckingordermodel,moreprofitablefirmsshouldhavelowerleverageandlowershort-term,butnotlong-term,payoutcontrollingforinvestmentopportunities.Inasimpleversionofthepeckingordermodel,firmswithhighinvestmentandgrowthopportunitiesarepredictedtohavehighleverage(ontheconditionthatinvestmentismorethantheinternalcapital).Inamorecomplexversionofpeckingordermodel,firmswithhighinvestmentandgrowthopportunitywillcarrylowleveragetakingintoconsiderationcurrentaswellasfuturefinancingcosts.Incontrastwiththeagencytheoryoffreecashflow,MyersandMajluf(1984)predictthatleveragedecreaseswiththehigherleveloffreecashflow.Peckingordertheoryalsopredictsthatfirmswithhighfuturegrowthopportunitiesshouldpayoutlowerdividends.Shyam-SunderandMyers(1999)introduceafundingdeficitmodeltotestthepeckingorderhypothesisoffirm'scapitalstructure.Theyarguethat,exceptforfirmsatorneartheirdebtcapacity,peckingorderpredictsthatthedeficitswillbefilledentirelywithnewdebtissues.Therefore,wecanexpectapositiverelationshipbetweenfundingdeficitandleverageassumingthatthefirmsarestillbelowtheirdebtcapacity.
3.2.Interdependencebetweencapitalstructureanddividendpolicy
Manyofthefactorsdiscussedabovehavebeenshowntoinfluencenotonlycapitalstructurebutalsodividendpolicy.Easterbrook(1984)documentsthatdividendsexistsbecausetheyinducefirmstofloatnewsecuritiessuggestingthatfirm'sdividenddecisionslinkedtofirm'sfinancingdecisions.Intuitively,itisclearthatthefirm'spayoutratiodeterminesitsretentionratioand,thus,itscapitalstructure.Further,giventheempiricalevidenceinsupportofthepeckingordertheory,corporatedebtlevelsshouldberelatedtothecashflowsretainedbyafirmandtoitsdividendpolicy.Indeed,becauseoftheinterdependencebetweendividendpolicyandcapitalstructure,empiricalstudiesofcapitalstructure,includingthosethatfocusontheimpactoffirmmultinational,aremostlikelymiss-specifiedunlesstheyincludeanassessmentofdividendpolicy.
Thereisconsiderableevidenceofthisinterdependencebetweendividendsandcapitalstructure.Forexample,consistentwiththepeckingorderhypothesis,Adedeji(1998)suggeststhatiffirmsrespondtoearningsshortagesbyborrowingtopaydividendsbecauseofreluctancetocutdividends,financialleveragemayhaveapositiverelationshipwithdividendpayoutratio,andapositiveornegativerelationshipwithinvestmentsdependingonwhetherfirmsborrowtofinanceinvestmentsorpostpone/reducetheinvestments.ThishypothesizedpositiverelationshipbetweendebtanddividendpayoutisempiricallyconfirmedinBaskin(1989).Thus,accordingtopeckingorderhypothesis,corporatecapitalstructureispositivelyrelatedtoitsdividendpolicy.
Ontheotherhand,Jensen(1986)hypothesizesthatdividendsanddebtaresubstitutemechanismsforcontrollingagencycostsoffreecashflows.EmpiricalfindingofAgrawalandJayaraman(1994)supportsJensen'shypothesis.Theyfindthatdividendpayoutratiosofasampleofallequityfirmsaresignificantlyhigherthanthoseofacontrolgroupofleveredfirms.Jensenetal.(1992)positsthatfirmswithhighdividendpayoutsmightfinddebtfinancinglessattractivethanequityfinancingleadingtoanegativerelationbetweendebtanddividends.AsnotedinthecomprehensivesurveyonpayoutpolicybyAllenandMichaely(2002),firmsalsomightnotwanttopayhighdividendswhentheyareobligatedtopayhighlevelsofotherfixedfinancecharges.
Thus,whilethedirectionofthedebtratio–dividendpolicyrelationshipisnotclear,itisclearthatcorporatecapitalstructureisdeterminedsimultaneouslywithitsdividendpolicy.Consequently,anyexaminationoftheimpactofmultinationaloncapitalstructuremustaccountfortheimpactofdividendpolicy.Recognizingtheendogenousnatureofsomeofthevariablesbeingtested,somestudiesdousesimultaneousequationmodelstostudytheinterdependencebetweencapitalstructureanddividendpayoutratiosofU.S.firms.Noronha,Shome,andMorgan(1996)applythree-stageleastsquares(3SLS)teststoinvestigatethesimultaneitybetweendividendandcapitalstructuredecisionsoftheU.S.firmsfortheperiodof1986–1988andfindthatthedebt–dividendsimultaneityisobservedempiricallyonlyforthesubsampleinwhichthemonitoringrationalefordividendsisappropriate.However,theydonotexaminethecapitalstructure-dividendpolicyinterdependenceformultinationalfirms.
Asthisbriefreviewshows,capitalstructureanddividendpolicyarelikelytobedeterminedsimultaneouslyinpractice.Astudyoftherelationshipbetweencapitalstructureandfirmmultinationalmustthereforeincludevariablesthatdeterminebothdebtratiosanddividendpayoutratios.Basedonthetheoreticalandempiricalevidencesoncapitalstructureanddividend
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