会计选择的实证研究外文翻译.docx
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会计选择的实证研究外文翻译.docx
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会计选择的实证研究外文翻译
外文文献翻译译文
原文:
EmpiricalResearchonAccountingChoice
1.Earningsmanagement
BurgstahlerandDichev(1997)reportthatmanagersapparentlymanageearningstoavoidearningsdecreasesandlosses.Theyrelyonatransactionscosttheoryratherthanefficientcontractingormanagerialopportunismtoexplaintheirresults.Thatis,theysuggesttermsoftransactionswithstakeholdersaremorefavorableforfirmswithhigherratherthanlowerearnings(seeBowen,etal.,1995forfurtherdiscussionofthispoint)andalsothatinvestorsarenotfullyrationalinassessingtheinformationcontentofreportedearnings,consistentwithprospecttheory.
Theabovestudiesallreportevidenceofearningsmanagementviachoicesofaccountingmethodsbutnonedocumentanyassociatedpricereactionstothesechoices.Inotherwords,thesestudiesdonotexplorewhethertheseaccountingchoiceshaveeconomicimplications.Barth,etal.(1999),ontheotherhand,findthatfirmswithatimeseriesofincreasingearningshavehigherpriceearningsmultiplesaftercontrollingforriskandgrowth,thanfirmswithoutanincreasingearningspattern.Thisevidenceisconsistentwiththesuccessofearningsmanagement.however,Barthetal.donotexplicitlytestforearningsmanagementanddonotattributetheearningspatternasnecessarilyduetoearningsmanagement.Davis(1990),inapartialreplicationandextensionoftheHong,etal.(1978)studyofthepurchaseandpoolingchoice,findsthatacquiringfirmsthatusethepurchasemethodenjoypositiveabnormalreturnsovertheperiodextendingfrombeforetheannouncementofthebusinesscombinationtoafteritsconsummation.Acquiringfirmsusingthepoolingmethodenjoyonlynormalmarketreturns.HisresultsareconsistentwiththoseofHong,etal.
2.Multiplemotivations
Inadditiontotheproblemofaddressingmultipleaccountingchoices,generallyasreflectedinaccruals,thereisalsotheissueofmultiple,andpotentiallyconflicting,motivationsfortheaccountingchoices.Mostoftheworkdiscussedinsection4focusesonasinglemotiveforaccountingchoicedecisions.Forexample,thecompensationliteraturefocusesonthequestionofwhethermanagersuseaccountingdiscretiontomaximizetheircompensation.Implicitly,theresultssuggestthatmanagers’actionscomeattheexpenseofshareholders.Butifthisisso,whydocompensationcontractsallowdiscretion?
Oneplausibleansweristhatmanagers’actionsarenotonlyanticipated,butalsodesirablefromshareholders’perspective.Forexample,thesameaccountingchoicesthatmaximizemanagers’compensationmayalsodecreasebondcovenantviolationsorincreaseassetvaluations.However,suchmotivesaretypicallynotincludedintheanalysis.Byfocusingononegoalatatime,muchoftheliteraturemissesthemoreinterestingquestionoftheinteractionsbetweenandtrade-offsamonggoals.Moreover,itisnotclearwhethertheconclusionsareattributabletothespecificmotivationbeinganalyzed;generallyresultsconsistentwithonehypothesisareconsistentwithmany.Forexample,whatmayappeartobeanopportunisticchoiceofanearningsincreasingaccountingmethodchoice(tobenefitmanagersattheexpenseofotherstakeholdersinthefirm),maybeinfactaresponsetoavoidabondcovenantviolation(andthusbenefitsallotherstakeholdersattheexpenseofthecreditors).Finally,withonlyfewexceptions,researchinthe1990sgenerallyfocusesonmotivesidentifiedinthe1970sand1980s–typicallytheusualsuspectsareroundedup.However,wesuspectthatnewinsightsmaybegainedbyinvestigatingadditionalmotives.
Theproblemofmultipleconflictscanbeviewed,inturn,asaspecialcaseofthefamiliar“correlatedomittedvariable”problemineconometrics.Forexample,iffirmswithcompensationcontractsthatdependonearningsarealsomorelikelytohavehighpoliticalcosts,thenacompensationstudycouldfindarelationshipbetweencompensationcontractsandaccountingchoice,eveniftheaccountingchoicesareinfactdrivenbypoliticalconsiderations.Theusualsolutiontothisproblemistoaddcontrolvariables.However,thissolutionasitisappliedtoaccountingchoiceresearchsuffersfromatleastthreedrawbacks.First,researchersoftenrelyoncoarseorinappropriateproxiestomeasuretheroleoftheomitteddeterminantsofaccountingchoice.Forexample,incompensationstudies,leverageandsizevariableshavebeenusedtoproxyforbondcovenanteffectsandpoliticalcosts.
Second,inferenceproblemsarelikelytoarisewhenanalyzingmultiplemotivationsusingproxieswithdifferingamountsofmeasurementerror,particularlywhentheunderlyingeffectsarecorrelated.Insuchinstances,theproxywiththeleastamountofmeasurementerrorislikelytodominate,evenwhenitstrueeffectmaynotbethemostimportant.Forexample,assumethatpoliticalcostsandcompensationmotivationsarecorrelated,butthataccountingchoicesaredrivenbypoliticalcosts.Nevertheless,ifsizeisusedasa(noisy)proxyforpoliticalcostswhiletheresearcherisabletomeasurethedesignofthecompensationcontractwithgreatprecision,thenaregressionofaccountingchoiceonsizeandcompensationcontractdesignwillloadonthemoreprecise(butlesseconomicallyimportant)compensationvariable,ratherthantheeconomicallysignificant(butnoisy)proxyforpoliticalcosts.Little,ifany,progresshasbeenmadeinaddressingtheseconcerns.
Finally,theproblemofmultiplemotivationsisfurthercompoundedbytheabsenceoflinearity.Specifically,discussionofthecorrelatedomittedvariableissueoften(atleastimplicitly)assumesthatthevariables(boththoseincludedandthoseomitted)arelinearandthattheomittedvariableisadditivelyseparablefromthevariableofinterest.Theseassumptionsaremadetofacilitateresearchdesign.However,thereisnoevidencethatsuchassumptionsarejustified.
Eventhosepapersthatconsidermultiplemotivationsgenerallytreatthemindependently.Inpractice,ofcourse,managersfaceavarietyofconflicts,whichwillnot,ingeneral,suggestconsistentcoursesofactions.Underthesecircumstances,firmsmustmaketrade-offsamongthevariousgoals.
3.Conclusionandsuggestionsforfuture
Wedonotwanttoleavetheimpressionthatresearchershavegainednoknowledgeoftheroleandtheimportanceofaccountingchoice.Rather,ourconcernisthatprogresshasslowed.Inpart,thisisduetounambitiousattemptstoexpandthefield.Forexample,testingtheimplicationsofonemoreaccountingstandardaddsverylittletothecumulativeknowledge.Amoreintransigentproblemisthedifficultyinspecifyingresearchdesignsthataccommodatethecomplexityofthetaskathand:
thatis,thesimultaneousimpactofmultiplechoices,multiplegoalsandeconometriccomplications.Ratherthancontinuetoreplicatewell-knownresultsinslightlydifferentsettings,wefeelthatitisimportantforresearcherstograpplewiththesemoredifficult,andatheart,morefundamentalissues.Wehavethreespecificrecommendationsforfutureresearch.
First,researchresultsfailtoprovidecompellingevidenceoftheimplicationsofalternativeaccountingmethodsandwerecommendmoreeffortstodeterminethenatureofsuchimplications.Theliteratureprovidesamplecircumstantialevidencethataccountingchoicemattersbutlittledirectevidence.Forexample,theliteraturedocumentsthatmanagersmakeaccountingchoicesconsistentwithbonusmaximization,butdoesnotdeterminewhetherthisbehaviorresultsinincreasedcashpayouts.Evenifsuchevidencewereproduced,thenextstepwouldbetoascertainwhetherexpectedtotalcompensationincreasesandwhetherthisresultwasintendedand/oranticipatedbythecontractingparties.Thatis,ifaccountingchoicehassuchpotentialwealthimplications,thencontractingpartiesshouldpriceaccountingchoice.One(modest)attemptatthisissuewasmadebyHealy,Kang,andPalepu(1987)forthecaseofmanagerialcompensation,butmoreisneeded.Anotheravenueistoinvestigatethecostscompaniesarewillingtoincurtomaintainaccountingmethodchoicediscretion.AfirstattemptatthisapproachcanbefoundinBeatty,etal.(2000),andweencouragemoreexplorationofthisissue.
Similarly,thereisnoconsistentevidencesupportingclaimedvaluationdifferencesduetoaccountingmethods.Wedonotknowwhetherthisisbecauseaccountingdifferencesdonotaffectfirmvaluationorbecauseempiricalmethodsareinadequatetodetectanysucheffect.Althoughmuchexistingresearchistiedtostockreturns,accountingnumbersgenerallyexplainonlyasmallportionofthevariabilityinstockreturns,raisingthequestionofwhetherthisistheappropriateplacetolookforaneffect.Despiteextensiveacademicresearch,theprocessbywhichsecuritypricesareset,includingtheinfluenceofaccountingdata,remainsunknown.
Second,becauseaccountingisusedformanypurposes,wehavearguedthatitisinappropriatetoanalyzeoneaccountingissueorevenonegoalinisolation.Ideally,onewouldhaveacomprehensivetheoryofaccountingchoice,butsuchatheoryispresentlynotavailable,anditsdevelopmentdoesnotappearimminentbecauseofthecomplexitiesinherentinsuchamodel.Analyticalmodelscanhelpprovideguidancetoresearchersinstructuringtheempiricalexperiments,inidentifyingappropriatevariables,andinformulatingalternativehypotheses.Atpresent,mostanalyticalmodelsaresoabstractastoofferonlylimitedguidancetoempiricists.Wedonotwanttogivetheimpressionthatweunderestimatethecomplexityofthistask.Furthermore,wearecautiouslyoptimisticthatprogresstowardthenecessarytheoreticali
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