特斯拉AEB功能失效分析Word下载.docx
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特斯拉AEB功能失效分析Word下载.docx
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Investigator:
KareemHabibReviewer:
JeffQuandt
Approver:
StephenRidella
Subject:
Automaticvehiclecontrolsystems
MANUFACTURER&
PRODUCTINFORMATION
Manufacturer:
TeslaMotors,Inc.
Products:
MY2014-2016TeslaModelSandModelX
Population:
43,781
ProblemDescription:
TheAutomaticEmergencyBraking(AEB)orAutopilotsystemsmaynotfunctionasdesigned,increasingtheriskofacrash.
FAILUREREPORTSUMMARY
ODI
Manufacturer
Total
Complaints:
Crashes/Fires:
InjuryIncidents:
FatalityIncidents:
ACTION/SUMMARYINFORMATION
Action:
ThisPreliminaryEvaluationisclosed.
Summary:
OnMay7,2016,a2015TeslaModelScollidedwithatractortrailercrossinganuncontrolledintersectiononahighwaywestofWilliston,Florida,resultinginfatalinjuriestotheTesladriver.DataobtainedfromtheModelSindicatedthat:
1)theTeslawasbeingoperatedinAutopilotmodeatthetimeofthecollision;
2)theAutomaticEmergencyBraking(AEB)systemdidnotprovideanywarningorautomatedbrakingforthecollisionevent;
and3)thedrivertooknobraking,steeringorotheractionstoavoidthecollision.OnJune28,2016,NHTSAopenedPE16-007to“examinethedesignandperformanceofanyautomateddrivingsystemsinuseatthetimeofthecrash.”
TheOfficeofDefectsInvestigation(ODI)analyzedthefollowingsubjectsaspartofNHTSA’sexaminationofthedesignandperformanceofTesla’sAutopilotsystem:
1)AutomaticEmergencyBraking(AEB)systemdesignandperformanceinthesubjectTeslaandpeervehicles;
2)human-machineinterfaceissuesrelatedtoAutopilotoperatingmode;
3)datafromcrashincidentsrelatedtoTesla’sAutopilotandAEBsystems;
and4)changesTeslahasimplementedintheAutopilotandAEBsystems.
NHTSA’sexaminationdidnotidentifyanydefectsinthedesignorperformanceoftheAEBorAutopilotsystemsofthesubjectvehiclesnoranyincidentsinwhichthesystemsdidnotperformasdesigned.AEBsystemsusedintheautomotiveindustrythroughMY2016arerear-endcollisionavoidancetechnologiesthatarenotdesignedtoreliablyperforminallcrashmodes,includingcrossingpathcollisions.TheAutopilotsystemisanAdvancedDriverAssistanceSystem(ADAS)thatrequiresthecontinualandfullattentionofthedrivertomonitorthetrafficenvironmentandbepreparedtotakeactiontoavoidcrashes.Tesla'
sdesignincludedahands-onthesteeringwheelsystemformonitoringdriverengagement.Thatsystemhasbeenupdatedtofurtherreinforcetheneedfordriverengagementthrougha"
strikeout"
strategy.Driversthatdonotrespondtovisualcuesinthedrivermonitoringsystemalertsmay"
andloseAutopilotfunctionfortheremainderofthedrivecycle.
Asafety-relateddefecttrendhasnotbeenidentifiedatthistimeandfurtherexaminationofthisissuedoesnotappeartobewarranted.Accordingly,thisinvestigationisclosed.TheclosingofthisinvestigationdoesnotconstituteafindingbyNHTSAthatnosafety-relateddefectexists.Theagencywillmonitortheissueandreservestherighttotakefutureactionifwarrantedbythecircumstances.Formoreinformationabouttheanalysis,seetheattachedreport.
PE16-007CloseResumePage1of1
1.0INTRODUCTION
3)thedrivertooknobraking,steeringorotheractionstoavoidthecollision;
and4)thelastrecordeddriveractionwasincreasingthecruisecontrolsetspeedto74mphlessthantwominutespriortoimpact.Thecrashoccurredonacleardaywithdryroadconditions.OnJune21,2016,NHTSAdeployedaSpecialCrashInvestigationsteamtothecrashsitetoevaluatethevehicleandstudythecrashenvironment.NHTSA’scrashreconstructionindicatesthatthetractortrailershouldhavebeenvisibletotheTesladriverforatleastsevensecondspriortoimpact.OnJune28,2016,NHTSAopenedPE16-007to“examinethedesignandperformanceofanyautomateddrivingsystemsinuseatthetimeofthecrash.”
1)AEBdesignandperformanceinthesubjectTeslaandpeervehicles;
2.1AEBSYSTEM
2.2AEBtechnologies.AutomaticEmergencyBrakingincludesthefollowingcrashavoidancetechnologies:
ForwardCollisionWarning(FCW),DynamicBrakeSupport(DBS),andCrashImminentBraking(CIB).AnFCWispresentedtothedriverifthesystempredictsacrashwithanobjectinthevehicle’sforwardpathisimminent.Tobeeffective,suchalertsareprovidedwithsufficientlead-timeforthedrivertoassessthepotentialhazard,andtorespondwiththeappropriatebrakingorsteeringneededtoavoidthecrash.Ifthedriverchoosestoavoidthecrashbybraking,butdoesnotapplysufficientbrakingtodoso,DBSautomaticallysupplementstheirapplication.Ifthedriverdoesnottakeactiontoavoidthecrash,CIBautomaticallyappliesthevehicle’sbrakessothatitmaybemitigatedoravoided.
2.3Background.AEBtechnologieshavebeeninuseforover10years.InSeptember2007,aNHTSA-sponsoredprojectwasinitiatedbytheCrashAvoidanceMetricsPartnership(CAMP)“todeveloptestmethodsforevaluatingcrashimminentbrakingsystemsandtoestablishbenefitsestimationmethodsforassessingtheireffectivenessatreducingtheseverityofpotentialinjuriesinvehiclecrashes.”1Thefinalreportfromthisproject,releasedinSeptember2011,validatedtheeffectivenessofradar,cameraandradar/camerafusionsystemsasrear-endcollisionmitigationoravoidancetechnologies.2Thereportalsoidentifiedseveralcrashmodesthatwerenotvalidatedbytheproject,includingstraightcrossingpath(SCP)3andleftturnacrosspath(LTAP)collisions:
1CrashImminentBraking(CIB)FirstAnnualReport.(2010).DOTHS811340.NationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration.Washington,DC.
2ObjectiveTestsforImminentCrashAutomaticBrakingSystemsFinalReportVolume1of2.(2011).DOTHS811521.NationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration.Washington,DC.
3TheclassicexampleofanSCPcrashisalaterallyapproachingvehicleinatrafficintersection.Challengesassociatedwiththesecrashmodesincreaseasspeedsoftargetand/orhostvehicleincrease.
ThetestmethodsrepresentingStraightCrossingPath[emphasisadded],LeftTurnAcross–OppositeDirection,OppositeDirection,andpole/treecrashscenarioswerealldesignatedas‘TestMethodNotValidated–BeyondScopeofCIBProject.’Whiletestscenariosweredevelopedanddemonstratedforthesecrashconditions,CIBsystemperformance,regardlessofsystemconfigurationorsettings,werenotcapableofreliablyrespondingtothesetests.Duetothedifficultyinpredictingthepre-crasheventsthatleaduptothesecrashtypes,thedifficultyinbalancingCIBactivationsforthesecrasheswithpotentialincreasesinundesirablefalseactivation,andmanyotherfactors,thesescenariosarealsonotlikelytobenear-termdeployablefeaturesofCIBsystemsandmaybebetteraddressedthroughotheractivesafetytechnologies.4
Figure1showsastraightcrossingpathtestconductedaspartoftheCIBproject.Thereportprovidesthefollowingassessmentofthetestresult,“Thelimitedtimethetargetisinthefieldofviewpriortoimpactchallengesthesystem’sabilitytoperformthreatassessmentandapplytheCIBsystem.Atargetisusuallyrecognizedverylateornotatallpriortoimpact.”5
Figure1.CIBProjectStraightCrossingPathTestScenario.
Sincemodelyear(MY)2010,NHTSAhasconductedtestingofFCWsystemperformanceaspartofitsNewCarAssessmentProgram(NCAP).Thetestsincludetherear-endcollisioncrashmodesvalidatedbytheCIBproject:
LeadVehicleStopped(LVS),LeadVehicleMoving(LVM),andLeadVehicleDecelerating(LVD).OnNovember5,2015,theagencyannounceditwouldbeaddingAEBsystemevaluationstoNCAPeffectiveforthe2018modelyear.InMarch2016,NHTSAissuedajointstatementwiththeInsuranceInstituteforHighwaySafety(IIHS)providinginformationrelatedtothecommitment
4ObjectiveTestsforImminentCrashAutomaticBrakingSystemsFinalReportVolume1of2,page84(2011).DOTHS811521.NationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration.Washington,DC.
5ObjectiveTestsforImminentCrashAutomaticBrakingSystemsFinalReportVolume2of2,pageL-51(2011).
DOTHS811521A.NationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration.Washington,DC.
by20automobilemanufacturers,representing99percentoftheU.S.new-carmarket,tovoluntarilymakeAEB“standardonvirtuallyalllight-dutycarsandtruckswithagrossvehicleweightof8,500lbs.orlessnolaterthanSeptember1,2022,andonvirtuallyalltruckswithagrossvehicleweightbetween8,501lbs.and10,000lbs.nolaterthanSeptember1,2025.”Thepredictedsafetybenefitscitedinthestatementarelimitedtorear-endcrashes:
IIHSresearchshowsthatAEBsystemsmeetingthecommitmentwould
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