房地产税中英文对照外文翻译文献Word文件下载.docx

房地产税中英文对照外文翻译文献Word文件下载.docx

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ThedevelopmentofpropertytaxationinthenewdemocraciesofCentralandEasternEurope

Themainpurposeofthispaperistoinvestigateissuesrelatingtotheroleoflandandbuildingtaxesasamechanismtoprovideanautonomousrevenuesourceforthenewlyestablishedlocalauthorities.AsMalmeandYoungman（1997）suggest,thereisaneedtoseekfundsforstrengtheninglocalgovernment,withcountriesneedingtoadjusttheirtaxsystemstoaccountforemergingprivatemarketswithinlandandbuildings.RealestatetaxeshavebeendesignatedaslocalrevenuesourcesinmanycountriesinCentralandEasternEurope,includingArmenia,Estonia,Latvia,Hungary,CzechRepublic,SlovakRepublic,Bulgaria,Rumania,andtheRussianFederation.However,itshouldberecognisedthatthelevelsofrevenuecurrentlybeingraisedfromproperty-basedtaxesisverysmallandthereisonlyalimitedpotentialtoincreasetheyield.BertaudandRenaud（1994）suggestthatmanycountrieshaveinstigatedpropertyvaluation/taxationsystemsforthepurelyopportunisticaimofincreasinglocalrevenues,theyarguethatduetoitsimmovablenature,landissimplyseenasaneasytargetforfundraising.However,thisrathergeneralisticstatementneedstobeplacedinperspective.Realpropertytaxationisalegitimatesourceofpotentialrevenueforvarioustiersofgovernment.AsKelly（1994）suggests,propertytaxationisperhapsthemostuniversally-usedrevenuesourceforlocalgovernmentsthroughouttheworld.Itisthereforeoflittlesurprisethatthenewdemocracieshavebeeninvestigatingandimplementingvarioustypesofproperty-basedtaxes.

Theinterplaybetweentaxpolicyandentrepreneurialactivityhasenjoyedaresurgenceintheempiricaleconomicsliterature.Mostoftherecentresearchhasfocusedonfederaltaxes,however,leavingstatetaxpoliciesrelativelyunexplored.Asstatescontinuetograpplewithdifficultissuesinbusinesstaxationanddevelopmentincentives,athoroughconsiderationoftheeffectsofstatetaxpoliciesonentrepreneurialactivitybecomesevenmoreimportant,especiallywhenconsideringthepossiblebenefitsthatcouldfollownewentrepreneurialventuresthrougheconomicgrowth,innovation,andthelike.Inthisreport,weexaminetherelationshipsbetweenstatetaxpolicyandentrepreneurshipusingalongitudinaldatabaseofdetailedinformationonstatetaxpoliciesforall50USstatesfrom1989through2002.

Thisinvestigationiswarrantedforanumberofreasons.First,asaresultofthefocusonfederaltaxes,earlierresearchhasonlyconsideredasubsetofthetaxesfacingsmallbusinesses.Forexample,Clineetal.（2006）showthatthetotalstateandlocaltaxburdenforUSbusinessesincludesmuchmorethandirectbusinesstaxessuchascorporateincometaxesorstatefranchise,excise,orgrossreceiptstaxes.Businesses—especiallysmallbusinesses—alsopaysignificantamountsofpropertyandsalestaxes,alongwithagrowingmenuofmiscellaneouschargesandfees.Theexistingarrayofstatetaxstructuresprovidesavirtualcornucopiaofexogenouspolicyvariationthatcanbeusedtocleanlyidentifyentrepreneurialresponses.

Asecondmotivationforourstudyistheobservationthatstategovernmentscontinuetodebateandenactthebulkofpro-entrepreneurshippolicyintheUSwithoutthebenefitofharddataontheeffectsofthosepoliciesonsmallbusinessdevelopmentandsuccess.Ononehand,highertaxesmightreduceentrepreneurialactivitybyloweringthereturns.Ontheotherhand,highertaxesincreasetherewards

fromtaxavoidanceorevasionandthusmighthavetheundesirableeffectofincreasingentrepreneurialactivity.Thesetwoimpactsmightalsooffseteachother,suchthathighertaxeshavenonoticeableimpactonentrepreneurialactivity.Theextenttowhichtaxpolicies—especiallystatetaxpolicies—actuallyinfluenceentrepreneurialactivityrequiresempiricalexploration.Iftaxesdonotaffectentrepreneurialactivity（i.e.,ifthereturnsandavoidanceeffectsareeitherbothsmallorcanceleachotherout）,usingtaxpolicytoencourageinnovationorgrowththroughentrepreneurshipisnotlikelytobefruitful.Alternatively,ifanonzeroeffectcanbedetermined,theactualparameterestimatescanbeusedtomoreefficientlydesigntaxpolicytoachievedesiredchangesinentrepreneurship.

Asstatedabove,ourpaperisoneofonlyafewtoinvestigatetherelationshipbetweenstatetaxpolicyandentrepreneurship,asthelargemajorityoftheliteraturehasfocusedonfederalpolicy.

Weextendtheirlineofanalysisinthefollowinggeneralways,allofwhicharediscussedindetailbelow:

（1）weconsiderabroaderarrayofstatetaxpolicyvariables,

（2）weconsideranadditionalmeasureofentrepreneurialactivitydrawnfromtaxreturndata,（3）weconsidernotonlythestockofentrepreneurshipinastate,butalsoastate’sshareofnationalentrepreneurshipinordertoaddresslocationeffects,（4）weconsidernotonlytaxratesbutalsotaxsharesinstatetaxportfolios,（5）weconsider

effectivetaxratesasarobustnesscheckonourbaselineanalysisofstatutorytaxrates,（6）weconsideragriculturalentrepreneurshipinanotherrobustnesscheck,and（7）weanalyzealongertimeperiod.

Twobroadareasofstudyintheearlierliteraturemotivatethisanalysis.Thefirstistheliteratureontheeffectsofstatetaxpoliciesonbusinesslocationdecisions.Theseresultsareimportantbecausebusinesslocationdecisionscanhaveimportantimpactsonmeasuredentrepreneurshiporself-employmentrates.Inhisoft-citedreviewofavastarrayofempiricalstudies,Wasylenko（1997）concludesthattaxeshavestatisticallysignificantbutquantitativelysmalleffectsoninterregionallocationbehavior.Inasimilarvein,Bartik（1991）concludesthathigherstateandlocaltaxesreducebusinessactivityinaregionwithanelasticityofabout-0.3,whilenotingsignificantdeviationfromthisaverageacrossstudies.3However,thisliteraturemaybeslightlylessrelevanttothepresentstudybecauseofitsfocusonlocationdecisionsamongfirms.Ifsmallerbusinessesarelessmobilethanlargerfirms（andtheymightnotbe）,theyareperhapslesslikelytorespondtostatedifferencesintaxpolicies.Further,moststatedevelopmentincentivesaretargetedatlargermanufacturingfirmsratherthansmallbusinesses.

Thesecondbroadareaofrelevantliteratureconsistsofempiricalstudiesoftaxationandentrepreneurship.Thenumberofstudiesinthisliteraturehasgrownsignificantlyinrecentyears,largelyduetogreateravailabilityofusefuldata.Timeseriesstudieshavefocusedonfederaltaxpoliciesandhavegenerallyconcludedthathigherfederalincomeorpayrolltaxratescausehigherratesofentrepreneurship,specificallydefinedasself-employment（Long1982;

Blau1987;

Parker1996;

CowlingandMitchell1997;

Robson1998）.Explanationsoftenrestontheideathathightaxratesdriveworkersoutofpaidemployment,orwagejobs,intoentrepreneurialventureswheretheycanmoreeasilyavoidorevadetaxes.Despitetheconsistencyofthelargergroupoftimesseriesstudies,amorerecentandextensivetimeseriesanalysisinthisareabyBruceandMohsin（2006）showsthatthequestionofhowtaxesaffectentrepreneurshipisnotyetsettled.Inadditiontopersonalincomeandpayrolltaxes,BruceandMohsinconsidercorporateincometaxes,capitalgainstaxesandestatetaxes.Resultsgenerallyindicatethattaxeshavestatisticallysignificantbutverysmallandscatteredeffectsonentrepreneurshiprates.Consequently,theyarelikelytobeineffectiveingeneratingdesiredchangesinentrepreneurialactivity.Noneofthesestudiesconsidertheeffectsofstatetaxes.

Severalotherstudieshaveexaminedcross-sectionalorpanelmicrodatatoexaminetheinfluenceoftaxpoliciesonindividualdecisionsaboutentrepreneurship.Resultsfromthesestudieshavealsobeeninconclusive（BruceandGurley2005;

Bruce2000,2002;

Carrolletal.2001;

GentryandHubbard2000;

Moore2003;

Schuetze2000）.Whilesomeofthesehaveindicatedthathighertaxratesonself-employmentincomehaveambiguouseffectsonself-employmentrates,agrowingconsensussuggeststhattaxrateincreasesreduceentrepreneurialentry,growth,hiring,investment,andsurvival.Statetaxeshavebeenconsideredinonlyaportionofthesestudies,however,andthenonlyasacomponentofacombinedfederalandstateincometaxrate.

Afewstudieshaveanalyzedstate-leveltimeseriesorpaneldatatoexplicitlyexaminetheeffectsofstatetaxpoliciesonentrepreneurialactivityandarethereforemostrelevanttothecurrentpaper.Carlton（1979）findsnostrongevidencethatlocaltaxesinfluencethenumberoffirmbirths.Heusesratherroughproxiesfortaxvariables,however,andonlyconsidersthreeindustriesforalimitedtimeperiod.Bartik（1989）usesmoredetailedtaxinformationandabroaderarrayofindustriesandfindsthathigherpropertytaxes,corporatetaxes,andsalestaxesonequipmentnegativelyimpactsmallbusinessstartups.4Healsofindsthatpersonalincometaxesandgeneralsalestaxesarenotstatisticallysignificant,whilegovernmentspendinghasmixedeffectsdependingonthecategoryofspending.Hissurveyofearlierstudiesfindselasticitiesthataregenerallybelow0.5inabsolutevalue.ChenandWilliams（1999）examinebusinessfailureratesfrom1984through1993,estimatingpanelregressionsforeachofanumberofindustrycategories.Althoughtheirfocusisnotexclusivelyonsmallbusinesses,theyfindthathighersalestaxespercapitaincreasebusinessfailureratesforlow-techindustries,whilehighercorporateincometaxespercapitalead