外文翻译税收筹划Word文档下载推荐.docx
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译文二:
基于对报酬的激励作用(下)
学生姓名周伟
学号07062136
院系经济与管理学院
专业会计
指导教师许庆高
完成日期2010年12月2日
CorporateTax-PlanningEffectiveness:
TheRoleofCompensation-BasedIncentives(Ⅰ)
JohnD.PhillipsUniversityofConnecticut
ABSTRACT
Thisstudyinvestigateswhethercompensatingchiefexecutiveofficersandbusiness-unitmanagersusingafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresleadstolowereffectivetaxrates,theempiricalsurrogateusedfortax-planningeffectiveness.Utilizingproprietarycompensationdataobtainedinasurveyofcorporateexecutives,therelationbetweeneffectivetaxratesandafter-taxperformancemeasuresismodeledandestimatedusingatwo-stepapproachthatcorrectsfortheendogeneitybiasassociatedwithfirms'
decisionstocompensatemanagersonapre-versusafter-taxbasis.Theresultsareconsistentwiththehypothesisthatcompensatingbusiness-unitmanagers,butnotchiefexecutiveofficers,onanafter-taxbasisleadstolowereffectivetaxrates.
KEYWORDStaxplanning;
performancemeasures;
endogenoustreatmenteffects.
I.INTRODUCTION
Effectivetaxplanning,definedbyScholesetal.(2002)astaxplanningthatmaximizesthefirm'
sexpecteddiscountedafter-taxcashflows,requiresmanagerstoconsidertheirdecisions'
after-taxconsequences.Inthispaper,Iinvestigatewhetherafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresleadtolowereffectivetaxrates(ETR),myempiricalsurrogatefortaxplanningeffectiveness.1TheETR,anincome-statement-basedoutcomemeasurecalculatedastheratiooftotalincometaxexpensetopre-taxincome,generallymeasurestheeffectivenessoftaxreductionstrategiesthatleadtohigherafter-taxincome.AlowerETR,however,canonlyproxyfortaxsavingsanddoesnotalwaysimplythatafter-taxincomeand/orcashflowshavebeenmaximized.2Despitethislimitation,theETRhasbeenusedtomeasuretheeffectivenessofspendingonthetaxfunction(Millsetal.1998)andcorporatetaxdepartmentperformance(Douglasetal.1996).Also,loweringtheETRisfrequentlycitedasawaytoincreaseearnings(e.g.,Ziegler1997)andincreaseshareprice(e.g.,Mintz1999;
Swenson1999).
Accountingresearchhasaddressedtherelationbetweenaccounting-basedcompensationandmanagers'
actions(e.g.,Larcker1983;
Healy1985;
Wallace1997).Thispaperisthefirsttoaddresswhetherafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresmotivatemanagerstotakeactionsthathelplowertheirfirms'
ETRanddoessoatboththechiefexecutiveofficer(CEO)andbusiness-unit(SBU)managerlevels.Priorafter-taxperformancemeasureresearchhasfocusedonlyonthedeterminantsofcompensationCEOsusingpre-versusafter-taxearnings(e.g.,Newman1989;
CarnesandGuffey2000;
Atwoodetal.1998;
Dhaliwaletal.2000)andprovidesnoevidenceconcerningafter-taxcompensation'
seffectivenessinloweringafirm'
staxliability.ExtendingthisinvestigationtotheSBUlevelismotivatedoutoftheapparentconflictbetweenargumentsthattaxesshouldbeallocatedtoSBUforincentivecompensationpurposes(e.g.,McLemore1997)withempiricalobservationsthatamajorityoffirmsdonotdoso(e.g.,Douglasetal.1996).4ThecurrentinvestigationprovidesevidenceconcerningtheincrementaleffectivenessofexplicitlymotivatingCEOsandSBUmanagerstoincorporatetaxconsequencesintotheiroperatingandinvestmentdecisions.
Acommonissueincross-sectionalstudiesthatattempttolinkaparticularmanagementaccountingchoicetoanoutcomemeasureisthatallsamplefirmsmaybeoptimizingwithrespecttothechoicebeinginvestigated(IttnerandLarcker2001).Withoutaddressingtheendogeneityofafirm'
schoice,itisdifficulttoprovideevidenceconsistentwiththischoiceleadingtoanimprovedoutcome.Toaddressthisissue,therelationbetweenETRandCEOandSBU-managerafter-taxperformancemeasuresisestimatedusingatwo-stepapproachthathelpscorrectforthepotentialendogeneitybiasassociatedwiththesetwochoicevariables.Asafirststepinimplementingthisapproach,theAntleandDemski(1988)controllabilityprincipleisusedtomodelafirm'
sdecisionstoadoptafter-taxCEOandSBU-managerperformancemeasures.Toincludeaparticularmeasureinamanager'
scompensationcontract,thisprinciplerequiresthattheexpectedbenefitsfromholdingamanagerresponsibleforameasuremustbegreaterthantheadditionalwagethatmustbepaidtocompensatethemanagerfortheresultingadditionalriskandeffort.Accordingly,anafter-taxperformancemeasureshouldbeusedasacontractingvariableinamanager'
sincentivecompensationcontractonlyifthemanager'
sinvolvementintax-planningeffortsleadstoadifferencebetweenpre-taxandafter-taxaccountingresults,whichisgenerallyreflectedintheETR.Consistentwithpriorresearch,thepre-versusafter-taxCEOandSBU-managerselectionmodelsincludevariablesthatcontrolforafirm'
stax-planningopportunitiesbecausethepresenceofsuchopportunitiesreflecttheextenttowhichamanager'
sactionscanbeexpectedtolowertheETR.
Evenifamanager'
seffortsareexpectedtoleadtoalowerETR,afirmwilluseanafter-taxperformancemeasureonlyiftheexpectedbenefitsexceedtheexpectedcostsofdoingso.Anafter-taxperformancemeasureisexpectedtoleadtoalowerETRbecauseitmotivatesthemanager'
sincreasedcooperationwithtaxprofessionalstohelpidentify,develop,andexecutetax-planningstrategies.McLemore(1997,1)citesHewlettPackard'
staxdirectortosupporttheneedforSBU-managerinvolvementintax-planningefforts:
Taxplanningisonlyasgoodasbeinginvolvedintheearlystagesofsuchthingsasbusinessplanning,strategicplanning,andmergerandacquisitionwork....Yourtaxdepartmenthastoberepresentedatthetablewhenthosedecisionsaremade.Theevolvingmodelforthefutureisthetightintegrationoftaxpeoplewithbusinessunitplanning.
Costsassociatedwithusingafter-taxperformancemeasuresincludetheadditionalwagethatmustbepaidtocompensatethemanagerfortheincreasedriskduetopotentialtaxlawchangesandtheincreasedeffortthatresultsfromincludingincometaxexpenseinthecompensationcontract.Otherpotentialcostsassociatedwithafter-taxcompensationincludetheadministrativecostofallocatingtaxexpensetoafirm'
sSBU,increasedtaxexaminationcosts,andincreasedtaxauthorityscrutiny.Contrarytomeasuringafter-taxcompensation'
sbenefitsviaobservedETR,therearenoclearempiricalsurrogatesforafter-taxperformancemeasures'
costs.Thisstudythusfocusesontherealizedbenefitsofcompensatingmanagersonanafter-taxbasisbutdoesnotprovideevidenceoftheassociatedcosts'
magnitude.
Proprietarydataobtainedinasurveyofcorporateexecutivesareusedtoconstructcertaintestvariables,includingthoseindicatingwhetherCEOsandSBUmanagersarecompensatedusingafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasures.PubliclyavailabledataareusedtoconstructETRandothertestvariables.TheresultsareconsistentwiththehypothesisthatcompensatingSBUmanagers,butnotCEOs,onanafter-taxbasisleadstolowerETR,resultinginanestimatedmediantaxsavingsof$13.3millionannually.SensitivitytestsperformedonasubsampleoffirmswithhighsimulatedMTR(Graham1996)providefurtherevidencethatlow-MTRfirms'
potentialETR-loweringactionsthatcouldhaveambiguouseffectsoncashflowsandafter-taxprofitsarenotdrivingthisresult.Furthersensitivitytestshelpruleouttheproportionoftaxfunctionoutsourcingasanalternativeexplanationforthestatisticallyandeconomicallysignificantnegativerelationbetweenafter-taxSBU-managercompensationandETR.
Theresultscontributetotheaccounting-basedcompensationliteraturebylinkingafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasurestoSBU-managerinvolvementthatisincrementallyeffectiveinloweringfirms'
ETR.ConsistentwithGuidryetal.(1999)whodocumentbonus-inducedearningsmanagementattheSBUlevel,thisfindingprovidesadditionalinsightintotheeffectthatSBU-manageraccounting-basedincentiveshaveonmanagers'
actions.Also,theestimatedexplicittaxsavingsresultingfromafter-taxperformancemeasuresprovidecorporatedecisionmakerswithinformationrelevanttothedesignofSBU-managerincentivecompensationplans.
Thepaperproceedsasfollows.Thenextsectionsetsforththehypothesestestedinthisstudy.SectionIIIoutlinestheempiricalmodelsandestimationproceduresusedintestingthesehypotheses.SectionIVprovidesadiscussionofthedataandsample,includingabriefoverviewofthesurveyusedtoobtainproprietarycompensationdata.ResultsarepresentedinSectionV.Thefinalsectionprovidestheconclusionandadiscussionofthestudy'
slimitations.
II.HYPOTHESISDEVELOPMENT
Newman(1989),CaresandGuffey(2000),andAtwoodetal.(1998)investigatefirms'
choicesofafter-taxearningsasthecontractingvariableinCEObonusplans.Thesestudieshypothesizethatfirmswithgreatertax-planningopportunities,consistentwiththeAntleandDemski(1988)controllabilityprinciple,aremorelikelytouseafter-taxperformancemeasures.Usingproxiesfortax-planningopportunities,thesestudiescollectivelyfindthatmultinationalstatus,numberofoperatingsegments,firmsize,andcapitalintensityarepositivelyassociatedwithafter-taxCEOcompensation.Atwoodetal.(1998)alsopresentsevidencethatleverageisnegativelyassociatedwiththischoice.
约翰D·
菲利普斯康涅狄格大学
摘要
本研究探讨首席执行官是否修正主管和业务部门经理利用税后会计为基础的绩效措施,导致较低的实际税率,以报酬激励用于税收筹划的有效性。
企业的主管由于被激励获得的专有报酬的数据,运用建模和估计这两个步骤来研究有效
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