索罗斯金融市场和金融泡沫Word格式文档下载.docx
- 文档编号:22050572
- 上传时间:2023-02-02
- 格式:DOCX
- 页数:8
- 大小:24.52KB
索罗斯金融市场和金融泡沫Word格式文档下载.docx
《索罗斯金融市场和金融泡沫Word格式文档下载.docx》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《索罗斯金融市场和金融泡沫Word格式文档下载.docx(8页珍藏版)》请在冰豆网上搜索。
金融市场和泡沫内容
2009年10月,乔治·
索罗斯在位于匈牙利布达佩斯的中欧大学发表了共分五个部分的系列演讲。
本文是他关于金融市场和泡沫的演讲的全文。
FinancialmarketsprovideanexcellentlaboratoryfordemonstratingandtestingtheideasthatIputforwardinanabstractformyesterday.Thecourseofeventsiseasiertoobservethaninmostotherplaces.Manyofthefactstakeaquantitativeform,andthedataarewellrecordedandwellpreserved.Theopportunityfortestingoccursbecausemyinterpretationoffinancialmarketsdirectlycontradictstheefficientmarkethypothesis,whichhasbeentheprevailingtheoryaboutfinancialmarkets.Thattheoryclaimsthatmarketstendtowardsequilibrium;
deviationsoccurinarandomfashionandcanbeattributedtoextraneousshocks.Ifthattheoryisvalid,mineisfalse—andviceversa.
Iamnotinagoodpositiontocriticizetheprevailingparadigmdirectly.Iwentintothefinancialmarketsinordertomakemoney,andtodothatIdidnotneedtoknoweithermodernportfoliotheoryorthetheoryofrationalexpectations.Idevelopedmyowninterpretationoffinancialmarketsandputitforwardasaclearalternativetotheprevailingview.WhenIpublishedTheAlchemyofFinancein1987Ifranklyadmittedmyignoranceofthegenerallyacceptedtheories.Nowonderthattheeconomicsprofessionreciprocatedbyignoringmyinterpretation.TheGovernoroftheBankofEngland,MervynKing,didmethehonorofexplicitlydismissingmytheory,butmostothereconomistssimplyignoredit.
Allthishaschangedinthewakeoftherecentfinancialcrisis.Eventshaveconclusivelydemonstratedtheinadequacyoftheefficientmarkethypothesis.Itneitherpredictednorexplainedwhathappened.Atthesametime,mywritingsprovidedaconceptualframeworkintermsofwhicheventscouldbebetterunderstood.Theybegantobetakenseriously,bothbyothers–likeMervynKing–andbymyself.Ibegantothinkthatmyinterpretationdoesprovideanewandbetterparadigm,andIputitforwardassuchinabookIpublishedearlyin2008,wellbeforethebankruptcyofLehmanBrothers.
Andyetthetheoryofreflexivityisstillnotacceptedinacademiccircles.Thefailureoftheefficientmarkethypothesisisgenerallyadmitted,butinsofarasanewparadigmisemerging,itisbasedonbehavioraleconomics.Behavioraleconomicsiscompatiblewithreflexivitybut,asIwilltrytoshow,itexploresonlyonehalfofthephenomenon.
***
Letmestatethetwocardinalprinciplesofmyconceptualframeworkasitappliestothefinancialmarkets.First,marketpricesalwaysdistorttheunderlyingfundamentals.Thedegreeofdistortionmayrangefromthenegligibletothesignificant.Thisisindirectcontradictiontotheefficientmarkethypothesis,whichmaintainsthatmarketpricesaccuratelyreflectalltheavailableinformation.
Second,insteadofplayingapurelypassiveroleinreflectinganunderlyingreality,financialmarketsalsohaveanactiverole:
theycanaffecttheso-calledfundamentalstheyaresupposedtoreflect.Thatisthepointthatbehavioraleconomicsismissing.Itfocusesonlyononehalfofareflexiveprocess:
themispricingoffinancialassets;
itdoesnotconcernitselfwiththeimpactofthemispricingontheso-calledfundamentals.
Therearevariousfeedbackmechanismsatworkwhichmayvalidatethemispricingoffinancialassets,atleastforawhile.Thismaygivetheimpressionthatmarketsareoftenright,butthemechanismatworkisverydifferentfromtheoneproposedbytheprevailingparadigm.Iclaimthatfinancialmarketshavewaysofalteringthefundamentalsandthatmaybringaboutaclosercorrespondencebetweenmarketpricesandtheunderlyingfundamentals.Contrastthatwiththeefficientmarkethypothesis,whichclaimsthatmarketsalwaysaccuratelyreflectrealityandautomaticallytendtowardsequilibrium.Therearevariouspathwaysbywhichthemispricingoffinancialassetscanaffecttheso-calledfundamentals.Themostwidelytravelledarethosewhichinvolvetheuseofleverage—bothdebtandequityleveraging.Thesepathwaysdeservealotmoreresearch.
Mytwopropositionsfocusattentiononthereflexivefeedbackloopsthatcharacterizefinancialmarkets.Therearetwokindsoffeedback:
negativeandpositive.Negativefeedbackisself-correcting;
positivefeedbackisself-reinforcing.Thus,negativefeedbacksetsupatendencytowardequilibrium,whilepositivefeedbackproducesdynamicdisequilibrium.Positivefeedbackloopsaremoreinterestingbecausetheycancausebigmoves,bothinmarketpricesandintheunderlyingfundamentals.Apositivefeedbackprocessthatrunsitsfullcourseisinitiallyselfreinforcing,buteventuallyitisliabletoreachaclimaxorreversalpoint,afterwhichitbecomesselfreinforcingintheoppositedirection.Butpositivefeedbackprocessesdonotnecessarilyruntheirfullcourse;
theymaybeabortedatanytimebynegativefeedback.
Ihavedevelopedatheoryaboutboom-bustprocesses,orbubbles,alongtheselines.Everybubblehastwocomponents:
anunderlyingtrendthatprevailsinrealityandamisconceptionrelatingtothattrend.Aboom-bustprocessissetinmotionwhenatrendandamisconceptionpositivelyreinforceeachother.Theprocessisliabletobetestedbynegativefeedbackalongtheway.Ifthetrendisstrongenoughtosurvivethetest,boththetrendandthemisconceptionwillbefurtherreinforced.Eventually,marketexpectationsbecomesofarremovedfromrealitythatpeopleareforcedtorecognizethatamisconceptionisinvolved.Atwilightperiodensuesduringwhichdoubtsgrow,andmorepeopleloosefaith,buttheprevailingtrendissustainedbyinertia.AsChuckPrince,formerheadofCitigroupsaid:
wemustcontinuedancinguntilthemusicstops.Eventuallyapointisreachedwhenthetrendisreversed;
itthenbecomesselfreinforcingintheoppositedirection.
[Chart]
Togobacktomyoriginalexample,theconglomerateboomofthelate1960s:
theunderlyingtrendisrepresentedbyearningspershare,theexpectationsrelatingtothattrendbystockprices.Conglomeratesimprovedtheirearningspersharebyacquiringothercompanies.Inflatedexpectationsallowedthemtoimprovetheirearningsperformance,buteventuallyrealitycouldnotkeepupwithexpectations.Afteratwilightperiodthepricetrendwasreversed.Alltheproblemsthathadbeensweptunderthecarpetsurfaced,andearningscollapsed.Asthepresidentofoneoftheconglomerates,OgdenCorporation,toldmeatthetime:
Ihavenoaudiencetoplayto.
Typically,bubbleshaveanasymmetricshape.Theboomislonganddrawnout:
slowtostart,itacceleratesgraduallyuntilitflattensoutduringthetwilightperiod.Thebustisshortandsteepbecauseitisreinforcedbytheforcedliquidationofunsoundpositions.Disillusionmentturnsintopanic,reachingitsclimaxinafinancialcrisis.
Bubblesthatconformtothispatterngothroughdistinctstages:
inception;
aperiodofacceleration,interruptedandreinforcedbysuccessfultests;
atwilightperiod;
andthereversalpointorclimax,followedbyaccelerationonthedownsideculminatinginafinancialcrisis.Thelengthandstrengthofeachstageisunpredictable,butthereisaninternallogictothesequenceofstages.Sothesequenceispredictable—buteventhatcanbeterminatedbygovernmentinterventionorsomeotherformofnegativefeedback.
Thesimplestcaseisarealestateboom.Thetrendthatprecipitatesitisthatcreditbecomescheaperandmoreeasilyavailable;
themisconceptionthatturnsthetrendintoabubbleisthatthevalueofthecollateralisindependentoftheavailabilityofcredit.Asamatteroffact,therelationshipbetweentheavailabilityofcreditandthevalueofthecollateralisreflexive.Whencreditbecomescheaperandmoreeasilyavailable,activitypicksupandrealestatevaluesrise.Therearefewerdefaults,creditperformanceimproves,andlendingstandardsarerelaxed.Soattheheightoftheboom,theamountofcreditinvolvedisatitsmaximumandareversalprecipitatesforcedliquidation,depressingrealestatevalues.
Yet,themisconceptioncontinuestorecurinvariousguises.Theinternationalbankingcrisisof1982revolvedaroundsovereigndebtwherenocollateralisinvolved.Thecreditworthinessofthesovereignborrowerswasmeasuredbyvariousdebtratios,likedebttoGDPordebtservicetoexports.Theseratioswereconsideredobjectivecriteria,whileinfacttheywerereflexive.Whentherecyclingofpetrodollarsinthe1970sincreasedtheflowofcredittocountrieslikeBrazil,theirdebtratiosimproved,encouragingfurtherinflowsandstartingabubble.
Notallbubblesinvolvetheextensionofcredit;
somearebasedonequityleveraging.Thebestexampleis,ofcourse,theInternetbubbleofthelate1990s.WhenAlanGreenspanspokeaboutirrationalexuberancein1996hemisrepresentedbubbles.WhenIseeabubbleformingIrushintobuy,addingfueltothefire.Thatisnotirrational.Andthatiswhyweneedregulatorstocounteractthemarketwhenabubbleisthreateningtogrowtoobig,becausewecannotrelyonmarketparticipants,howeverwellinformedandrationaltheyare.
Bubblesarenottheonlyforminwhichreflexivitymanifestsitself.Theyareonlythemostdramaticandthemostdirectlyopposedtotheefficientmarkethypothesis;
thereforetheydeservespecialattention.Butreflexivitycantakemanyotherforms.Incurrencymarkets,forinstance,theupsideanddownsidearesymmetricalsothatthereisnosignofanasymmetrybetweenboomandbust.Butthereisnosignofequilibriumeither.Freelyfloatingexchangeratestendtomoveinlarge,multi-yearwaves.
Themostimportantandmostinterestingreflexiveinteractiontakespla
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- 罗斯 金融市场 金融 泡沫
![提示](https://static.bdocx.com/images/bang_tan.gif)