三里岛事故文档格式.docx
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三里岛事故文档格式.docx
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∙In1979acoolingmalfunctioncausedpartofthecoretomeltinthe#2reactoratThreeMileIslandinUSA.Thereactorwasdestroyed.
∙Someradioactivegaswasreleasedacoupleofdaysaftertheaccident,butnotenoughtocauseanydoseabovebackgroundlevelstolocalresidents.
∙Therewerenoinjuriesoradversehealtheffectsfromtheaccident.
TheThreeMileIslandpowerstationisnearHarrisburg,PennsylvaniainUSA.Ithadtwopressurizedwaterreactors.OnePWRwasof800MWeandenteredservicein1974.Itremainsoneofthebest-performingunitsinUSA.Unit2wasof900MWeandalmostbrandnew.
Theaccidenttounit2happenedat4amon28March1979whenthereactorwasoperatingat97%power.Itinvolvedarelativelyminormalfunctioninthesecondarycoolingcircuitwhichcausedthetemperatureintheprimarycoolanttorise.Thisinturncausedthereactortoshutdownautomatically.Shutdowntookaboutonesecond.Atthispointareliefvalvefailedtoclose,butinstrumentationdidnotrevealthefact,andsomuchoftheprimarycoolantdrainedawaythattheresidualdecayheatinthereactorcorewasnotremoved.Thecoresufferedseveredamageasaresult.
Theoperatorswereunabletodiagnoseorrespondproperlytotheunplannedautomaticshutdownofthereactor.Deficientcontrolroominstrumentationandinadequateemergencyresponsetrainingprovedtoberootcausesoftheaccident.
Thechainofevents
Withinsecondsoftheshutdown,thepilot-operatedreliefvalve(PORV)onthereactorcoolingsystemopened,asitwassupposedto.About10secondslateritshouldhaveclosed.Butitremainedopen,leakingvitalreactorcoolantwatertothereactorcoolantdraintank.TheoperatorsbelievedthePORVhadshutbecauseinstrumentsshowedthemthata"
close"
signalwassenttothevalve.However,theydidnothaveaninstrumentindicatingthevalve'
sactualposition.
Respondingtothelossofcoolingwater,high-pressureinjectionpumpsautomaticallypushedreplacementwaterintothereactorsystem.Aswaterandsteamescapedthroughthereliefvalve,coolingwatersurgedintothepressuriser,raisingthewaterlevelinit.(Thepressuriserisatankwhichispartofthereactorcoolantsystem,maintainingproperpressureinthesystem.Thereliefvalveislocatedonthepressuriser.InapressurizedwaterreactorlikeTMI-2,waterintheprimarycoolingsystemaroundthecoreiskeptunderveryhighpressuretokeepitfromboiling.)
Operatorsrespondedbyreducingtheflowofreplacementwater.Theirtrainingtoldthemthatthepressurizerwaterlevelwastheonlydependableindicationoftheamountofcoolingwaterinthesystem.Becausethepressuriserlevelwasincreasing,theythoughtthereactorsystemwastoofullofwater.Theirtrainingtoldthemtodoalltheycouldtokeepthepressuriserfromfillingwithwater.Ifitfilled,theycouldnotcontrolpressureinthecoolingsystemanditmightrupture.
Steamthenformedinthereactorcoolingsystem.Pumpingamixtureofsteamandwatercausedthereactorcoolingpumpstovibrate.Becausetheseverevibrationscouldhavedamagedthepumpsandmadethemunusable,operatorsshutdownthepumps.Thisendedforcedcoolingofthereactor.(Theoperatorsstillbelievedthesystemwasnearlyfullofwaterbecausethepressuriserlevelremainedhigh.)However,asreactorcoolantwaterboiledaway,thereactor'
sfuelcorewasuncoveredandbecameevenhotter.Thefuelrodsweredamagedandreleasedradioactivematerialintothecoolingwater.
At6:
22amoperatorsclosedablockvalvebetweenthereliefvalveandthepressuriser.Thisactionstoppedthelossofcoolantwaterthroughthereliefvalve.However,superheatedsteamandgasesblockedtheflowofwaterthroughthecorecoolingsystem.
Throughoutthemorning,operatorsattemptedtoforcemorewaterintothereactorsystemtocondensesteambubblesthattheybelievedwereblockingtheflowofcoolingwater.Duringtheafternoon,operatorsattemptedtodecreasethepressureinthereactorsystemtoallowalowpressurecoolingsystemtobeusedandemergencywatersuppliestobeputintothesystem.
CoolingRestored
Bylateafternoon,operatorsbeganhigh-pressureinjectionofwaterintothereactorcoolingsystemtoincreasepressureandtocollapsesteambubbles.By7:
50pmon28March,theyrestoredforcedcoolingofthereactorwhentheywereabletorestartonereactorcoolantpump.Theyhadcondensedsteamsothatthepumpcouldrunwithoutseverevibrations.
Radioactivegasesfromthereactorcoolingsystembuiltupinthemakeuptankintheauxiliarybuilding.DuringMarch29and30,operatorsusedasystemofpipesandcompressorstomovethegastowastegasdecaytanks.Thecompressorsleaked,andsomeradioactivegaswasreleasedtotheenvironment.
TheHydrogenBubble
Whenthereactor'
scorewasuncovered,onthemorningof28March,ahigh-temperaturechemicalreactionbetweenwaterandthezircaloymetaltubesholdingthenuclearfuelpelletshadcreatedhydrogengas.Intheafternoonof28March,asuddenriseinreactorbuildingpressureshownbythecontrolroominstrumentsindicatedahydrogenburnhadoccurred.Hydrogengasalsogatheredatthetopofthereactorvessel.
From30Marchthrough1Apriloperatorsremovedthishydrogengas"
bubble"
byperiodicallyopeningtheventvalveonthereactorcoolingsystempressurizer.Foratime,regulatory(NRC)officialsbelievedthehydrogenbubblecouldexplode.However,suchanexplosionwasneverpossiblesincetherewasnotenoughoxygeninthesystem.
ColdShutdown
Afterananxiousmonth,on27Apriloperatorsestablishednaturalconvectioncirculationofcoolant.Thereactorcorewasbeingcooledbythenaturalmovementofwaterratherthanbymechanicalpumping.Theplantwasin"
coldshutdown"
.
Publicconcernandconfusion
WhentheTMI-2accidentisrecalled,itisofteninthecontextofwhathappenedonFridayandSaturday,March30-31.TheheightoftheTMI-2accident-inducedfear,stressandconfusioncameonthosetwodays.TheatmospherethenandthereasonsforitaredescribedwellinthebookCrisisContained,TheDepartmentofEnergyatThreeMileIsland,byPhilipLCantelonandRobertC.Williams,1982.ThisisanofficialhistoryoftheDepartmentofEnergy'
sroleduringtheaccident.
"
Fridayappearstohavebecomeaturningpointinthehistoryoftheaccidentbecauseoftwoevents:
thesuddenriseinreactorpressureshownbycontrolroominstrumentsonWednesdayafternoon(the"
hydrogenburn"
)whichsuggestedahydrogenexplosion-becameknowntotheNuclearRegulatoryCommission[thatday];
andthedeliberateventingofradioactivegasesfromtheplantFridaymorningwhichproducedareadingof1,200millirems(12mSv)directlyabovethestackoftheauxiliarybuilding.
Whatmadethesesignificantwasaseriesofmisunderstandingscaused,inpart,byproblemsofcommunicationwithinvariousstateandfederalagencies.Becauseofconfusedtelephoneconversationsbetweenpeopleuninformedabouttheplant'
sstatus,officialsconcludedthatthe1,200milliremsreadingwasanoff-sitereading.Theyalsobelievedthatanotherhydrogenexplosionwaspossible,thattheNuclearRegulatoryCommissionhadorderedevacuationandthatameltdownwasconceivable.Garbledcommunicationsreportedbythemediageneratedadebateoverevacuation.Whetherornottherewereevacuationplanssoonbecameacademic.WhathappenedonFridaywasnotaplannedevacuationbutaweekendexodusbasednotonwhatwasactuallyhappeningatThreeMileIslandbutonwhatgovernmentofficialsandthemediaimaginedmighthappen.OnFridayconfusedcommunicationscreatedthepoliticsoffear."
(Page50)
Throughoutthebook,CantelonandWilliamsnotethathundredsofenvironmentalsamplesweretakenaroundTMIduringtheaccidentperiodbytheDepartmentofEnergy(whichhadtheleadsamplingrole)orthethen-PennsylvaniaDepartmentofEnvironmentalResources.Buttherewerenounusuallyhighreadings,exceptfornoblegases,andvirtuallynoiodine.Readingswerefarbelowhealthlimits.Yetapoliticalstormwasragingbasedonconfusionandmisinformation.
NoRadiologicalHealthEffects
TheTMI-2accidentcausedconcernsaboutthepossibilityofradiation-inducedhealtheffects,principallycancer,intheareasurroundingtheplant.Becauseofthoseconcerns,thePennsylvaniaDepartmentofHealthfor18yearsmaintainedaregistryofmorethan30,000peoplewholivedwithinfivemilesofThreeMileIslandatthetimeoftheaccident.Thestate'
sregistrywasdiscontinuedinJune,1997,withoutanyevidenceofunusualhealthtrendsinthearea.
Indeed,morethanadozenmajor,independenthealthstudiesoftheaccidentshowednoevidenceofanyabnormalnumberofcancersaroundTMIyearsaftertheaccident.Theonlydetectableeffectwaspsychologicalstressduringandshortlyaftertheaccident.
Thestudiesfoundthattheradiationreleasesduringtheaccidentwereminimal,wellbelowanylevelsthathavebeenassociatedwithhealtheffectsfromradiationexposure.Theaverageradiationdosetopeoplelivingwithin16kilometresoftheplantwas0.08millisieverts,withnomorethan1millisieverttoanysingleindividual.Thelevelof0.08mSvisaboutequaltoachestX-ray,and1mSvisaboutathirdoftheaveragebackgroundlevelofradiationreceivedbyU.S.residentsinayear.
InJune1996,17yearsaftertheTMI-2accident,HarrisburgU.S.DistrictCourtJudgeSylviaRambodismissedaclassactionlawsuitallegingthattheaccidentcausedhealtheffects.TheplaintiffshaveappealedJudgeRambo'
sruling.TheappealisbeforetheU.S.ThirdCircuitCourtofAppeals.However,inmakingherde
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