中小企业融资研究文献综述及外文文献资料Word下载.docx
- 文档编号:20960080
- 上传时间:2023-01-26
- 格式:DOCX
- 页数:11
- 大小:27.99KB
中小企业融资研究文献综述及外文文献资料Word下载.docx
《中小企业融资研究文献综述及外文文献资料Word下载.docx》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《中小企业融资研究文献综述及外文文献资料Word下载.docx(11页珍藏版)》请在冰豆网上搜索。
ACaseStudyfromKosovo
Abstract
Inthisstudyweinvestigatetheimpactoffirmandentrepreneurshipcharacteristicsinsmallandmediumenterprises(SME-s)investmentfinancethroughdebt(bankloan).Dataaregatheredfrominterviewsbasedonaself-organizedquestionnairewith150SME-sinKosovo.Basedontheeconometricmodeloflinearregression,keyfactorsareidentifiedwhichinfluencetheinvestmentgrowthfinancedbydebt.Theresultsindicatethatthereismutualcorrelationamongthefirm'
sage,size,businessplan,sector,numberofowners,sourcesoffinancingandtheinvestmentgrowthfinancedfrombanksinKosovo.Therefore,findingsinthisworksuggestthattheaccesstoexternalsourcesoffinancingthroughbankloanisanimportantfactorthatinfluencestheinvestmentgrowth.Thepaperprovidessomeimportantconclusionsandimplicationsforpolicymakersandentrepreneurs.
Keywords:
SME,entrepreneurship,financingthroughdebt,investment,Kosovo
1.Introduction
ItisexplicitlyacceptedthatSME-spresentapivotalelementintheeconomicactivityinboth,developedanddevelopingcountries(Acs&
Audretsch,1990;
Johnson&
Loweman,1995).NumerousauthorsfromacademicandprofessionalworlddesignateSME-sasgeneratorsofboth,economicgrowthandoverallsocialdevelopment(Audretsch&
Klepper,2000;
WorldBankGroup,2005;
McMillan&
Woodruff,2002).
ThediscussionoftherelevantliteraturerelatedtotheaccessofSME-stofinance,aswellastoinvestmentfinanceisofparticularimportance(Krasniqi,2007).AccordingtoBecketal.(2007),theSME-saccessto,andcostof,financesisquiteoftencharacterizedasamajordifficulty,uptotheextentof35percent.Itshouldalsobestressedthatthesmallfirmscomewithmoredifficultytoloans,sincetheyencounterhighertransactioncostsandhigherpremiumrisks,fortheyaremorefragileandtheyofferlowercollaterals(Becketal.,2006).AudretschandElston(2006)alsostressthatsmallfirmsconfrontedhigherfinancialdifficultiesthanlargeones.Similarconclusionscanbefoundamongotherauthorswhohaveworkedinthisdirection(Becketal.,2006;
Oliveira&
Fortunato,2006).
Brinckmannetal.(2011)findsthatsmallfirmshavehigherlimitationstoaccessexternalsourcesoffinancingthanbiggerfirms,and,thus,theybecomemoredependentoninternalfundsforfinancingtheirinvestmentneeds.AmajorobstacleinfinancialmarketstotheaccessonfinancesbySME-sisalsotheasymmetryofinformation.Thus,basedonZhaoetal.(2006),onefromthemajordifficultiesforaccessingfinanceistheasymmetryofinformationamonglendersanddebtors;
forinstance,borrowershaveprivateinformationonthefirmthatlendersdonotpossess.Becauseoftheirsmallsize,shorthistoryandinconsistentaccountingdata,theissueofasymmetricinformationforSME-sbecomesmoreserious(Deakinsetal.,2008;
EBRD,1999;
Pissardiesetal.,2003;
Klapperetal.,2002).
DifficultiesofthiskindareexpressedalsoamongSME-sofKosovo,asonefromthelastcountriesintransition.InspiteofthefactthattheSMEsectorinKosovoisrelativelynew,itconstitutes98%ofallthefirms,thusrepresentingahugepotentialforgenerationofnewjobsandforeconomicdevelopmentofthecountry.BasedondataoftheWorldBank(2010),themajorobstacletothedevelopmentofSME-sinKosovoisaccesstobankloans.Only10%ofinvestmentsmadebySME-sarefinancedthroughbankloans,andabove85%ofinvestmentsarefinancedfromprivatesources(WorldBank,2010).
Objectiveofthisworkistoempiricallyinvestigatetheroleandimportanceofthefirmsandentrepreneurshipcharacteristicsthatinfluencetheinvestmentgrowththroughdebtfinance(loans)inKosovo.Therefore,theresearchquestioninthisstudyis:
HowdoestheinvestmentgrowthimpacttheperformanceofSME-s,bydiscussingthefirmandentrepreneurshipcharacteristicsoftheinvestmentgrowthofSME-sinKosovo?
Theorganizationoftheworkisasfollowing:
Partonediscussesthecontextoftheresearch,parttwothetheoreticalaspectandthesummaryofliterature.Inpartthreeweprovidetheresearchmethodologyandmodel.Partfourcontainstheresultsandempiricalfindings.And,partfivedealswiththeconclusions.
2.TheoryandLiteratureReview
Untilnow,thereisnosingleanduniquetheoreticalmodelthatexplainsthefinancingofSME-s,whichinfluencestheperformanceofinvestments,theirgrowthanddevelopment.ThetheoreticalprinciplesunderlyingcapitalstructurecangenerallybedescribesintermsofthestatictradeofftheorybyModiglianiandMiller(1958),thepeckingordertheory(Myers&
Majluf,1984),managerialtheoryofinvestments(Marris,1963;
Baumol,1967),agencytheorybyJensenandMeckling(1976)andextendedbyStiglitzandWeiss(1981).
Accordingtoneoclassicaltheoryofinvestments(M-M),whichaffirmstheattitudeontheirrelevanceofthecapitalstructureforthevalueofthefirm,internalandexternalsourcesoffinancingareperfectsubstitutes.Intheworldoftheperfectfunctioningofthemarket,thechoicebetweenfinancingthroughcapitalordebtisirrelevant.Therefore,thecostofcapitalandthemarketvalueofthefirmareindependentfromthevalueofthefirm(Modigliani&
Miller,1958).ThetheoryofM-Misbasedonthefollowingpremises:
therearenotaxes,therearenotransactioncosts,therearenobankruptcycosts,theequalcostofdebtforcompaniesandforinvestors,symmetricalinformationinthemarket,thereisnoinfluenceofdebtintheprofitofthecompanybeforeinterestandtaxation.
ModiglianiandMiller(1958)modifytheirtheorybyintroducingthetaxonprofit.Inthiscase,thevalueofthefirmispositivelyrelatedtodebt.Afterintroducingthetaxonprofitintheiranalysis,theyascertainthatthefinancialleverageincreasesthevalueofthefirm,sincetheinterestdecreasesthetaxbase(itisdeducedfromthebusinessprofit),and,therefore,wehavesavingswhichhavethevalueoftheinterest.Fromthisascertainment,thevalueofthefirmgrowsbigger,asthefinancialleverageincreases,whichmeansthatthehighestvalueofthefirmisachievediftheburdenofdebtbecomes100%.Inthiswaythefirmattainsabsoluteadvantage,giventhatitisdefendedfromtaxes.
Scott(1972)emphasizesthat100%taxshielddoesnotexistinreality,becauseofdistresscosts.Debtleadstolegalobligationtopayinterestandprincipal.Ifafirmcannotmeetitsdebtobligation,itisforcedintobankruptcyanincursassociatedcosts(Fatoki&
Asah,2011).Thistheory,infact,doesnottakeintotheconsiderationalltheotherfactors,suchas:
thecostsofthebankruptcyofthefirm,thecostsoftheagency,theimpactofdebtinprofit,theasymmetryofinformation,and,therefore,thistheoryischallengedbyothertheories(Harris&
Raviv,1991).
Thus,thestatictradeofftheory,whichisbasedontheM-Mtheoryandisitscomplementary,exceptsavingsfromthetaxonprofit,incorporatesintothediscussionalsothecostofbankruptcy,suchas:
judicialtaxes,attorneycosts,administrativecosts,and,also,theagencycosts(thefirmsmanagersdamagetheinterestsofthecreditorsbyworkingintheinterestofshareholders),andthiscanreducethevalueofthefirm(JensenandMeckling,1976).Thistheoryis,infact,thedominanttheoryregardingthedeterminationofthefinancialstructureofthefirm,anditisfoundedonthepremisethatitisthefirmthatchooseshowmuchitwillbefinancedfromdebt,andhowmuchfromthecapital,bybalancingthecostofprofits.Accordingtothistheory,theoptimallevelofthestructureofcapitalistheonewhichequatestheprofitandcostsfromdebt.
Accordingtopeckingordertheory,thefirminitiallyprefersinternalsourcesoffinancingtoexternalones,and,regardingexternalsources,theypreferdebttocapital(Donaldson,1961).Thus,initiallywehavetheuseofaccumulatedprofit,amortization,debt,and,finally,theequitycapital.Accordingtothistheory,thefirmsfinancetheirinvestmentrequirementsbasedonahierarchicorder.Thiscandirectalsotoexistenceoftheasymmetryofinformationbetweenmanagers(insiders)andinvestors(outsiders).Asaresultofthis,managershavemoreinformationtheninvestors(Myers&
Majluf,1984).
Basedontheagencytheory,StiglitzandWeiss(1981)presenttheproblemthat,asaconsequenceofasymmetricalinformation,occurbetweenmanagersandshareholders,ononehand,andtheproblemamongshareholders,managersandcreditors,ontheother.TheyarguethatonlySME-sknowstherealfinancialstructureoftheirown,therealstrengthoftheirinvestmentprojectsandthetendenciesforsettlingupthedebt,and,therefore,thefirmpossessessuperiorprivateinformation(Mazanai&
Fatoki,2012).
3.Hypothesis
3.1BusinessPlan
AccordingtoGuffey,thebusinessplanisanecessaryrequirementatthebeginningofbusiness,anditisusedasanimportantelementtoacquirefinancialsupportduringapplicationtobankinginstitutions(Guffey,2008).Anincreaseinthelevelofskillsofthosewhoarelookingforcreditsinthecompilationofbusinessplans,willincreasetheiropportunitiestohaveproperlyprepareddocumentation,andtohaveaclearideaonthecourseoftheirbusiness.AccordingtoMaziku(2012),theasymmetricinformationbetweenthedebt-seekingSME-sandthebank,isreflectedintheincapabilityofthemajorityofSME-stoprovideconsistentfinancialdataandrealbusinessplans,whichincreasestheoperationalcostduringthedecisionmakingforpermittingtheloansbytheabank(Maziku,2012).Thus,th
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- 中小企业 融资 研究 文献 综述 外文 文献资料