IFM10 Ch16 Solutions Manual文档格式.docx
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IFM10 Ch16 Solutions Manual文档格式.docx
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PartII
ANSWERSTOBEGINNING-OF-CHAPTERQUESTIONS
16-1Arbitrageisgenerallythoughtofastheprocessofbuyinganiteminonemarketandsimultaneouslysellingitatahigherpriceinanothermarketandthusearningarisklessprofit.MMbroadenedthisconcept.Theyshow,underasetofassumptions,thatpersonaldebtcanbeusedtocausetheriskoftwodifferentstockstobethesamebutthereturnsonthestockscanbedifferent.Then,onecouldbuythecheaperstockandsimultaneouslysellthemoreexpensiveoneandendupearningarisklessprofit.Usingthisarbitrageconcept,theydemonstratedthatifanunleveredfirmhadahighervaluethanaleveragedfirm,theninvestorscoulduse“homemade”leveragetoearnarisklessprofitbysellingtheleveragedfirm’sstockandborrowingtobuystockintheunleveredfirm’sstock.So,investorswouldgettothesamedebtpositionandhavethesamerisk,butearnahigherprofit.
TheMMconclusionswerebasedonanumberofassumptions,andintherealworld,thoseassumptionsarenotcorrect.Investorscannotnecessarilyborrowatthesamerateascorporations,interestratesincreasewiththeamountborrowed,bankruptcycostsdoexist,andsoon.Moreover,inbadtimescorporationsaremorelikelytousecashflowstoservicetheirowndebtthantheyaretopaydividendstoenablestockholderstoservice“homemade”leveragedebts,whichcouldresultinadditionalrisktothepersonallyleveragedinvestor.
ItshouldbenotedthatmanyoftheargumentsagainsttheMMassumptionsarevalidifonethinksaboutindividualinvestorslikecollegeprofessorsbutlessvalidifthe“investor”isaninstitutionalinvestorlikeapensionfundthathasreadyaccesstocapitalandmaynothavetopaytaxes.Then,taxesandbrokeragecostsmayreallybeimmaterial,borrowingcostsmaybethesamefortheinvestorandthecompany,theinvestorandthefirmmayhavethesameinformation,andtheinvestormayhaveenoughclouttoforcethecompanytoprovidecashtoservicetheinvestor’sdebt.Asaresult,arbitrageundoubtedlyworksbetterforcertainlargeinvestorsthanforsmallinvestors.TheuseofdebtincorporateAmericaincreasedafterMMpublishedtheirwork,andwebelievethatMM’sworkcontributedtothisdevelopment.
16-2MilleraddedpersonalincometaxestotheMMequation.Heargued
(1)thatthepersonaltaxratewashighoninterestincomeanddividendsbutmuchloweroncapitalgainsincome,and
(2)thatindividualscouldusevarioustaxshields,includingdeath,toavoidcapitalgainstaxes,whilecorporationscouldretainearnings,usestockbuy-backprograms,andsoontohelpstockholdersminimizepersonaltaxesonincomefromstock.Miller’sconclusionwasthatinvestorscouldessentiallyavoidtaxesonstockincome,hencetheyhadamuchlowerrisk-adjustedrequiredrateofreturnonstocksthanonbonds,andthatthisadvantagelargelyoffsetthetaxadvantagetocorporatedebt.
HereisMiller’sformulaforthegainfromleverage:
Gainfromleverage=
D
Notethatifallthetaxrateswerezero,thegainfromleveragewouldreducetozero,andwewouldbebackattheoriginalMMposition.Millerpersonallythoughtthatthiswasthemostlikelysituation.NotealsothatifTs=Td,i.e.,thetaxratesonstockanddebtincomeareequal,thenthegainfromleverageisequaltoTcD,whichistheMMwithcorporatetaxesposition.
MostsubsequentresearchersconcludedthatMillerhadagoodpoint,butthepersonaltaxadvantageofstockonlypartially,notcompletely,offsettheadvantageofcorporatedebt,becauseTd>
Ts.Forexample,supposethatTc=35%,Td=28%,andTs=10%,thentheterminbracketswillbe1-(1-.35)(1-.10)/(1-.28)=0.1875versus.35undertheMMwith-taxesmodel.Thegainfromleveragewithothertaxratesisshowninthemodeloutput.
TheMillerModelleadsustotheconclusionthatthe“PureMM”lineinthevaluegraphsshouldhavealesssteepslopethatTD,andthat,inturn,leadstotheconclusionthattheoptimalcapitalstructureinthetrade-offmodelshouldincludesomewhatlessdebt.
16-3UndertheMMandMillerassumptions,firmsdonotgrowandthedebttaxshieldisdiscountedatthecostofdebt.UndertheseassumptionsthevalueoftheunleveredfirmisVL=VU+TDandtheleveredcostofequityisrsL=rsU+(rsU–rd)(1-T)(D/S).ThisexpressionfortheleveredcostofequityalsomeansthattheWACCdecreasesasthelevelofdebtincreases.
However,iffirmsareallowedtogrow,thentwodifferencesemerge.First,thepresentvalueofagrowingtaxshieldislargerthanthepresentvalueofaconstanttaxshield,sothecontributiontovaluethatthedebttaxshieldmakesislarger.Second,thevalueofthegrowingtaxshielddoesn’tmakeanysenseifthediscountrateisthecostofdebt,becauseusingsuchalowdiscountrateallowsthevalueofthegrowingtaxshieldtodominatethevalueofoperations,whichmakesnoeconomicsense.Rather,thediscountrateforthetaxshieldmustbetheunleveredcostofequity,whichislargerthanthecostofdebt.Usingahigherdiscountratemakesthetaxshield’scontributiontovaluesmallerthanifthecostofdebthadbeenusedtodiscountit.ThesetwooppositeeffectsleadtotheresultthatthepresentvalueofthegrowingtaxshieldswhendiscountedattheunleveredcostofequityisVL=VU+(rdTD/(rsU–g).TheleveredcostofequityundertheseassumptionsisrsL=rsU+(rsU–rd)(D/S);
boththetaxrateandthegrowthratedropoutoftheexpressionanditlookslikeMM’sresult,butwithouttaxes.Thismeansthateverythingelseequal,MM’scalculationoftheleveredrequiredrateofreturnissmallerthanitwouldbeifgrowthwereaccountedfor.ThisalsomeansthatthecalculationofWACCunderMMwillbesmallerthanthecalculationofWACCundertheextension.Theendresultisthatwhengrowthiscorrectlyincludedinthemodel,thebenefitsduetothetaxshieldareactuallylowerthanwhatMM’smodelsuggests.
ThemodelforthesequestionsgraphstheWACCbasedonMMandtheWACCbasedontheextensiontoMM.
16-4IfcorporatedebtisactuallyriskyratherthanrisklessasMMassumed,thenmanagersreallyhavetheoptiontodefaultifthevalueofthecompanyisn’tenoughtomakeitworthwhiletopaytheinterestorprincipalonthedebt.Inthesimplecaseofaleveredcompanywithzerocoupondebt,theequityinthefirmlooksalotlikeacalloptiononthevalueoftheentirefirm,withastrikepriceequaltothefacevalueofthedebt.Viewingequityinthiswaycanleadtosomedangerousbehavioronthepartoffirmmanagement.Forexample,optionsareworthmorewhentheunderlyingstockismoreriskier.Thesameistruewiththeequityinaleveredfirm.Ifmanagementtakesthemoneythatitborrowsandinvestsitinriskierprojectsthanoriginallyintended,thenitmakesthefirmriskier,anditmakestheoptionvalue(theequityvalue)greater.Thiswouldbegoodnewsfortheshareholders—thevalueoftheirstockincreases.Anditwouldbebadnewsforthebondholders.Ifmanagementisn’tinvestinginhighernpvprojects,onlyriskierones,thentheincreaseintheshareholders’positionisexactlyoffsetbyadecreaseinthebondholders’position.Sotheshareholderswouldbeexpropriatingwealthfromthebondholdersbyusinga“baitandswitch”strategy.Ofcoursebondholderswouldwanttoavoidthisifpossible,sotheywouldputrestrictionsonhowthemoneythattheylendcanbeused,ortheymightchargeahigherinterestratebecausetheyknowthismighthappen,ortheymightrefusetodealwiththefirmagainifithappens.
ANSWERSTOEND-OF-CHAPTERQUESTIONS
16-1a.MMPropositionIstatestherelationshipbetweenleverageandfirmvalue.PropositionIwithouttaxesisV=EBIT/rsU.SincebothEBITandrsUareconstant,firmvalueisalsoconstantandcapitalstructureisirrelevant.Withcorporatetaxes,PropositionIbecomesV=Vu+TD.Thus,firmvalueincreaseswithleverageandtheoptimalcapitalstructureisvirtuallyalldebt.
b.MMPropositionIIstatestherelationshipbetweenleverageandthecostofequity.Withouttaxes,PropositionIIisrsL=rsU+(rsU–rd)(D/S).Thus,rsincreasesinaprecisewayasleverageincreases.Infact,thisincreaseisjustsufficienttooffsettheincreaseduseoflowercostdebt.Whencorporatetaxesareadded,PropositionIIbecomesrsL=rsU+(rsU–rd)(1–T)(D/S).Heretheincreaseinequitycostsislessthanthezero-taxcase,andtheincreasinguseoflowercostdebtcausesthefirm’scostofcapitaltodecrease,andagain,theoptimalcapitalstructureisvirtuallyalldebt.
c.TheMillermodelintroducespersonaltaxes.Theeffectofpersonaltaxesis,essentially,toreducetheadvantageofcorporatedebtfinancing.
d.Financialdistresscostsareincurredwhenaleveragedfirmfacingadeclineinearningsisforcedtotakeactionstoavoidbankruptcy.Thesecostsmaybetheresultofdelaysintheliquidationofassets,legalfees,theeffectsonproductqualityfromcuttingcosts,andevasiveactionsbysuppliersandcustomers.
e.Agencycostsarisefromlostefficiencyandtheexpenseofmonitoringmanagementtoensurethatdebtholders’rightsareprotected.
f.TheadditionoffinancialdistressandagencycoststoeithertheMMtaxmodelortheMillermodelresultsinatrade-offmodelofcapitalstructure.Inthismodel,theoptimalcapitalstructurecanbevisualizedasatrade-offbetweenthebenefitofdebt(theinteresttaxshelter)andthecostsofdebt(financialdistressandagencycosts).
g.Thevalueofthedebttaxshieldisthepresentvalueofthetaxsavingsfromtheinterestpayments.IntheMMmodelwithtax
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