Chinas listed companies to implement the Audit CoWord文档格式.docx
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Chinas listed companies to implement the Audit CoWord文档格式.docx
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Abstract:
InWesterncountries,theAuditCommitteehasbecomeacorporategovernancestructureisanimportantpartofourAuditCommitteeinthetheoryandpracticearestillinthestageofintroductionandexploration.Inthispaper,inourparticularenvironmentoflistedcompaniesundertheBoardofAuditorstoimplementthesystemanalysisoftheproblems,proposedtheestablishmentoftherelevantlawsandregulations,improveandperfecttheindependentdirectorsystemcorrespondingmeasures.
Keywords:
:
AuditCommittee;
BoardofDirectors;
independentdirectors;
BoardofSupervisors
TheAuditCommitteeBoardofDirectorsestablishedacommitteeofitsboardofdirectorstoestablishcanbeusedtoimprovethequalityoffinancialinformationandincreasethecompanyreleasedthereliabilityoffinancialstatementstoenhancethepublic’sconfidenceinthefinancialstatements,sothattheBoardofTrustees,management,internalauditandexternalauditcommunicationandexchangeofinformationbetweenthemoreeffective.AsChina’smarketeconomydevelopment,corporategovernancehasincreasinglybecomethefocusofattention,andfurtherimplementationoftheAuditCommitteesystem,thevoiceisalsogrowing,buttherearesomeproblems,sothattheAuditCommitteethedevelopmentofthesystemisnotsatisfactory.AccordingtotheShanghaiStockExchangeWebsiteinformationoncorporategovernancerulesresultsshowedthat,asofDecember31,2005,ShanghaistockmarketAstock822has280listedcompanies,thecompany’sboardofdirectorsestablishedtheAuditCommittee,theproportionof34.06%,anauditcommitteeisnotashighas65.94%.inthecompany’sAuditCommitteehasbeenestablished,asthecompanycanmanipulatetheAuditCommitteeoftheformationandruntheprogram,theAuditCommitteehasnotyetsubstantialroletoplay.FortheAuditCommitteetocontinuetofullyandeffectivelyperformitsroleinimprovingcorporategovernance,wemustaddresstheprocessofimplementationproblems.
First,theAuditCommitteeofChina’slistedcompaniestoimplementasystemproblem
(A)lawsandregulationsarenotperfect
Inrecentyears,China’slistedcompaniesoncorporategovernanceissuesmoreprominentinfinancialgovernanceisparticularlyserious.Tothisend,theSFCissuedin2001‘ontheestablishmentofanindependentdirectoroflistedcompanies,theguidancesystem,’suggestslistedcompaniestoestablishanddevelopanindependentdirectorsystem,theChinaSecuritiesRegulatoryCommissionandtheEconomicandTradeCommissionjointlyissuedin2002,the‘CorporateGovernanceGuidelines’recommendationslistedcompaniestoestablishanddeveloptheauditcommitteesystem.InJanuary2004,in‘theStateCouncilonpromotingthecapitalmarketreformandstabledevelopmentofanumberofobservations’inthefurtherrequeststandardizetheoperationoflistedcompanies,improvetheindependentdirectorsystem.InNovember2005‘oftheStateCounciltransmittedtheCommissionontheimprovementofthequalityoflistedcompanies,theviewsof’madeinfurtherimprovingcorporategovernancestructure,settingupanauditcommitteeconsistingmainlyofindependentdirectorsandfullyplayitsrole.Theintroductionofthisseriessystem,althoughtheestablishmentofalistedcompanyauditcommitteesystemhasprovidedsomeguidelinesandbasisfor,andmanylistedcompanieshavealsobeenactivelyengagedinwork,but,asthesearenotprovidedforthegovernanceofnon-mandatoryrecommendationsarenotlegallybinding,theestablishmentoftheAuditCommitteeofthearbitrarylarge,sothattheBoard’srelativelyslowpaceofdevelopment.
Atpresent,therelevantprovisionsoftheAuditCommitteeisonlyamatterofprinciple,thereisnospecificoperationalguidelines.InChina,theauditcommitteesystemhasjuststarted,theAuditCommitteemembersdidnotworkexperience,theabsenceofspecificoperationalguidelinesasaguide,islikelytoenabletheBoard’sworkworthyofthename,amereformality,thereineffectivegovernancesituation.
(B)theindependenceofindependentdirectorsdifference
TheindependenceandauthorityoftheAuditCommitteeistoensurethatthekeytoitsnormaloperation,itsmembersweremostlyorentirelybytheindependentdirectors.Independentdirectorsshouldhaveawiderangeofbusinessexperience,familiarwiththeprofessionalauditingstandardsregulatethebasicconcepts,understandingofthemainaccountingandreportingrulesinordertocompletetheirinspectionandsupervisionoffinancialreportingandinternalandexternalaudittasks.Therefore,theformationmechanismofindependentdirectorsistoensuretheindependenceandauthorityoftheAuditCommitteemembersofthekey.AtpresentthemajorityofindependentdirectorsoflistedcompaniesinChinabythegovernmentauthorities,theboardorchairmanoftheappointment,lostitsmostvaluablerealindependence.Independentdirectorsarenotindependent,thecorrespondingbytheauditcommitteeofindependentdirectorscannotstandindependentandimpartialperspectiveoftheeffectiveimplementationofitsoversightresponsibilities,there‘humanDirectors’,‘vaseofdirectors’phenomenon.Independentdirectorsoflistedcompanieshasnotbeeneffectiveintheroleoftheplay,andalsomakestheAuditCommitteewasunabletoeffectivelycarryoutitsoversightresponsibilities,resultinginalackofmanycompanies‘voluntary’anauditcommitteerequirements.
(C)Thegovernancestructureoflistedcompaniesdefects
MostofChina’slistedcompaniesthroughthelistingofstate-ownedenterpriserestructuring,thecompanysharesarehighlyconcentratedinstate-ownedor-controlledenterprises,theinternalcontrolproblemisveryserious,majorshareholdersandboardchairmanandseniormanager,anagentofthephenomenoniswidespread,sothatthepresenceoffunctionalBoardofDirectorsdefectsexistinnameonly.Thegeneralabsenceofexternalindependentdirectorsorinvalid,resultinginunsoundboardstructureandcorporategovernancechecksandbalancesfailed.BoardofSupervisorsnottoparticipateintheprocessofsupervision,butonlyfocusontheresultsofsubsequentmonitoring,thespecificcircumstancesofthecompany’spastlackofunderstanding,didnotparticipateintheentiredecision-makingprocess,enablinggreatlyreducedthesupervisoryroleoftheboardofsupervisors.Internalauditdepartmentbythedepartmentsandunitsdirectlyresponsibleforleadership,thelackofadequateinternalauditindependenceandauthority,wecannoteffectivelyplayitssupervisoryrole,theseshortcomingsresultinalistedcompanyisunclear,chaoticmanagement,theAuditCommitteeisalsoverydifficulttoplayitsrole.
(D)TheAuditCommitteeandSupervisoryBoardintheoversightresponsibilitiesoverlap
‘CorporateGovernanceGuidelines’issuedpriortotheimplementation,manylistedcompanies,operatedbytheBoardofSupervisorsisresponsiblefortherightchecksandbalancesandoversight.Haveanauditcommittee,theSupervisoryBoardandtheAuditCommitteeofoverlappingresponsibilitiesbetweentheoverlappingphenomenonofuncleardivisionformedisdifferentfromtheUnitedKingdom,theUnitedStatesalsoisdifferentfromthesingle-boardmodelofGermanyandJapan,two-tierboardmodelofthedualsupervisionofourcountrymechanism.Inaccordancewith‘CompanyLaw’dutyoftheboardofsupervisors,requiretheboardofsupervisors,includingsupervisionofthecompany’sfinancialperformance,includingthetermsofreference.‘CorporateGovernanceGuidelines’alsoexpresslyprovidesthattheAuditCommittee’smainfunctionistothecompany’sfinancialoversight.Governanceelementsoftheguidelinesthemselves,forboththedivisionofresponsibilityinthesupervisionaremoreambiguous.ResponsibilitiesoftheAuditCommitteeandtheBoardofoverlap,conflictofauditcommitteesystembroughtabouttheestablishmentandoperationofanumberofcontradictionsandproblems,ormakingthetwocreatea‘freeride’mentality,therebuck-passing,nooneisresponsibleforthephenomenondidnotwantto;
orthetwowranglebuck-passing,creatinganewinternalfriction.WhichwillinevitablyhindertheestablishmentoftheAuditCommittee’senthusiasm,isnotconducivetotheAuditCommitteehasbeenestablishedtofunctioneffectively.
Second,theimplementationofChina’slistedcompany’sauditcommitteesystemofmeasures
(A)theestablishmentoftherelevantlawsandregulations
Fromabroad,theexperienceofcorporategovernance,auditcommitteesystemtogetagooddevelopment,wemustusethelawofthiscoercivemeanstoberegulated.Atpresent,Chinahaspromulgatedthe‘governanceguidelinesforlistedcompanies’andothersystemsofthedepartmentalregulations,thelegalsysteminChina’scurrentpositionisnothigh,authoritativeenough,butratherfortheAuditCommitteetobecomeaneffectiveorganization,wemustmakeitacompanyGovernanceinthehard-liners,whichshouldspeedupthelegislativeworkoftheAuditCommittee,theauditcommitteesystemrelatedissuesincorporatedintothelawexplicitlyrequiresalllistedcompaniestosetupanauditcommitteesystem,andtheprovisionsoftherelevantinformationdisclosuremechanismtoensureaneffectivesystemoftheAuditCommitteeimplementation.
Inaddition,shouldtheAuditCommitteetodevelopamoredetailedoperationalguidelines,suchasthepurposeoftheAuditCommittee,responsibilities,roles,reportingandtherelationshipbetweenthepartiestothespecificstandardsforauditcommitteememberso
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