NIE and Development TheoryWord文件下载.docx
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NIE and Development TheoryWord文件下载.docx
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NIEandDevelopmentTheory@#@TheNewInstitutionalEconomicsandDevelopmentTheory:
@#@@#@ABriefCriticalAssessment@#@PRANABBARDHAN@#@UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley@#@Summary.–Inthispaperwediscussstrengthsandweaknessesoftransaction-costandimperfect-informationapproachestotheeconomictheoryofinstitutions,particularlywithreferencestoproblemsrelevanttoeconomicdevelopment.@#@1.ALTERNATIVETHEORLES@#@Inrecentyearstwostrandsofnon–Walrasianeconomicliteraturehavedevelopedwell-articulatedendogenoustheoriesofinstitutions,andtheyarebothgettingtobeprominentinthenewmicroeconomicsofdevelopmentOneisthetransactioncostschoolflowingoutofthefamouspaperbyCoase(1960),followedbythewritingsofAlchian,Demsetz,Williamson,Northandothers;@#@theotherschoolisassociatedwiththetheoryofimperfectinformationasintheworkofAkerlof,Stiglitz,Spenceandothers.Althoughthereissomefamilyresemblancebetweenthetwostrands,thereareimportantdifferencesintheirpointsofemphasis.Buttheybothdenythevalidityofsomeoftheprincipal–resultsofmainstreameconomics.Forexample,oneofthemainpillarsofWalrasianneoclassicaleconomicstheseparabilityofequityandefficiency---breaksdownwhentransactioncostsandefficiency;@#@thetermsandconditionsofcontractsinvarioustransactions,whichdirectlyaffecttheefficiencyofresourceallocation,nowcruciallydependonownershipstructuresandpropertyrelations.Developmenteconomics,whichdealswithcaseswheremarketfailureandincompletemarkets(oftentheresultofthesubstantivepresenceoftransactioncostsandinformationproblems)arepredominant,clearlyprovideshospitableterritoryforsuchinstitutionalanalysis.@#@Accordingtothetransactioncostsschool,institutionsthatevolvetolowerthesecostsarethekeytotheperformanceofeconomies.Thesecostsincludethoseofinformation,negotiation,negotiation,monitoring,coordinationandenforcementofcontracts.Whentransactioncostsareabsent,theinitialassignmentofpropertyrightsdoesnotmatterfromthepointofviewofefficiency,becauserightscanbevoluntarilyadjustedandexchangedtopromoteincreasedproduction.Butwhentransactioncostsaresubstantial,asisusuallythecase,theallocationofpropertyrightsiscritical.Inthehistoricalgrowthprocessthereisatradeoffbetweeneconomiesofscaleandspecializationontheonehandandtransactioncostsontheother.Inasmall,closed,face-to-facepeasantcommunity,forexample,transactioncostsarelow,buttheproductioncostsarehigh,becausespecializationanddivisionoflaborareseverelylimitedbytheextentofmarketdefinedbythepersonalizedexchangeprocessofthesmallcommunity.Inalarge-scalecomplexeconomy,asthenetworkofinterdependencewidenstheimpersonalexchangeprocessgivesconsiderablescopeforallkindsofopportunisticbehavior(cheating,shirking,moralhazard)andthecostsoftransactingcanbehigh.InWesternsocietiesovertime,complexinstitutionalstructureshavebeendevised(elaboratelydefinedandeffectivelyenforcedpropertyrights,formalcontractsandguarantees,corporatehierarchy,verticalintegration,limitedliability,bankruptcylawsandsoon)toconstraintheparticipants,toreducetheuncertaintyofsocialinteraction,ingeneraltopreventthetransactionsfrombeingtoocostlyandthustoallowtheproductivitygainsoflargerscaleandimprovedtechnologytoberealized.NorthandThomas(1973)haveexplainedeconomicgrowthofWesternEuropebetweenthe10thandthe18thcenturiesprimarilyintermsofinnovationsintheinstitutionalrulesthatgovernedpropertyrights.Inthisview,asinMarxisthistory,propertyrelationswhichweresociallyusefulatonetimebecome“fetters”onthefurtherdevelopmentoftheforcesofproduction,andanappropriateredefinitionofpropertyrightsbecomesnecessary.Newpropertyrightsemergethatallowanincreaseingainsfromtradebyeconomizingontransactioncosts(includinggainsfromnewproductionorearlierhightransactioncostsandtheconsequent“marketfailure”).Northandmanyotherneoclassicalinstitutionaleconomistsbelievethatthebasicsourceofinstitutionalchangeisfundamentalandpersistentchangesinrelativeprices,whichleadoneofbothpartiesinatransactiontoperceivethattheycouldbebetteroffunderalternativecontractualandinstitutionalarrangements.Historically,populationchangeisjudgedtohavebeenthesinglemostimportantsourceofrelativepricechanges,thoughtechnologicalchange(includingthatinmilitarytechnology)andchangesinthecostsofinformationarealsodeemedasmajorsources.@#@Theimperfect-informationtheoryofinstitutionsiscloselyrelatedtothatoftransactioncosts,sinceinformationcostsconstituteanimportantpartoftransactioncosts.Buttheformertheoryisusuallycastinamorerigorousframeworkclearlyspellingoutassumptionsandequilibriumsolutionconcepts,drawingoutmorefullytheimplicationsofstrategicbehaviorunderasymmetricinformationandsharplydifferentiatingtheimpactofdifferenttypesofinformationproblems.Imperfect-informationtheoryyieldssomewhatmoreconcreteandspecificpredictionsaboutthedesignofcontracts,withmoreattentiontothedetailsoftermsandconditionsofvaryingcontractualarrangementsundervaryingcircumstances,thantheusualpresentationsoftransactioncosttheory.ExceptionsinthelatterareprovidedbyWilliamson’stheoryoftransaction-specificassetsandhistheoryofincompletecontractsasfurtherdevelopedbyHartandHolmstrom(1987).Thelatterfocusonadaptivesequentialdecision-makingratherthanthecomprehensivecontingentclaimscontractsoftheimperfect-informationliterature.Theimperfect-informationtheoristsgivemoreemphasistoexantemechanismdesignincontractsandlesstomaladaptationcostsincurredwhentransactionsdriftoutofalignmentexpostinaworldofboundedrationalitywherecontractsarenecessarilyincomplete(i.e.cannotpossiblytakeintoaccountallcontingencies).Inparticular,oncerelation-specificinvestments(i.e.wheretheinvestmentsthepartiesmakehaveamuchgreateruseinsidetherelationshipthanoutside)aremade,thereisscopeforpost-contractualopportunisticbehavior.Institutionaldevicestoreducethisconsistusuallyoflong-timecontractualrelationsorintegrationoffirms(convertinganarm-lengthtransactionintoaninternaloneanddefiningpropertyrightsasthedefaultoptioninincompletecontracts).Long–termimplicitcontractsandpersonalized,less-than-arms-lengthtransactionsare,ofcourse,quitecommonindevelopingcountries,althoughWilliamson’simmediateconcerniswiththecorporatestructureandpracticesinindustriallyadvancedcountries.@#@Theimperfect-informationtheoryhasbeenfruitfullyusedinmodelingmanykeyagrarianinstitutions,whichareseentoemergeassubstitutesformissingcredit,insurance,andfuturesmarketsinanenvironmentofpervasiverisks,informationasymmetry,andmoralhazard.Itstartedwiththeliteratureonsharecropping,thenoninterlockingoftransactionsinlabor,creditandlandlease,onlabortying,oncreditrationingandsoon.Radicaleconomistshaveoftencitedsomeoftheseproductionrelationsasinstitutionalobstaclestodevelopmentinapooragrarianeconomy,overlookingthemicroeconomicrationaleoftheformationoftheseinstitutions.Underasetofinformationalconstraintsandmissingmarkets,agivenagrarianinstitution(say,sharecroppingofinterlockingofcontracts)maybeservingarealeconomicfunctionItssimpleabolition,asisoftendemandedonaradicalplatform,withouttakingcareofthefactorsthatgaverisetotheinstitutioninthefirstplace,maynotnecessarilyimprovetheconditionsoftheintendedbeneficiariesoftheabolitionprogram.Theremaybesomeimportantpoliticallessonsherefromwhatcanbecalledtheeconomicsofsecond-bestreformism.@#@2.FUNCTIONALISMANDOTHERLIMITATIONS@#@Thetransaction-costandimperfect-informationtheoriesareequallymurkyonthemechanismthroughwhichnewinstitutionsandpropertyrightsemerge.Onegetstheimpressionthatmoreefficientinstitutionsandgovernancestructuresevolveasthepartiesinvolvedcometoappreciatethenewbenefit-costpossibilities.TheliteratureismarkedbyacertainahistoricalfunctionalismandevenvulgarDarwinismonthispointAninstitution’smerefunctionofservingtheinterestsofpotentialbeneficiariesisclearlyinadequateinexplainingit,justasitisanincompetentdetectivewhotriestoexplainamurdermysteryonlybylookingforthebeneficiaryand,onthatbasisalone,proceedstoarresttheheirofthemurderedrichmanOnecannotgetawayfromtheenormityofthecollectiveactionproblemthatlimitstheabilityofpotentialgainerstogettheiracttogetherinbringingaboutinstitutionalchanges.Therearetwokindsofcollectiveactionproblemsinvolvedhere;@#@oneisthewellknownfree-riderproblemaboutsharingthecostsofbringingaboutchangetheotherisabargainingproblemwheredisputesaboutsharingthepotentialbenefitsfromthechangemayleadtoabreakdownofthenecessarycoordination@#@Wehavenotedbeforetheneoclassicalinstitutionaleconomists'@#@strongbeliefthatrelativepricechangesfuelthemainmotiveforceforinstitutionalchangesinhistory(primarilybyinducingthedevelopmentofpropertyrightstothebenefitoftheownersofthemoreexpensivefactorofproduction).Inparticular,demographicchangesalteringtherelativepriceoflabortolandleadtotheincentiveforredefinitionofpropertyrightsonlandandarearrangementoflaborrelations:
@#@North(l981)andHayamiandRuttan(1985)givesev
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