外文翻译股利政策一个综述Word文件下载.docx
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外文翻译股利政策一个综述Word文件下载.docx
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外文翻译股利政策一个综述@#@外文原文@#@Dividendpolicy:
@#@areview@#@1.Introduction@#@Explainingdividendpolicyhasbeenoneofthemostdifficultchallengesfacingfinancialeconomists.Despitedecadesofstudy,wehaveyettocompletelyunderstandthefactorsthatinfluencedividendpolicyandthemannerinwhichthesefactorsinteract.AllenandMichaely(1995)concludethat‘‘muchmoreempiricalandtheoreticalresearchonthesubjectofdividendsisrequiredbeforeaconsensuscanbereached’’(p.833).ThefactthatamajortextbooksuchasBrealeyandMyers(2002)listsdividendsasoneofthetenimportantunsolvedproblemsinfinancereinforcesthisconclusion.ThefirstempiricalstudyofdividendpolicywasprovidedbyLintner(1956),whosurveyedcorporatemanagerstounderstandhowtheyarrivedatthedividendpolicy.Lintnerfoundthatanexistingdividendrateformsabenchmarkforthemanagement.Companies’managementusuallydisplayedastrongreluctancetoreducedividends.Lintneropinedthatmanagersusuallyhavereasonablydefinitivetargetpayoutratios.Overtheyears,dividendsareincreasedslowlyataparticularspeedofadjustment,sothattheactualpayoutratiomovesclosertothetargetpayoutratio.@#@2.Dividendirrelevanceandtaxclienteles@#@WhileLintner(1956)providedthestylisticdescriptionofdividends,thewatershedinthetheoreticalmodellingofdividendswasalmostsurelytheclassicpaperMillerandModigliani(1961),whichfirstproposeddividendirrelevance.Essentially,theirmodelisaone-periodmodelundercertainty.Givenafirm’sinvestmentprogram,thedividendpolicyofthefirmisirrelevanttothefirmvalue,sinceahigherdividendwouldnecessitatemoresaleofstocktoraisefinancesfortheinvestmentprogram.Thecrucialassumptionhereisthatthefuturemarketvaluewillremainunaffectedbycurrentdividends.@#@Theargumentrestsontheassumptionsthattheinvestmentprogramisdeterminedindependentlyandthateverystockholderearnsthesamereturn(i.e.thediscountrateremainsconstant).MillerandModigliani’sdividend-irrelevanceargumentiselegant,butthisdoesnotexplainwhycompanies,thepublic,investmentanalystsaresointerestedindividendannouncements.Clearly,theobservedinterestindividendannouncementmustberelatedtosomeviolationoftheMillerandModiglianiassumptions.MillerandModigliani,whileformulatingtheirfamousdividendirrelevancepropositions,observedthatinthepresenceoftaxation,investorswillformclienteleswithspecificpreferencesforparticularlevelsofdividendyields.Thisspecificpreferencefordividendsmaybedetermined,interalia,bythemarginaltaxratesfacedbytheinvestor.Alteringthedividendlevel,accordingtoMillerandModigliani,leadsonlytoachangeintheclienteleofshareholdersforthefirm.Partofthedividendpuzzlearisesfromthefactthatdividendsaretypicallytaxedatahigherratecomparedtotheincomefromcapitalgains.Thishascertainlybeenhistoricallytruealthoughinrecentyearswehavenoticedamovetoeliminate/reducetaxondividends.Weshould,therefore,expectinvestorstoprefercashfromcapitalgainsovercashfromdividends.@#@MillerandScholes(1978)provideaningeniousschemetoconvertdividendincometocapitalgainsincome.RecentlyAllenetal.(2000)haveadvancedatheorybasedontheclienteleparadigmtoexplainwhysomefirmspaydividendsandothersrepurchaseshares.AvariantoftheclienteletheoryhasalsobeenadvancedbyBaker(2004)wheretheypositthatdividendpaymentsareinresponsetodemandsfrominvestorsfordividends.@#@3.Informationalasymmetryandsignallingmodels@#@DeviationsfromtheMillerandModigliani(1961)dividendirrelevancepropositionisobtainableonlywhentheassumptionsunderlyingthesettingofMillerandModiglianiareviolated.Thetax-clientelehypothesisusesthemarketimperfectionofdifferentialtaxationofdividendsandcapitalgainstoexplainthedividendpuzzle.Bhattacharyya(1979)developsanotherexplanationforthedividendpolicybasedonasymmetricinformation.Managershaveprivateknowledgeaboutthedistributionalsupportoftheprojectcashflowandtheysignalthisknowledgetothemarketthroughtheirchoiceofdividends.@#@Inthesignallingequilibriumhighervalueofthesupportissignalledbyhigherdividend.Inotherwords,thebetterthenews,thehigheristhedividend.Heinkel(1978)considersasetupwheredifferentfirmshavedifferentreturn-generatingabilities.Thisinformationistransmittedtothemarketbymeansofdividends,orequivalently,frominvestingatlessthanthefirstbestlevel.IntheequilibriumofHeinkel’smodel,thefirmwithlessproductivityinvestsuptoitsfirstbestlevelanddeclaresnodividend,whilethefirmwithhigherproductivityinvestslessthanitsfirstbestlevelofinvestment,anddeclaresthedifferencebetweentheamountraisedandtheamountinvestedasthedividend.Thefirmwithhigherproductivityactsinthiswayinordertodistinguishitselffromthefirmwithlessproductivity.DividendsarestillirrelevantinthesensethatbothfirmtypescouldraiseanextraXdollarswithanewissuetopayanextraXdollarsasadividendwithnosignallingeffect.Thesignallingcostinthismodelcomesfromreducedinvestmentfromfirstbestlevel.Incontrast,thesignallingcostinBhattacharyya(1979)comesfromtaxationandnon-symmetriccostofraisingfundsinthecapitalmarket.BhattacharyyaandHeinkel’sworkwasfollowedbyanumberofotherpaperswhichpositedthatdividendsareusedbymanagerstotransmitinformationtothecapitalmarket.@#@NotableworksinsignallingparadigmofdividendpolicyarethoseofMillerandRock(1985),JohnandWilliams(1985)andWilliams(1988).Thesesignallingmodelstypicallycharacterizetheinformationalasymmetrybybestowingthemanagerortheinsiderwithinformationaboutsomeaspectofthefuturecashflow.Inthesignallingequilibriumsobtainedinthesemodels,thehighertheexpectedcashflow,thehigheristhedividend.InMillerandRock(1985),thesignallingcostistheopportunitycostoflessthanfirstbestinvestment.InJohnandWilliams(1985),andWilliams(1988),thedifferentialtaxationofdividendsvis-a-viscapitalgainssustainsthesignallingequilibriums.Inthesepapersdividendssustainafullyseparatingequilibrium.Bycontrast,Kumar(1988)demonstratesthatdividendscouldalsosustainasemi-separatingequilibriumwherethemanagerhasprivateinformationabouttheproductivityofthefirm.Venezia(1991)setuparationalequilibriumexpectationmodel.Bayesianinvestorsexpectthatdividendswillbeproportionaltocashflows.Managershaveadvancenoisyinformationaboutthefuturecashflow.Theinvestorsobservethedividendandupdatetheirbeliefaboutthecashflow.Underthesecircumstances,Veneziashowthattheoptimaldividendisproportionaltothecashflow.BrennanandThakor(1990)focusonadifferentquestioncomparedtotheothersignallingtypepapersondividendpolicy.Mostdividendpolicypapersmodelthedividenddecision,asadecisionabouttheamounttobedistributedasdividends.Incontrast,thispaperviewstheamountofcashtobedistributedasexogenouslygiven.Itconsiderthreeformsofdisbursement:
@#@dividebddeclaration,non-proportionatesharerepurchasethroughopenmarketoperation,andnon-proportionatesharerepurchasethroughtenderoffer.BrennanandThakorassumethattherearetwoclassesofshareholders–informedanduninformed.Theyshowthatinatenderoffer,theuninformedshareholderalwaystenders,whereastheinformedholdsontohis/hershares.Thesituationisreversedinanopenmarketoperation,wheretheinformedshareholderalwayssellhis/herholdingandtheuninformedneverdoes.@#@4.Freecashflowhypothesis@#@Therichtheoreticaldevelopmentinmodellingdividendsassignalsofprivatemanagerial/entrepreneurialinformationalsogaverisetoempiricalresearchseekingtodeterminethefitofthesignallingtheorytorealworlddata.Typically,theempiricalliteratureattemptedtotestthesignallingparadigmcounterpoisedagainstanalternativerationalefordividendsadvancedbyJensen(1986),basedontheprincipal-agentframework.Accordingtothisframework,dividendsareusedbyshareholdersasadevicetoreduceoverinvestmentbymanagers.Themanagerscontrolthefirm;@#@therefore,theymightinvestcashinprojectswithnegativenetpresentvalues,butwhichincreasethepersonalutilityofthemanagersinsomeway.Adividendreducesthisfreecashflowandthusreducesthescopeforoverinvestment.ThetwomostcitedworksinthisgenrearethepapersbyEasterbrook(1984)andbyJensen(1986).Unfortunately,neitherofthesepaperstrytomodelthesituation;@#@rather,theyputforwardplausiblehypotheses.Ontheonehand,Easterbrook(1984)hypothesizesthatdividendsareusedtotakeawaythefreecashfromthecontrolofthemanagersandpayitofftoshareholders.Thisensuresthatthemanagerswillhavetoapproachthecapitalmarketinordertomeetthefundingneedsfornewprojects.Theneedtoapproachthecapitalmarketsimposesadisciplineonthemanagers,andthusreducesthecostofmonitoringthemanagers.Additionally,Easterbrookhypothesizesthattheimperativetoapproachthecapitalmarketalsoactsasacounterweighttothemanagers’ownriskaversion.Jensen(1986)ontheotherhand,contendsthatincorporationswithlargecashflows,managerswillhaveatendencytoinvestinlowreturnprojects.AccordingtoJensen,debtcountersthisbytakingawaythefreecashflow.Jensencontendsthattakeoversandmergerstakeplacewheneithertheacquirerhasalargequantumoffreecashflowortheacquiredhasalargefreecashflowwhichhasnotbeenpaid
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