环境信息披露的规范理论分析外文翻译Word文档下载推荐.docx
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环境信息披露的规范理论分析外文翻译Word文档下载推荐.docx
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原文:
InformationDisclosureasEnvironmentalRegulation:
ATheoreticalAnalysis
Abstract
Governmentsaroundtheworldarebeginningtoembraceanewformofenvironmentalregulation–mandatorydisclosureofinformation.Whileinformationdisclosureprogramsappeartohaveanimpactonsubsequentfirmbehavior-oftenresultinginlowerlevelsofpollution-littleisknownaboutthecostsandbenefitsoftheseprogramsandwhetherornottheyenhancesocialwelfare.Thispaperpresentsasimplebargainingmodelwheremandatoryinformationdisclosureisusedtoovercomealackofinformationonthepartofthepublic.Wecharacterizetheconditionsunderwhichinformationdisclosurewillleadtoareductioninemissions,andultimately,theconditionsunderwhichitwillenhancesocialwelfare.Severalextensionsofthemodelarebrieflyexplored,includingtheeffectoftwosourcesofpollution-onlyoneofwhichissubjecttoinformationdisclosure
1.Introduction
Governmentsaroundtheworldarebeginningtoembraceanewformofenvironmentalregulation–mandatorydisclosureofinformation.Perhapsthebest-knownexampleistheToxicReleaseInventory(TRI)programintheU.S.,wherebyfirmsarerequiredtodiscloselegallyemittedchemicalreleases.TRIhasbroughtaboutsignificantreductionsinchemicalemissions.Forexample,totalon-siteandoff-sitereleasesoftoxicemissionsarereportedlydownby45.5%between1988and1999(EPA,2001:
TableE-6).Otherdisclosureprogramshavefocusedondrinkingwatersafetyandriskmanagementplansforchemicalreleases.1Similarprogramshavebeeninstitutedinothercountriesandcontexts,includingIndia,Indonesia,Philippines,Colombia,MexicoandBrazil(Afsah,LaplanteandWheeler,1996).
Themechanismsbywhichinformationdisclosureprogramsleadtoreductionsinpollutionarevariedandstillbeingstudied(seee.g.,Maxwell,LyonandHackett,2000;
andKonarandCohen,2000).Dependingonthecontext,consumersmaydecidetoreduceorwithdrawfromconsumingtheproductofafirmthatisahighpolluter.Investorsmayshunthestockoffirmsthatarefoundtobehighpolluters–eitherthroughsociallyactiveinvestmentdecisionsorbyanassessmentthathighlypollutingfirmswillultimatelybelessprofitable.Victims2maybringaboutpressureonpollutingfirmstoreduceemissionsbypicketing,lobbyinglocalzoningboardsformorestringentrestrictions,pressuringgovernmentenforcementagenciestoscrutinizelargepollutersmorecarefully,orcallingfornewregulations.Theymightalsosuefordamagesundervarioustheoriesoftortlaw.
Regardlessofthemechanism,informationdisclosureprogramsappeartohaveanimpactonsubsequentfirmbehavior.Tietenberg(1998)hascharacterizedinformationdisclosureasbeingthethirdwaveofenvironmentalregulation–followingtheoriginalcommandandcontrolapproachandthesubsequentintroductionofmarket-basedincentivessuchasemissionfeesandmarketablepermits.Informationdisclosureprogramshavebeenwidelytoutedbypolicymakersfornumerousreasons.Oneobviousbenefitisthefactthatinformationdisclosurehasbeenfoundtoresultinsignificantimprovementsinenvironmentalquality.Inaddition,however,informationdisclosureprogramssatisfythedemocraticbeliefthatthepublichasa‘righttoknow’thattheymightbeaffectedbythirdpartypollution.Onamorepracticallevel,informationdisclosureprogramsaregenerallythoughttocostthegovernmentfarlessthandraftingandimplementingindustrywideregulations.Asaresultofthesepresumedbenefits,informationdisclosureprogramsmightalsobepoliticallymorefeasiblethannewcoerciveregulations.
Despitethesepresumedbenefits,informationdisclosureprogramsarenotfree.Aswithanygovernmentpolicy,theyshouldbesubjecttothescrutinyofacost-benefitanalysis.Thebenefitsareobvious–improvementsintheenvironmentthatarepresumablyvaluedbysomemembersofsociety.Onthecostside,informationdisclosurerequiressomeamountofgovernmentrule-makingalongwithdatacollection,verification,anddissemination.Firmsalsoincurthecostsofcollectinganddisseminatingdataandpresumablyincurthecostsofanyvoluntarypollutionreduction.Consumergroupsandothernon-governmentalgroupsthatexertpressureonpollutingfirmstoreducetheiremissionsalsoincurcosts–thecostofcollectiveaction,lobbying,litigation,etc.Thesecostssubstitutetosomeextentforthesavingsfromreducedgovernmentmonitoringandenforcement.Finally,thereisanotherpotentialcostassociatedwithinformationdisclosureprograms–theopportunitycostofforegonepollutionreductionbenefitsoutsidetheindustry/pollutantsubjecttoinformationdisclosure.Thatis,byplacingattentionononeformofpollution,amandatorydisclosureprogrammightdiverttheattentionandlimitedresourcesofconsumer,community,andenvironmentalgroupsawayfromotherformsofpollutionthatmightbeworsethan–and/orlessexpensivetocontrolthan–thepollutantsubjecttoinformationdisclosureregulation.Worseyet,itispossiblethatinformationdisclosureprogramsmayresultinnonetbenefitinenvironmentalquality–andevenaworsening–totheextentthatfirmssubstituteoneformofpollutionforanother.
Todate,virtuallyalloftheliteratureoninformationdisclosurehasbeenempirical–eitherdemonstratingtheaggregateeffectofaninformationdisclosureprogramonemissionsorattemptingtocharacterizethemechanismsbywhichinformationdisclosureleadstotheseemissionreductions.ExamplesincludeHamilton(1995),KonarandCohen(1997and2000),Khanna,QuimioandBojilova(1998),andMaxwell,LyonandHackett(2000).Inspiteofthisgrowingliteratureoninformationdisclosure,noattempthasbeenmadetotheoreticallyanalyze.
2.Bargainingbetweenpolluterandvictim:
Theimpactofvictim’signoranceofhisdamage
Theproblemweareconsideringissimilarto–butnottypicalof–aCoaseanbargainingmodelwithasymmetricinformation(seeCoase,1960;
andHuberandWirl,1998).Inastandardasymmetricinformationproblem,thevictimknowsthedamagecausedbypollution,butdoesnotknowthecostofpollutioncontrol.However,inthismodel,thevictimdoesnotknowthedamage.Shemayormaynotknowthecostofpollutioncontrol.
Considertheproblemofasinglepolluterwhosepollutioncausesdamagetoasinglevictim.LetDbethedamageandCbethecostofcontrollingpollution.Thus,onecancharacterizethestateofknowledgebasedonacombinationoffourparameters,{(D,C);
(D,C)}wherethefirstpairisthestateofknowledgeofthepolluterandthesecondcharacterizestheknowledgeofthevictim.Thus,forexample,{(0,1);
(1,0)}indicatesthatthepolluterknowshiscosts(butnotthedamagetovictim)andthevictimknowsherdamage(butnotthecost).Weexplorevariouspossiblestatesofknowledge,wherebythevictimmightormightnotknoweitherDorC.Thepolluteralwaysknowsthecostofabatement,C.Althoughwealsoassumethatthepolluteralwaysknowshowmuchpollutionisbeinggenerated,wedonotassumethatthepolluteralwaysknowsthefunctionalrelationshipbetweenpollutionanddamages.Inotherwords,itispossiblethatthepolluterdoesnotknowthedamagecausedbyhispollutionevenifthevictimdoes.
3、ExtensionsoftheModel
Ourresultsthusfarassumenotransactionscosts,onlyonepolluterandonevictim.Whileweleaveextensivemodelingtofutureresearch,inthissection,webrieflyexploresomeoftheobviousextensionsofthemodelandprovideconjecturesabouttheirimplications.
3.1.InformationDisclosurewithTransactionsCosts
Ourmodelassumedzerotransactionscostsandefficiencyhasbeendefinedsolelyintermsofcostlessbargaining.Inreality,therecanbenumerousformsoftransactionscostsincludingthecostofnegotiation,monitoringtoensurethattheprovisionsofanycontractareadheredto,andenforcement/punishmentcoststothegovernmenttoensurethatinformationishonestlydisclosed.Introducingtransactionscostsintothebargainingprocessreducesthelikelihoodthatinformationdisclosureprogramswillresultinpollutionreductions.Ofcourse,thehigherexpectedpollutionis,themorethevictimiswillingtodevoteresourcestobargainingforreducedpollution.Oneoftheobviousimplicationsofthisextensionisthatceterisparibus,wewouldexpectinformationdisclosureprogramstoworkbestincommunitiesthatarebetterofffinanciallyorareendowedwitharelativeabundanceoftime(i.e.havealowopportunitycostoftime).Thesecommunitieswillhavetheresourcestobargainand/orpressurefirmstoreducepollution.
3.2.MultiplePollutersorTypesofPollution
Wealsoassumedonlyonepolluterandonetypeofpollution.Iftherearetwopolluterswithdifferentcoststructures,ortwotypesofpollutionwithdifferentdamages,thegovernmentmustdecidewhethertorequiredisclosureofallpollutiontypesand/orallsources.Ifthegovernmentarbitrarilydecidestoimposeaninformationdisclosureprogramononepolluterbutnottheother,itispossiblethatthiswilldistorttheexpectedbenefitsofpollutionreductioninsuchamannerthatthevictimwillnowbargainwiththewrongfirmforpollutionreductions.Thiscouldworkineitherdirection.Forexample,supposetherearetwotypesofpollution,P1andP2.IfinformationdisclosuresuggeststhatdamagesfromP1areworsethanthevictimthought,shemightshiftresourcestothatpollutionsourceeventhoughatthemarginshewouldprefertoreduceP2ifshehadbetterinformation.Similarly,iftheinformationdisclosuresuggeststhatdamagesfromP1arelessthanthevictimthought,shemightshi
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- 关 键 词:
- 环境 信息 披露 规范 理论 分析 外文 翻译
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