股权激励外文文献中英对照Word文件下载.docx
- 文档编号:17585503
- 上传时间:2022-12-07
- 格式:DOCX
- 页数:11
- 大小:28.06KB
股权激励外文文献中英对照Word文件下载.docx
《股权激励外文文献中英对照Word文件下载.docx》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《股权激励外文文献中英对照Word文件下载.docx(11页珍藏版)》请在冰豆网上搜索。
1.INTRODUCTION
PaststudieshavebroughttolightthedissimilaritiesinthepaypackagesofmanagersinAnglo-Saxoncountriesascomparedwithothernations(e.g.,Bebchuk,FriedandWalker,2002;
CheffinsandThomas,2004;
Zattoni,2007).IntheUKand,aboveallintheUS,remunerationencompassesavarietyofcomponents,andshortandlongtermvariablepaycarriesmoreweightthanelsewhere(ConyonandMurphy,2000).Inothercountries,however,fixedwageshavealwaysbeenthemainingredientintopmanagers’payschemes.Overtime,variableshort-termpayhasbecomemoresubstantialandtheimpactoffringebenefitshasgraduallygrown.Notwithstanding,incentiveslinkedtoreachingmediumtolong-termcompanygoalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(TowersPerrin,2000).
Inrecentyears,however,paypackagesofmanagershaveundergoneanappreciablechangeasvariablepayhasincreasedconsiderably,evenoutsidetheUSandtheUK.Inparticular,managersinmostcountrieshaveexperiencedanincreaseinthevariablepayrelatedtolong-termgoals.Withinthecontextofthisgeneraltrendtowardmediumandlong-termincentives,thereisapronouncedtendencytoadoptplansinvolvingstocksorstockoptions(TowersPerrin,2000;
2005).Thedriversofthediffusionoflongtermincentiveplansseemtobesomerecentchangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironmentatthelocalandgloballevels.ParticularlyimportanttriggersoftheconvergencetowardtheUSpayparadigmarebothmarketorienteddrivers,suchastheevolvingshareownershippatternsortheinternationalizationofthelabormarket,andlaw-orienteddrivers,suchascorporateortaxregulation(CheffinsandThomas,2004).Drivenbythesechangesintheinstitutionalandmarketenvironment,weobserveaglobaltrendtowardthe“Americanizationofinternationalpaypractices,”characterizedbyhighincentivesandverylucrativecompensationmechanisms(e.g.,Cheffins,2003;
CheffinsandThomas,2004).
Ironically,thespreadoftheUSpayparadigmaroundtheworldhappenswhenitishotlydebatedathome.Inparticular,thecriticsareconcernedwithboththelevelofexecutivecompensationpackagesandtheuseofequityincentiveplans(CheffinsandThomas,2004).CriticsstressedthatUStopmanagers,andparticularlytheCEOs,receiveverylucrativecompensationpackages.The’80sand’90ssawanincreasingdisparitybetweenCEO’spayandthatofrank-and-fileworkers.Thankstothiseffect,theirdirectcompensationhasbecomeahundredtimesthatofanaverageemployee(HallandLiebman,1998).ThemaindeterminantsoftheincreasinglevelofCEOs’andexecutives’compensationareannualbonusesand,aboveall,stockoptiongrants(ConyonandMurphy,2000).Stockoptionplanshaverecentlybeencriticizedbyscholarsandpublicopinionbecausetheycharacteristicallyaretoogenerousandsymptomaticofamanagerialextractionofthefirm’svalue(Bebchuketal.,2002;
BebchukandFried,2006).
Inlightoftheserecenteventsandoftheincreasedtendencytoadoptequityincentiveplans,thispaperaimsatunderstandingthereasonsbehindthedisseminationofstockoptionandstockgrantingplansoutsidetheUSandtheUK.ThechoicetoinvestigatethisphenomenoninItalyreliesonthefollowingarguments.First,thelargemajorityofpreviousstudiesanalyzetheevolutionofexecutivecompensationandequityincentiveplansintheUSand,toasmallerextent,intheUK.Second,ownershipstructureandgovernancepracticesincontinentalEuropeancountriesaresubstantiallydifferentfromtheonesinAnglo-Saxoncountries.Third,continentalEuropeancountries,andItalyinparticular,almostignoredtheuseoftheseinstrumentsuntiltheendofthe’90s.
Ourgoalistocomparetheexplanatorypowerofthreecompetingviewsonthediffusionofequityincentiveplans:
1)theoptimalcontractingview,whichstatesthatcompensationpackagesaredesignedtominimizeagencycostsbetweenmanagersandshareholders(JensenandMurphy,1990);
2)therentextractionview,whichstatesthatpowerfulinsidersmayinfluencethepayprocessfortheirownbenefit(Bebchuketal.,2002);
and3)theperceived-costview(HallandMurphy,2003),whichstatesthatcompaniesmayfavorsomecompensationschemesfortheir(supposedorreal)costadvantages.
Tothispurpose,weconductedanempiricalstudyonthereasonswhyItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentiveplanssincetheendofthe’90s.Togainadeepunderstandingofthephenomenon,wecollecteddataandinformationbothontheevolutionofthenationalinstitutionalenvironmentinthelastdecadeandonthediffusionandthecharacteristics(i.e.,technicalaspectsandobjectives)ofequityincentiveplansadoptedbyItalianlistedcompaniesin1999and2005.Weusedbothlogitmodelsanddifference-of-meansstatisticaltechniquestoanalyzedata.Ourresultsshowthat:
1)firmsize,andnotitsownershipstructure,isadeterminantoftheadoptionoftheseinstruments;
2)theseplansarenotextensivelyusedtoextractcompanyvalue,althoughafewcasessuggestthispossibility;
and3)plans’characteristicsareconsistentwiththeonesdefinedbytaxlawtoreceivespecialfiscaltreatment.
Ourfindingscontributetothedevelopmentoftheliteratureonboththerationalesbehindthespreadingofequityincentiveschemesandthediffusionofnewgovernancepractices.Theyshow,infact,thatequityincentiveplanshavebeenprimarilyadoptedtotakeadvantageoflargetaxbenefits,andthatinsomeoccasionstheymayhavebeenusedbycontrollingshareholderstoextractcompanyvalueattheexpenseofminorityshareholders.Inotherwords,ourfindingssuggestthatItalianlistedcompaniesadoptedequityincentiveplanstoperformasubtleformofdecoupling.Ontheonehand,theydeclaredthatplanswereaimedtoalignshareholders’andmanagers’interestsandincentivevaluecreation.Ontheotherhand,thankstothelackoftransparencyandpreviousknowledgeabouttheseinstruments,companiesusedthesemechanismstotakeadvantageoftaxbenefitsandsometimesalsotodistributealargeamountofvaluetosomepowerfulindividuals.Theseresultssupportasymbolicperspectiveoncorporategovernance,accordingtowhichtheintroductionofequityincentiveplanspleasestakeholders–fortheirimplicitalignmentofinterestsandincentivetovaluecreation–withoutimplyingasubstantiveimprovementofgovernancepractices.
2.CorporateGovernanceinItalianListedCompanies
Italiancompaniesaretraditionallycontrolledbyalargeblockholder(Zattoni,1999).Banksandotherfinancialinstitutionsdonotownlargeshareholdingsanddonotexertasignificantinfluenceongovernanceoflargecompanies,atleastasfarastheyareabletorepaytheirfinancialdebt(Bianchi,BiancoandEnriques,2001).Institutionalinvestorsusuallyplayamarginalrolebecauseoftheirlimitedshareholding,theirstrictconnectionswithItalianbanks,andaregulatoryenvironmentthatdoesnotofferincentivesfortheiractivism.Finally,thestockmarketisrelativelysmallandundeveloped,andthemarketforcorporatecontrolisalmostabsent(Bianco,2001).Inshort,theItaliangovernancesystemcanbedescribedasasystemof“weakmanagers,strongblockholders,andunprotectedminorityshareholders”(Melis,2000:
354).
Theboardofdirectorsistraditionallyonetier,butashareholders’generalmeetingmustappointalsoaboardofstatutoryauditorsaswellwhosemaintaskistomonitorthedirectors’performance(Melis,2000).Further,somestudiespublishedinthe’90sshowedthattheboardofdirectorswasundertherelevantinfluenceoflargeblockholders.Bothinsideandoutsidedirectorswereinfactrelatedtocontrollingshareholdersbyfamilyorbusinessties(Melis,1999;
2000;
Molteni,1997).
Consistentwiththispicture,fixedwageshavebeenthemainingredientoftopmanagers’remuneration,andincentiveschemeslinkedtoreachingmediumtolongtermcompanygoalshaveneverbeenwidelyused(Melis,1999).EquityincentiveschemesadoptedbyItaliancompaniesissuestockstoallemployeesunconditionallyforthepurposeofimprovingthecompanyatmosphereandstabilizingthesharevalueontheStockExchange.Onlyveryfewcanbecomparedwithstockoptionplansinthetruesenseoftheterm.Eveninthiscase,however,directorsandtopmanagerswererarelyevaluatedthroughstockreturns,becauseofthesupposedlimitedabilityoftheItalianstockmarkettomeasurefirm’sperformance(Melis,1999).
3.TheEvolutionofItalianInstitutionalContext
TheinstitutionalcontextinItalyhasevolvedradicallyinthelastdecade,creatingthepossibilityforthedisseminationofequityincentiveplans.Themainchangesregardedthedevelopmentofcommerciallaw,theintroductionandupdatingofthecodeofgoodgovernance,theissueofsomereportsencouragingtheuseofequityincentiveplans,andtheevolutionofthetaxlaw(Zattoni,2006).
Concerningthenationallawandregulations,somereformsinthecommerciallaw(1998,2003,and2005)andtheintroduction(1999)andupdate(2002)ofthenationalcodeofgoodgovernancecontributedtotheimprovementofthecorporategovernanceoflistedcompanies(Zattoni,2006).FinancialmarketsandcorporatelawreformsimprovedtheefficiencyoftheStockExchangeandcreatedaninstitutionalenvironmentmorefavorabletoinstitutionalinvestors’activism(BianchiandEnriques,2005).Atthesametimetheintroductionandupdateofthecodeofgoodgovernancecontributedtotheimprovementofgovernancepracticesattheboardlevel.ThesereformsdidnotproduceanimmediateeffectongovernancepracticesofItalianlistedcompanies,alt
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- 股权 激励 外文 文献 中英对照