会计学院入选分论坛文章学术论文Word文档格式.docx
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会计学院入选分论坛文章学术论文Word文档格式.docx
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Analyzingthestrategies’choiceontheinteractionbetweenthegovernmentregulatorsandgroupsofresearcherswiththeevolutionarygametheory,amodelofasymmetricgamebetweenthemissetupandthesteadystateofthemonitoringactivityunderthisconditionisanalysed.Atthesametime,thedecisionsbetweenthegovernmentregulatorsandgroupsofresearchersarediscussedandsomesuggestionsaboutscientificresearchfundssupervisionaregiven.
Keywords:
scientificresearchfunds;
evolutionarygame;
duplicativedynamic;
supervisionmechanism
基于复制动态的科研经费流失监管演化博弈分析
酒莉莉,曾冰
(重庆理工大学会计学院,重庆,400054)
摘要:
利用演化博弈论的方法对政府监管部门和科研人员群体之间相互作用时的策略进行了分析,建立了监管部门与科研人员之间的非对称博弈模型,并对该条件下科研经费流失的稳定状态进行分析,讨论政府监管方与科研人员在相互作用的过程中决策的选择,并提出关于科研经费的保障建议。
关键词:
科研经费监管;
演化博弈;
复制动态;
监管机制
1Introduction
AsChinesegovernmentsenhanceinvestmentsinscienceandtechnology,theprojectfundsscientificresearchinstitutionsaskforhavebeenontheincreasecontinually,whichmakessourcesoffundsdiverseandmulti-layered.Nevertheless,multitudesofresearchfundstendnottobetransferredintoproductiveforcesandexampleslikethatamulti-millionresearchprojectonlyproducesseveralpoorpapersareextremelynumerous.Itisnoteworthythatthereexistsmanyproblems,suchaslackingofopenness,seriousabuse,notenoughsupervision,inourusemechanismofscientificresearchfunds.Alargenumberoflivingexampleshavebroughtusawake-upcall,andblockingthe"
blackhole"
ofresearchfundslossissuchapressingthingthatwecannotwait.
Thispaperanalysesthelossandsupervisionbehavioursofresearchfunds,andsetupamodelofevolutionarygameanalysisbetweengovernmentregulatorsandgroupsofresearcherswiththeevolutionarygametheory.Meanwhile,thesteadystateundertheconditionofbothsidesinterconnectingandbindingeachothertomakethefairuseofthefundsisanalysed.
2EvolutionaryGameAnalysis
2.1AsymmetricGameModel
Evolutionarygamedynamicsistheapplicationofpopulationdynamicalmethodstogametheory.Ithasbeenintroducedbyevolutionarybiologists,anticipatedinpartbyclassicalgametheorists(JosefHofbauer;
KarlSigmund,2003).
Theparties(thegovernmentregulatorsandresearchers)bothhavetwokindsofstrategies:
thegovernmentregulatorscantakestrictorminorsupervisionstrategy,whileresearcherschooseabidanceorfraudtacticstotheregulation.Asneitherofthemdoselectionsimultaneously,northeirstrategicchoiceandprofitareasymmetric,therecomestoaasymmetricgame.Onthebasisofnon-cooperativerepeatedgame,Table1showstherelevantpayoffmatrix
Strategy
GovernmentalRegulators
Strictsupervision(x)
Minorsupervision(1-x)
Researchers
Abidance(y)
D-B,-A
D-B,0
Fraud(1-y)
-E,E-A
0,-G
Table1Asymmetricgamemodelbetweengovernmentregulatorsandresearchers
Table1showsthemonitoringcostofgovernmentregulatorsisA.Regulatorscan'
ttakeaeffectivesupervisionforthecostlimit,whilechecktheperformanceatacertainprobability"
x"
;
Meanwhile,iftheresearchershaveagoodsenseofacademicethicsandlegalliteracy,theychooseabidancetacticsnomattertheregulatorscheckthemornot,whichgivesrisetolossofsomeillegalincome"
B"
andacquisitionofreputationbenefits"
D"
wedefineitsprobabilityas"
y"
Ifresearchersengageingoingafterillegalbenefitsandwealth,weregardthehugefinealongwithlossofsocialimageas"
E"
oncetheywerediscoveredbyregulators;
Inaddition,ifregulatorsmakesupervisionbecomeamereformality,yetresearchersneglecttheriskofliabilityarisingfromirregularitiesaswell,allthesebringaboutsocialcostas"
C"
andnegativereturnsforregulatorsas"
G"
.
Scientificresearchersincontemporarysocietyareuniversallyshortofmoralconsciousnessandacademicself-restraint,also,governmentadministratorsdonotimplementseverepunishmenttothisbehaviourofresearchpersonnel'
simproperuseoffundsandignorethelossofreputationderivingfromtheirirresponsiblemannerthatmakeGsmaller.Insuchcircumstances,therealwaysexistsG<
A-E.Bynow,(Fraud,Minorsupervision)reachaNashequilibrium,andthisistheparticularlysameascurrentsituation.Itisimportanttonotethatthisiswhatweurgentlywanttoworkoutandwehavetochangesuchasituation.Theauthortablesasuggestionthatthereferredsocialcost"
shouldbebornbytheregulators.Normally,thenegativereturnscausedbysocialcost"
isfarmorethantheregulatoryagencies'
monitoringcost"
A"
thereexistsC>
A>
A-E.Throughthismethod,regulatorswillbepromotedtoincreasemonitoringeffortsandconstraintresearchers'
illegalproceedsbehaviourwithvariousmeans.Theasymmetricgamemodelbetweenbothsidesisdepictedinthefollowingtable:
GovernmentalRegulators
0,-C-G
Table2Payoffmatrixbetweenregulatorsandresearchersunderaasymmetricgamemodel
2.2EvolutionaryAnalysisofBehaviourChoicesbetweentheRegulatorsandResearchers
Mostpeoplealwaystakeactionsbyintuitionorimitatingothersuccessstoriesundertheboundedrationalityconditionwhenthey'
reconfrontedwithcomplicatedproblems,whichisacontinuousprocessofseekingandstudyingfortheinitialstrategymaynotbethebestone.Intheprocess,theproportionofhigh-profitstrategygroupskeepsarisinguntilitcomestoESS.
Table2showstheexpectedrevenueofresearchersasfollows:
abidancestrategy:
+
fraudtactic:
theaverageexpectedrevenueofresearchers:
(1)
While,theexpectedrevenueofregulatorsshouldbe:
strictstrategy:
minorstrategy:
thentheaverageexpectedrevenueofregulatorsis:
(2)
Consequently,theresearchers'
replicateddynamicequationfortheactionofmisusefundsis
(3)
Makedy/dt=0,weget
InaccordancewiththestabilitytheoremofdifferentialequationandnatureofESS,whenthereisF'
(y*)<
0,y*istheevolutionarystablestrategy.Thefollowingchartrespectivelyshowsdifferentdynamictendencyindifferentsituations.
Chart1Replicateddynamicphasediagramofresearchersinasymmetricgamemodel
Whenx*comesto
F(y)getstobe0consistentlyandwecanconsideritasthis:
assoonasregulators'
supervisionarrivesatx*,theinitialproportionoftheattitudes(properuseorimproperusefunds)ofresearchersisstable.
Whenx<
x*,therealwaysexistsF(y)<
0insection(0,1)andreplicateddynamicequation(3)getstwobalancepoints:
whichleadstoF'
(0)<
0,F'
(1)>
0.Thatmeanswhenthereisx<
x*,
isthesingleESSasawhole.Itispointedoutthatoncethegovernmentalsupervisorstakeweakinspectionontheoppositeside'
sbehaviour,thelegalityofusingfundskeepsdescending.
Whenx>
x*,F(y)>
0insection(0,1)andreplicateddynamicequation(3)stillgetstwobalancepoints:
contemporaneouslyF'
(0)>
0,F'
(1)<
0.Thenwhenthereisx>
istheonlyevolutionarystablestrategy(ESS)overallsituation.Weseeitasthis:
theregulatorsinteractwellwithresearchersandresearcherenhancethelegaluseofscientificfunds,whichattainsParetoOptimalitygradually.
Thenlet'
sdeliberatethegovernmentsideandtheirreplicateddynamicequationgetstobe:
(4)
Make
weget
Still,inlinewiththestabilitytheoremofdifferentialequationandnatureofESS,whenthereisG'
(x*)<
0,x*istheevolutionarystablestrategy(ESS).
When
G(x)alwayskeeps0.Behavioursofcorruptionandwastedonotexistingroupsofresearchers,whichmeanswhenseriousnessofattentioninTable2comesuptoy*,itisstableforregulatorstomonitor.Tofurtherillustratethiskindofdynamictendency,therecomesChart2:
Chart2Replicateddynamicphasediagramofresearchersinasymmetricgamemodel
Whiley>
y*,G(x)>
0insection(0,1),whicharousesequation(4)togetbalancepointsof
simultaneouslyG’(0)>
0,G’
(1)<
0.Wecancometotheconclusionthatundertheconditionofy>
y*,
getstobetheESS.Itissaidthatregulatorswillplayagreatroleinsupervisionundersuchsituationofbothparties'
carryingonperfectly,whichdefinitelyachievesParetoOptimalitygradually.
Wheny<
y*,forthesamereason,
provestobetheESS.Sotospeak,researchers'
poorbehavioursofwasteandillegaluseoffunds,combinedwiththeotherside'
sminorsupervisionandignoranceofthehugeloss,createsanenormousadverseimpactonoursociety.
3ConclusionsandAdvice
3.1Conclusions
Toregulators,ifmonitoringcost"
keepsincreasing,theny*decreases.Inotherwords,thesescientificresearcherswilltakenoaccountbydegreesofthelegalityoftheiractionontheuseofstudyfunds;
Moreover,ifCandGgrowsinnumberofquantitiy,theny*decreases,aswellitcanbeinterpretedasregulatorsenduremorewiththeincrementalexpectationofthepublic,whichresultsinthegovernmentsideenhancingsupervisionandtheoppositesidemakinguptheirmindinaccordancewithregulators:
supposingthatx>
x*,itisabestchoiceforresearcherstoabide,whichgeneratesy*>
0;
Lastbutnotleast,intheeventofE
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