How to kill or save a law schoolWord格式.docx
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How to kill or save a law schoolWord格式.docx
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BackinAugust2010,Iwroteapostcalled“Howtokillalawfirm”thatcontinuestoreceiveasteadystreamoftrafficandresponses.Recently,JohnP.MayeronTwittersuggesteditwastimeforalawschoolversionofthatarticle.Iagree.
Myinterestinapplyingalegaleducationfocustothistopicwasfurtherheightenedbytherecentpublicationoftwoop-edpiecesbylawschooldeans:
ThisonebythedeanofCaseWesternUniversityLawSchoolinTheNewYorkTimesandthisonebythedeanoftheUniversityofOttawaFacultyofLawinCanadianLawyer.YoucanalsoreadthoroughcritiquesofeacharticleatTheGirl’sGuideToLawSchoolandSlaw,respectively.Thearticlesandtheirresponsesneatlyframeboththeenormouschallengesfacinglawschoolsandtheapparentinabilityoftheirleadershiptoappreciatethosechallenges.
Mygoal,Ishouldprobablymakeclear,isnottohelpannihilatelawschoolsacrossCanadaandtheUnitedStates—Ilikelawschools,andIhopetheyprosper.Norismygoaltocreatearoadmapforpotentialcompetitorstocarryoutthatdestruction—believeme,theydon’tneedanyroadmapsketchedoutforthem.Theschoolshaveallbutdrawnuptheblueprintsthemselves,althoughtheydon’trealizeit.
WhatIwanttodoisencouragelawschoolstoparticipateinanexercisearoundcreativedestruction.Iwantthemtothink:
ifanewcompetitorfortheroleoflegaleducationproviderweretotargetus,howwouldtheydoit?
Iftheywantedtoknockusdownandreplaceus,howwouldtheygoaboutit?
Whatweakspotsandvulnerabilitiesinourmodelwouldtheyattack?
Whatmarketneeds,unmetbyus,wouldtheystrivetomeet?
Then,oncethey’veidentifiedtheirstrategicexposures,I’dlikelawschoolstoexploitthosevulnerabilitiesthemselvesfirst,beforetheupstartscandoso.Theworld’smostsuccessfulcompanies,fromGEtoApple,dothisregularly—theysetouttodestroytheirownbusinessbeforeanyoneelsecan.Lawschoolsbadlyneedtodothesame.
Finally,it’sworthexplainingwhoImeanby“competitors.”Mostlawschoolfacultyandadministrationwouldprobablydismissoutrighttheideathattheyhaveanycompetitionatall,exceptforotherlawschoolsthatoperateexactlythesamewaytheydo.Thistunnelvisionitselfqualifiesasamajorvulnerability,butwe’llletthatpass.TheprimarycompetitorsIhaveinmindare:
1low-rankedlawschoolsindangerofclosureandthereforewithnothingtolosefromexperimentation(i.e.,the“fourth-placenetwork”);
2universitiesorotherlicensededucationalinstituteswithoutalawschoolbutseekingtocreateoneclearlydifferentiatedfromthecurrentmodel;
3non-academicbusinesstrainingprovidersalreadyalignedwiththe“practicalskills”demandsofbothstudentsandlawfirmrecruitingdirectors;
and
4thelegalprofessionitself,throughgoverningbodiesorbarassociations,movingtocreatecompetinglegaleducationprogramsgearedtotheirneeds.
Therearealmostcertainlyothersoutthere,especiallyintherapidlyexpandingonlineeducationsphere(SoloPracticeUniversityhasbeenbuildingitsleadthereforseveralyearsnow),butwecanstartwiththesefourbecausethey’reallplausiblepresent-daycandidatesfordisruptivemarketentry.
So,withallthatestablished,let’sstartnotingtheweaknessesinlawschools’currentapproachtothemarket.Asyou’llsee,thereisnoshortage.
1.Price.Thefirstandeasiestpressurepointtoidentifyisthepriceofalawschooleducation,whichatalmosteveryschoolinNorthAmericahasrisenbymultiplesof100%overthepast15-20years.Moreaffordabletuitionwouldbealegitimatedrawingcardforgoodapplicants,andit’sasignoflawschools’cartel-likebehaviourthatfewifanyschoolshavepursuedthispath.
Isitrealistictoexpectachallengertoofferarobustlegaleducationatbelow-marketprices?
Ithinkitis,becausealmostallthefactorsdrivingupthepriceoflawschoolareinstitutional,notcurricular—thatis,theyhaveeverythingtodowithinternaleducationalpoliticsorarbitraryexternalforces,andlittletodowiththequalityandsubstanceofthelawdegreeitself.We’llexaminethesefactorsin#4,below.
2.Faculty.Thesinglegreatestimpedimenttolawschools’abilitytochangeistheirfaculty.Manyifnotmostlawschoolfacultymembershaveheldtheirpositionsfordecadesandarefullyinsulatedfromoutsidepressuresbyvirtueofbothtenureandage-discriminationlaws.Theyareresearchersandpublishersfirst,teacherssecondorthird.Mosthaveneverpractisedlaw(atnumerousschools,morethantwoyearsinalawpracticedisqualifieslawprofessorsfromtenure)andtheyhavenointerestintheBar.Theyfightchangealmostasamatterofcourse.Theyareamillstonearoundthelawschool’sneckwhenitcomestoinnovation.
Itwilltakeatleast5-10yearsforattritiontosolvethisproblematmostschools;
inthattime,newentrantscanmaketheirmove.Legaleducationdisruptorswillidentifyrespectedpractitioners,retiredjudges,andevennon-lawyerexpertstoleadtheircourses.Theywilltraintheseindividualsin21st-centuryteachingmethods,assignthemcourseswithtightlycontrolledsyllabi,andoperateastreamlinedandstrategicallycoherenteducationalsystem.Theywillrecognizethatextensiveacademicpedigree,admirableandworthwhileasitcertainlyis,isneitheranecessarynorasufficientqualificationtoteachthelaw.
3.Curriculum.Closelyrelatedtotheobstacleoffacultyistheconundrumofcurriculum.Thefirst-yearcoursesmandatedforstudentsatmyalmamatertodayarethesameaswhenIenrolled22yearsagoandhavenotchangedsubstantiallysincethe1950s.Themenuofoptionalcourseshasexpandedsignificantly,especiallythosetaughtby“adjunct”(freelance)faculty,butmostarestilldeliveredaslecturesandgradedbyexams,asifeveryoneinvolvedwerestillinjuniorhigh.Buttheprimaryvulnerabilityisandalwayshasbeenthepaucityofcoursesthatstrivetopreparefuturelawyersinsomewayfortheirfirstfewyearsinthemarketplace.
Lawprofessorsarefondofsayingthatit’stheBar’sresponsibilitytopreparestudentsforpractice,notlawschools’.Butthatispreciselythepointtheymiss—itisn’taquestionofresponsibility,butopportunity.Whatcoursesmightaschoolteachthatwoulddifferentiateitfromotherschoolsandprovemoreattractivetobothstudentsandrecruiters?
Whatprogramscoulditcreatethatwouldbridgethegapbetweenbasiclegalknowledgeandinitialprofessionalcompetence?
That’stheopportunitymost(butnotall)schoolscontinuetomiss,andit’sonethatnewproviderswillexploit.
4.Status.Thisis,insomeways,themostimportantvulnerability,becauseitgoestotheheartofthecurrentlegaleducationsystem.Defendersofthelawschoolstatusquowillsaythattheseforegoingpointsareveryniceandall,butthey’realsoirrelevant:
lawschools’abilitytoinnovateisutterlyconstrainedbyexternalfactors.
Twofactorsinparticulardominatetheconversation,intheUnitedStatesatleast:
theABAaccreditationprocessandtheUSNews&
WorldReportrankings.Theformermandatesaminimumamountofinfrastructureinvestmenttoobtainandmaintainaccreditation;
thelatterholdssomuchswayamongapplicantsandrecruitersthatschoolsareforcedtoactfoolishly(andsometimesillegally)tosqueezetheirprogramsintotherankings’pre-definedmould.Athirdfactor,receivingincreasingattentionrecently,istheroleoftheuniversityitself,whichcountsonthelawschoolasasteadyandever-increasingsourceofrevenueandwhichplacesimmensepressureonlawschooladministratorstokeepthemoneyflowingin.
Combinetheseexternalforceswiththeinternalalbatrossesoffacultyself-interestandinstitutionalinertia,thedefenderssay,andthere’snoblaminglawschoolsforactingthewaytheydo.Andperhapsthey’reright.
ButIcantellyouthis:
thatdoesn’tmatteraniotatothedisruptorsthataretargetinglawschoolsrightnow.They’rethrilledtoseesomanyarbitraryconstraintsonlegaleducationincumbents,becausetheycanchoosetobeentirelyfreeofthem.TheycanignoreABAaccreditationortheUSNewsrankingsiftheywish.Theycanrefusetoenteralosinggame,toacceptthesameshacklesthatareparalyzinglawschools.Thinkaboutit:
whywouldtheywanttoacquiretheincumbents’handicaps?
Thebiggestadvantagethatlegaleducationdisruptorshavetodayisthattheycanenterthemarketunencumberedbythelegacyburdensoflawschools.Theydon’thavetobebig,important,recognizedandexpensive—theydon’tneed“status.”Theycanbesmall,modest,flexibleandaffordable—oratleast,theycanstartoffthatway.Theycanaligntheirstrategieswiththeinterestsoftheirtargetmarket,notthoseoftheirteachersortheiraffiliatedacademicinstitutions.TheycannegotiatedirectlywithBaradmissionsofficialsandsatisfythemastoboththeacademicandpracticalmeritsoftheirdegrees.Theydon’tneedtocompeteforall“thebestandthebrightest”applicants,whateverthatmeans:
theycantargetthestudentstheywanttoattractandtheemployers(lawfirms,lawdepartments,governments,individualclients)theywanttoconnectthosestudentswith.
Innovatorsdon’tduplicatetheexistingmodel;
theyimproveit.NonewprivatelegalenterprisetodaywouldcopytheAmLaw200partnershipmodel,andnonewlegaleducationproviderwouldcopyexistinglawschools.Disruptioninlegaleducationispoisedtocomefrominnovatorsthatrejectthestandardassumptionsaboutwhatalegaleducationproviderlo
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