银行信贷标准文献翻译Word文件下载.docx
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银行信贷标准文献翻译Word文件下载.docx
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Bankersandthebusinesspressoftenspeakofcyclesinbankcreditstandards,periodsinwhichbanks’lendingstandardsaretoolax,followedbyperiodsinwhichstandardsaretoostringent.Inthisview,banklendingpoliciestendtoamplifyfluctuationsinGDP;
easymoneyduringtheupturnsowstheseedsoftightmoneyepisodesinthedownturn.
Butthispatternisalsoconsistentwithvariationsinbanklendingdrivenbychangesinborrowers’defaultriskoverthebusinesscycleorchangesinthedemandforloans,whichrisesandfallswithGDP.Tomakesenseoftheideaofalendingcycle,wemustuncoverasystematicreasonforbankstomakeunprofitableloansinanupturnandtoforgotprofitableloansinadownturn.Iemphasizethatthetendencymustbesystematictodistinguishtheideaofacreditcyclefromthetruismthatloansmadenearthepeakofanexpansionaremorelikelytogobadsimplybecausebankers(justlikeeconomistsandotherbusinessmen)havedifficultiespredictingdownturns.
Whatistheevidenceforanindependenteffectforchangingbanklendingstandards—thatis,a
systematicreasonwhybanksmightbetoolaxortoostringent?
Andwhatfactorsmightexplainthistypeofbehavior?
Economistshaveproposedanumberofplausiblemodelsofabanklendingcycle,emphasizingchangesinbankcapital,competition,orherdingbehavior.Todate,onlythechannelrelatingchangesinbankcapitaltolendingstandardshasfirmempiricalsupport.Theavailableevidenceistooweaktogiveusmuchconfidenceinassigninganimportantroleforother
theoriesofbanklendingstandards.
WHATARECREDITSTANDARDS?
Itishelpfultobealittlecleareraboutwhatwemeanbyachangeinbankcreditstandards.Let’sbeginwithastraightforwardprescriptionfrominvestmenttheory:
Aprofitmaximizingbankshouldmakeanyloanwithapositivenetpresentvalue(NPV).TheNPVofaloanisjustthesumofdiscountedfuturerepayments(principalplusinterest)ontheloanminustheloanamount.Futurerepaymentsmustbediscountedfortwodifferentreasons:
First,$10inthebanknowisworthmorethan$10paidayearfromnow.Afterall,thebankcouldreceiveayear’sinterestbypurchasingTreasurybillsonthe$10paidbacktomorrow.Second,thebankrecognizesthattheborrowermaydefaultinthefuture,sothebankmayneverreceivesomefuturepayments.Thefirmmayhaveahealthybalancesheetatthetimetheloanismade;
ayearfromnow,theborrowingfirmmaysufferfinancialsetbacksandmaybeunabletopaybackitsloan.
Usingthisframework,wecandefineachangeinbankcreditstandardsasachangeinabank’sloangrantingdecisionsforsomereasonotherthanachangeintheNPVoftheloan.WecandefineacreditcycleasasystematictendencytofundnegativeNPVloansduringanexpansionandasystematictendencytorejectpositiveNPVloansduringacontraction.Sincebanks’lendingdecisionsalsoinvolvethepricinganddesignofloancontracts,acreditcyclemightalsotaketheformofasystematictendencytorelaxortightenloantermsbymorethanwouldbejustifiedbychangesinborrowerrisk.
Conceptually,itisnottoodifficulttodefineacreditcycle.Empirically,itmaybemuchhardertotellwhetheronehasoccurred.Forexample,thinkaboutsomeofthethingsthathappeninaneconomicdownturn.Aseconomicconditionsbecomemoredifficult,morefirmsexperienceeconomicdifficultiesandtheprobabilitythatafirmwilldefaultincreases.ThisreducestheNPVofagivenstreamofrepaymentsandwouldprobablyinducethebanktoraisetheloanrate,imposenewcontractualrestrictions,orrefusetomaketheloanatall.Whiletheseactionsmightbeinterpretedasatighteningofstandardsbyanoutsideobserverorbyanaggrievedborrower,creditstandardshaven’tchangedaccordingtoourdefinition.
Figures1aand1billustratethedistinctionbetweentheeffectsofatighteningofcreditstandardsandtheeffectsofanincreaseincreditrisk.Figure1ashowsaprobabilitydistributionofloanapplicants’NPVs.Theprofit-maximizingruleforabankistomakealoanaslongasitsNPVispositive(thesumoftheshadedregions).Ifthebanktightensitscreditstandards,forexample,makingonlyloanswithanNPVgreaterthan$A,thebankwillmakeasmallernumberofloans(justthedarkerregion).Figure1billustratestheeffectsofadownturn:
LoansbecomeriskierandthedistributionofNPVsshiftstotheleft.Butthisfigureshowsabankthatretainstheprofit-maximizingrule.Notethatthenumberofloansmadefallsinthiscasealso(fromthesumoftheshadedregionstojustthedarkerregion).
Slightlymoresubtly,inadownturnmanyloansoftengobadatonce.Typically,abankwillchargeaborrowerahigherloanrateiftheborrowerislikelytodefaultatthesametimeasotherborrowersinabank’sportfoliodefault.Toseethis,consideraDetroitbankthathasaportfoliowithahighconcentrationofloanstoautopartssuppliers.Thisbankisevaluatingtwoprospectiveloanswithidenticalprobabilitiesofdefault.Oneoftheloansistoanautopartssupplier,andtheotheristoadepartmentstore.Eventhoughtheprobabilityofdefaultisidenticalforbothprojects,thebankwillnotchargethesamedefaultriskpremiumtoboth.Instead,thebankwillchargeahigherriskpremiumfortheloantotheautopartssupplierbecauseitsperformanceismorehighlycorrelatedwiththerestofthebank’sportfolio.
Takingthisideaastepfurther,economistshavefoundthatfirms’defaultstendtobecorrelated.
Thus,weshouldnotbesurprisedthatabankwoulddemandahigherpremiumfordefaultriskinadownturnascompensationforthehigherprobabilitythatmanyloanswillgobadatthesametime.Althoughthebankhaschargedborrowersahigherpriceforbearingrisk,thisshouldnotbeviewedasachangeincreditstandards.
Inaneconomicdownturn,nonfinancialfirmsalsocutbackoninvestmentsinplantandequipmentandinventories,and,inturn,theycutbackonborrowing.Adeclineinthedemandforloansshouldcertainlynotbeviewedasachangeinbankcreditstandards.
Wecanseetheempiricalchallengeinidentifyinganindependenteffectforlendingstandardsonthequantityofloans.Consideraneconomicdownturn.Inadownturn,defaultriskincreases,risksbecomemorecorrelated,andthedemandforloansdeclines.Noneofthesefactorsreflectsachangeinlendingstandards,butallleadtoadeclineinthequantityofloansmade.Touncoveralendingcycle,theresearchermustfindsomewaytodisentangletheeffectsofchanginglendingstandardsfromtheseothereffects.
THEBROADFACTS
Economistshavedocumentedanumberofempiricalobservationsthatarebroadlyconsistentwiththeexistenceofalendingcycle.Thefirstempiricalobservationisthatdeclinesinbankcapitalareassociatedwithdeclinesinbanklending.BenBernankeandCaraLown(amongmanyothers)havefoundevidencethatlargenegativeshockstobankcapital(suchasthoseexperiencedbybanksinNewEnglandattheendofthe1980s)areassociatedwithdeclinesinbanklending.Therelationshipbetweencapitalandlendingisarobustempiricalfinding,butsincetheweakeconomicconditionsassociatedwithadeclineinbankcapitalarealsoassociatedwithhigherdefaultrisk,morecorrelatedrisks,andadeclineinloandemand,economistshavehadtobeingeniousinprovidingcompellingevidenceforthecapitalchannel(asIdiscussinthenextsection).
Asecondobservationisthewell-documentedflighttoqualityduringeconomicdownturns.For
example,WilliamLangandLeonardNakamurashowthatbankportfoliosshiftfromhigh-tolow-riskloansduringadownturn;
specifically,theyshowthatbankportfoliosshiftawayfromloansmadeabovetheprimerate.Theirfindingisconsistentwithevidencethatduringadownturn,
bankssystematicallyshifttheirportfoliostowardlargerborrowersandtowardborrowerswithpre-existingloancommitments.Whilethesestudiesshedlightonthewaysthatbanklendingmayamplifynegativeeconomicshocks,theobservedportfolioshiftsmaysimplyreflectariseindefaultriskduringaneconomicdownturn,ratherthananindependentroleforlendingstandards,accordingtoourdefinition.Withariseindefaultrisk,someborrowersareshutoutofpublicdebtmarketsandshifttowardbankborrowing,whilebankportfoliosshifttowardlowerriskborrowers.
Athirdobservationisthatloantermsvarysystematicallyoverthebusinesscycleinawaythatmayamplifyeconomicfluctuations.PatrickAseaandAsaBlombergfindthatcommercialloanmarkups(thespreadbetweentheloanrateandtherateonarisklessTreasurysecurity)fallcontinuouslyrightuptothebeginningofarecession.Theirinterpretationofthisfindingisthatcreditstandardsareexcessivelyeasyattheendofanexpansion,sowingtheseedsoffutureportfolioproblems.
JianpingMeiandAnthonySaundersprovideevidenceoftrendchasingbehaviorbybanks.Theyfindthatbanksincreaserealestatelendingwhenpastrealestatereturnsarehigh,butthatbankrealestateinvestmentsareunprofitable,onaverage.Theseresultsareconsistentwithasystematictendencyforexcessivelylaxcreditstandardsduringanexpansion,andtheymayalsobeevidenceofatendencyforbankstoinvestinaherd-likemanner.However,theevidencefromcommerciallendingandrealestatelendingmarketsmaysimplymeanthatbankshavedifficultypredictingadownturn(justlikeeveryoneelse).Thus,banksmaycontinuelendingstronglyevenasthedownturnbegins.
Themostdirectevidenceforadirectroleforbankcreditstandardscomesfromsurveyresults.CaraLownand
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