公司理财第九版课后习题答案(英文word)Word文件下载.doc

公司理财第九版课后习题答案(英文word)Word文件下载.doc

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CorporateFinance

Ross,Westerfield,andJaffe

9thedition

CHAPTER1

INTRODUCTIONTOCORPORATEFINANCE

AnswerstoConceptQuestions

1.Inthecorporateformofownership,theshareholdersaretheownersofthefirm.Theshareholderselectthedirectorsofthecorporation,whointurnappointthefirm‘smanagement.Thisseparationofownershipfromcontrolinthecorporateformoforganizationiswhatcausesagencyproblemstoexist.Managementmayactinitsownorsomeoneelse‘sbestinterests,ratherthanthoseoftheshareholders.Ifsucheventsoccur,theymaycontradictthegoalofmaximizingthesharepriceoftheequityofthefirm.

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2.Suchorganizationsfrequentlypursuesocialorpoliticalmissions,somanydifferentgoalsareconceivable.Onegoalthatisoftencitedisrevenueminimization;

i.e.,providewhatevergoodsandservicesareofferedatthelowestpossiblecosttosociety.Abetterapproachmightbetoobservethatevenanot-for-profitbusinesshasequity.Thus,oneansweristhattheappropriategoalistomaximizethevalueoftheequity.

3.Presumably,thecurrentstockvaluereflectstherisk,timing,andmagnitudeofallfuturecashflows,bothshort-termandlong-term.Ifthisiscorrect,thenthestatementisfalse.

4.Anargumentcanbemadeeitherway.Attheoneextreme,wecouldarguethatinamarketeconomy,allofthesethingsarepriced.Thereisthusanoptimallevelof,forexample,ethicaland/orillegalbehavior,andtheframeworkofstockvaluationexplicitlyincludesthese.Attheotherextreme,wecouldarguethatthesearenon-economicphenomenaandarebesthandledthroughthepoliticalprocess.Aclassic（andhighlyrelevant）thoughtquestionthatillustratesthisdebategoessomethinglikethis:

―Afirmhasestimatedthatthecostofimprovingthesafetyofoneofitsproductsis$30million.However,thefirmbelievesthatimprovingthesafetyoftheproductwillonlysave$20millioninproductliabilityclaims.Whatshouldthefirmdo?

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5.Thegoalwillbethesame,butthebestcourseofactiontowardthatgoalmaybedifferentbecauseofdifferingsocial,political,andeconomicinstitutions.

6.Thegoalofmanagementshouldbetomaximizethesharepriceforthecurrentshareholders.Ifmanagementbelievesthatitcanimprovetheprofitabilityofthefirmsothatthesharepricewillexceed$35,thentheyshouldfighttheofferfromtheoutsidecompany.Ifmanagementbelievesthatthisbidderorotherunidentifiedbidderswillactuallypaymorethan$35persharetoacquirethecompany,thentheyshouldstillfighttheoffer.However,ifthecurrentmanagementcannotincreasethevalueofthefirmbeyondthebidprice,andnootherhigherbidscomein,thenmanagementisnotactingintheinterestsoftheshareholdersbyfightingtheoffer.Sincecurrentmanagersoftenlosetheirjobswhenthecorporationisacquired,poorlymonitoredmanagershaveanincentivetofightcorporatetakeoversinsituationssuchasthis.

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7.Wewouldexpectagencyproblemstobelesssevereinothercountries,primarilyduetotherelativelysmallpercentageofindividualownership.Fewerindividualownersshouldreducethenumberofdiverseopinionsconcerningcorporategoals.Thehighpercentageofinstitutionalownershipmightleadtoahigherdegreeofagreementbetweenownersandmanagersondecisionsconcerningriskyprojects.Inaddition,institutionsmaybebetterabletoimplementeffectivemonitoringmechanismsonmanagersthancanindividualowners,basedontheinstitutions‘deeperresourcesandexperienceswiththeirownmanagement.

8.TheincreaseininstitutionalownershipofstockintheUnitedStatesandthegrowingactivismoftheselargeshareholdergroupsmayleadtoareductioninagencyproblemsforU.S.corporationsandamoreefficientmarketforcorporatecontrol.However,thismaynotalwaysbethecase.Ifthemanagersofthemutualfundorpensionplanarenotconcernedwiththeinterestsoftheinvestors,theagencyproblemcouldpotentiallyremainthesame,orevenincreasesincethereisthepossibilityofagencyproblemsbetweenthefundanditsinvestors.

9.Howmuchistoomuch?

Whoisworthmore,RayIraniorTigerWoods?

Thesimplestansweristhatthereisamarketforexecutivesjustasthereisforalltypesoflabor.Executivecompensationisthepricethatclearsthemarket.Thesameistrueforathletesandperformers.Havingsaidthat,oneaspectofexecutivecompensationdeservescomment.Aprimaryreasonexecutivecompensationhasgrownsodramaticallyisthatcompanieshaveincreasinglymovedtostock-basedcompensation.Suchmovementisobviouslyconsistentwiththeattempttobetteralignstockholderandmanagementinterests.Inrecentyears,stockpriceshavesoared,somanagementhascleanedup.Itissometimesarguedthatmuchofthisrewardissimplyduetorisingstockpricesingene