Marbury vMadison.docx

Marbury vMadison.docx

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MarburyvMadison

LectureOne:

Marburyv.Madison

（1803）FirstdecisionoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatestodeclareanactofCongressunconstitutional,thusestablishingthedoctrineofjudicialreview.In1801newlyelectedPres.ThomasJeffersonorderedSecretaryofStateJamesMadisontowithholdfromWilliamMarburythecommissionofhisappointmentbyformerPres.JohnAdamsasjusticeofthepeaceintheDistrictofColumbia.MarburythenrequestedthattheSupremeCourtcompelMadisontodeliverhiscommission.Indenyinghisrequest,thecourtheldthatitlackedjurisdictionbecausethesectionoftheJudiciaryActpassedbyCongressin1789thatauthorizedtheCourttoissuesuchawritwasunconstitutionalandthusinvalid.ChiefJusticeJohnMarshall,writingfortheCourt,declaredthattheConstitutionmustalwaystakeprecedenceinanyconflictbetweenitandalawpassedbyCongress.

USSupremeCourt:

Marburyv.Madison

MarburywasthefirstSupremeCourtcasetoapplytheemergentdoctrineofjudicialreviewtoacongressionalstatute.WilliamMarburyhadbeenappointedajusticeofthepeaceintheDistrictofColumbialateintheadministrationofFederalistPresidentJohnAdams.AlongwithanumberofotherFederalistpartisansappointedtofederaljudgeships,Marburyfellwithinthegroupof“midnightjudges”targetedforpoliticalattackbytheincomingRepublicanadministrationofThomasJefferson.Marbury'ssignedandsealedcommissionremainedundeliveredwhenthenewsecretaryofstate,JamesMadison,tookoffice.MadisonrefusedtodeliverthecommissiontoMarbury,whotheninvokedtheoriginaljurisdictionoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,askingthattheCourtissueawritofmandamustoMadison,orderinghimtodeliverthecommission.

CongressalteredthedateofSupremeCourtterms,therebydelayinghearingMarbury'scaseuntilFebruary1803.Intheinterval,theFederalist‐sponsoredJudiciaryActof1801wasrepealedandcircuitjudgesappointedunderitsprovisionsweredismissed.（SeeJudiciaryActsof1801and1802.）Stuartv.Laird（1803）,achallengetothedischargeofthecircuitcourtjudges,wasarguedonthedateMarburywasdecided.JusticeWilliamPatersonupheldtheconstitutionalityofthedismissals.NewlyelectedRepublicanlegislatures,atboththestateandfederallevels,werecontemplatingorbringingimpeachmentproceedingsagainstFederalistjudges.Republicans,includingJeffersonhimself,believedthat,havinglostatthepolls,theFederalistpartyintendedtofrustrateJeffersonianlegislativeprogramsthroughthepowerofthejudiciary.ThischargedpoliticalatmospherewasaggravatedbyspecialcircumstancespresentinMarbury'scase.ChiefJusticeJohnMarshallhadbeenappointedduringthelastmonthsoftheAdamsadministrationandthuswasvirtuallya“midnightjudge”himself.（Ironically,MarshallwasalsotheoutgoingFederalistsecretaryofstatewho,probablybecauseofanoversight,failedtodeliverMarbury'scommission.）

InhisopinionfortheCourt,MarshallheldthatMarburywasentitledtohiscommissionandthatMadisonhadwithhelditfromhimwrongfully.Mandamuswastheappropriateremedyatcommonlaw,butthequestionpresentedwaswhetheritwasavailableunderArticleIII'sgrantoforiginaljurisdictiontotheSupremeCourt.Todecidethatquestion,MarshallwasrequiredtocomparethetextofArticleIIIwithsection13oftheJudiciaryActof1789,bywhichCongressauthorizedthemandamuswrit.FindingthatthestatuteconflictedwiththeFederalConstitution,Marshallconsideredit“theessenceofjudicialduty”（p.178）tofollowtheConstitution.Heconcludedthat“theparticularphraseologyoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesconfirmsandstrengthenstheprinciple,supposedtobeessentialtoallwrittenconstitutions,thatalawrepugnanttotheconstitutionisvoid;andthatcourts,aswellasotherdepartments,areboundbythatinstrument”（p.180）.13

Sinceaffirmingreliefwasdenied,thedecreeinMarburywasself‐executing,andnotableasanexampleofself‐restraintinthefaceofwhatMarshalldescribedasanarbitrarydenialofMarbury'spropertyrights.TheopinionalsoseemedtopreachrespectforthoserightstoJeffersonandhissubordinates,anditprovidedthejudiciary,bothstateandfederal,withapotentweaponforprotectingindividualrightsagainsttheactionsoflegislativemajorities.Atthetime,itwasattackedinnewspaperarticlesbyJudgeSpencerRoaneofVirginiaandJudgeJohnBannisterGibsonofPennsylvaniainEakinv.Raub（Pa.,1825）.Criticscontendedthen（asnow）thatthejudiciaryshouldnotarrogatetoitselftherighttopassuponthevalidityofalegislativeact.Suchthinking,coupledwithhispersonalanimositytoMarshall,movedPresidentJeffersontoencouragemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativestobeginimpeachmentproceedingsagainstJusticeSamuelChaseduringthesummerof1803.

Marburywasnotthefirstcasetoenunciatetheprincipleofjudicialreview.Precedentsexistedinthestatecourtsandinthelowerfederalcourtswherejudgeshadrefrainedfromfollowingalawtheyconsideredcontrarytotheprovisionsofthestateorfederalconstitution.Marshall'swasthefirststatementofthedoctrinebytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt.Marshalldelineatedacomprehensiverationaleforthepracticeofjudicialreview.Hejustifieditbytheconceptsoflimitedgovernment,thewrittenconstitution,andtheruleoflaw.Coloniallawyers,mostnotablyJamesOtisarguingtheWritsofAssistanceCaseinMassachusetts（1761）,haddrawnuponSirEdwardCoke'sstatementinDr.Bonham'sCase（1610）thatparliamentarystatutescontrarytocustomandrightreasonwereinvalid.InTheFederalistno.78（1788）AlexanderHamiltonarguedthatlimitedgovernmentrequiredthatcourtsofjusticebeempoweredto“declareallactscontrarytothemanifesttenoroftheConstitutionvoid,”andMarshall'sopinioninMarburyreflectedmuchofHamilton'sreasoning（SeeFederalist,The）.

Marshallstressedthedutyofjudgestoapplythelawtocasesbeforethem.Carriedtoitslogicalconclusion,thismeantthatthelife,liberty,andpropertyofcitizensdependedupontheexerciseofjudicialreviewasaconstitutionalcheckonlegislativediscretion.

MarburystandsastheclassicexpressionofjudicialreviewinAmericanconstitutionallaw.Itembodiedwhatmightbecalled“coordinatebranch”judicialreview.ThemorecommonformofjudicialreviewinthefederalsysteminvolvesthestatutesandjudicialdecisionsofthestatesandthedegreetowhichtheyconflictwiththefederalConstitutionandthusviolatetheSupremacyClauseofArticleVI.ThissubordinationofstatelawstothefederalConstitutioniswhatProfessorEdwardS.Corwincalledthe“linchpinoftheConstitution,”withoutwhichthefederalunionwouldfalter.

Marshall'sopinionconcededthatthefederalgovernmenthasonlythelimitedauthorityconferreduponitbythetermsoftheConstitution;allotherpoliticalpowerandsovereigntyisreservedeithertothestatesortothepeoplebytheTenthAmendment.ThusconceptsoflimitedgovernmentmostvigorouslycircumscribedthepowersofthefederalgovernmentatleastbeforetheCivilWar.InMarbury,MarshallwasaskedtoexpandthemeaningoftheConstitutiontopermitCongresstograntamandamuspowernotexpresslygivenunderArticleIII.Butparadoxically,theauthoritytoexercisejudicialreviewwasitselfnotconferredbyanyexplicitconstitutionalprovisionoranyactofCongress.Thedecisionassertedonepowerevenasitrejectedtheprofferofanother.

TheCourtdidnotagainexerciseitspowerof“coordinatebranch”judicialreviewuntil1857whenitheldthe1820MissouriCompromiseunconstitutionalinthecaseofDredScottv.Sandford.After1868,judicialreviewofstatestatutesanddecisionshasbecomemorefrequentinSupremeCourtjurisprudenceowingtotheexpandedfunctionsofthefederalgovernmentandthecreationofAmericancitizenship,withattendantrightsundertheFourteenthAmendment.DredScottunderminedapoliticalcompromiseoverslavery'sexpansionintotheterritories.Italsodealtwiththeissueoffederaljurisdiction—thatis,whetherdiversityofcitizenshipconferredjurisdictiononthelowerfederalcourtoverslavery'sfreedomsuits.ChiefJusticeRogerB.Taneyinvokeda“higherlaw”thantheConstitutioninanefforttodefendowners'propertyrightsinslaves,justasantislaverypublicistsurgedmoralandnaturallawprinciplesinsupportoffederalpowertoabolishorrestrictslavery.By1900,thefederaljudiciary,ledbytheSupremeCourt,evolvedtheprincipleofsubstantivedueprocesstorestrictstateandfederallegislativepowertoregulateeconomicenterprise.ThisrequiredabroaderconceptofjudicialreviewthanhadbeenprovidedinMarbury.

TheSupremeCourt'sdecisioninCooperv.Aaron（1958）markedthehightideofexpandedjudicialreview.CitingMarbury,theunanimousCourtdeclaredthat“thefederaljudiciaryissupremeintheexpositionofthelawoftheConstitution,andthatprinciplehaseversince[Marbury]been…apermanentandindispensablefeatureofourconstitutionalsystem”（p.18）.Cooperv.Aaronslightedthefactthatpresidentshavevetoedlegislationonconstitutionalgrounds（AndrewJackson'svetooftheMaysvilleRoadbillin1830beingoneexample）,andthatChiefJusticeMarshallhadalwaysbeencarefultodefertothepoliticalbranches—Congressandthepresident—whenimportantmattersofdomesticandforeignpolicywereinvolved.

AlthoughthesignificanceofMarburyhasbeenenlargedovertime,thecaseremainsoneofthefundamentaljudicialopinionsinAmericanconstitutionalhistory.Itcorrectlyassessedtheroleofthejudiciaryinmaint