日本的股权集中度代理冲突股息政策英文原文与译文论文.docx
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日本的股权集中度代理冲突股息政策英文原文与译文论文.docx
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日本的股权集中度代理冲突股息政策英文原文与译文论文
原文:
Ownershipconcentration,agencyconflicts,anddividendpolicyinJapan
1.Introduction
Agencyconflictsplayanimportantroleincorporatedecisions.Intheirseminalpaper,JensenandMeckling(1976)showthatdecisionmakersmayselectvalue-decreasingoutcomesthatarejustifiedonlybecauseofthewealthtransferfromotherstakeholders.Togiveawell-knownexample,managersmayinvestinunprofitableprojectswhosecostsarebornebyshareholdersifdoingsoenhancestheirownstatusandbringthemprivatebenefits.Likewise,shareholdersmaytakeexcessiveriskknowingthatthedownsideisassumedbydebtholders,whiletheybenefitfromtheupside.
Agencyconflictscantakemanyotherforms.MyersandMajluf(1984)arguethatfirmsactingintheinterestofcurrentshareholdersshouldrationallypassupprofitableinvestmentprojectsifthebenefitsarecapturedbyoutsideinvestors.ShleiferandVishny(1997)emphasizetheagencyconflictsbetweenmajorityandminorityshareholders,promptedbyrecentevidencethatdominantshareholdersextractrentsattheexpenseofsmallshareholdersthroughthetunnelingofassetsandprofits,suchastheuseofunfairtransferpricingbetweencontrolledentities.Johnsonetal.(2000)provideafewexamplesofexpropriationtakingplaceindevelopedcountries.
Payoutpolicyisoneareaofcorporatedecisionsthatcannotescapetheinfluenceofagencyconflicts.Infact,Easterbrook(1984)arguesthatdividendscanbeeithertheresultorthesolutiontoagencyconflicts.Becausemanagersprefertoretainearningstoincreaseprivateconsumptionorreducetheriskontheirhumancapital,lowgovernancestandardsandpoorshareholderprotectionarelikelytoresultinlowerpayout.Thisviewisclearlyestablishedinthecross-countryanalysisofLaPortaetal.(2000).Conversely,dividendpayoutcancontributetomitigateagencyconflicts.Jensen(1986)advocatestolowerthefreecashflowsavailabletomanagersinordertoincreasefinancialdiscipline.Payinghighdividendspreciselyachievesthispurpose,thusprovidingacosteffectivesubstitutetoshareholdermonitoring.
Morerecently,GuglerandYurtoglu(2003)highlighttheimportanceofagencyconflictsbetweenshareholdersbylookingatthedividendpolicyofGermanfirms.Sincedominantshareholderscanextractprivatebenefitsfromthecashflowsundertheircontrol,theirpreferencetranslatesintolowerdividends.However,thepresenceofanotherlargeshareholdercanrestraintherentextraction,leadingeventuallytoahigherpayout.
ThepurposeofthispaperistoexaminethedividendpolicyofJapanesefirmsfromanagencyperspective.Ifownershipconcentrationisconsistentwiththealignmentofinterestbetweenmanagementandshareholder,asstudiesofcorporateperformancehavesuggested,thereshouldbeahigherdividendpayout.However,ownershipconcentrationcanalsofacilitaterentextractionbydominantshareholders,resultinginlowerpayout.
Ourresultssupportthesecondhypothesis.Ownershipconcentrationisassociatedwithsignificantlylowerdividendpaymentsinproportionofoperatingearningsasinproportionofbookequity.Ineffect,thedifferencebetweenthehighconcentrationandlowconcentrationgroupsisfoundtobeintheorderof10%.
Weinvestigatethereasonsforthisdifference,focusingontheroleofprofitability,growthopportunitiesandchangesinleverageinexplainingthedecisiontochangedividends.Ouranalysisuncoversanumberofagencyconflicts.First,tightlycontrolledfirms(i.e.,firmswithconcentratedownership)arelesslikelytoincreasedividendswhenprofitabilityincreasesandwhenoperatingprofitsarenegative.Thispatternisconsistentwiththeirlowerpayoutandtheassumptionthatdominantshareholderextractprivatebenefitsfromresourcesundertheircontrol.
Wealsofindthattightlycontrolledfirmsaremorelikelytoomitdividendswheninvestmentopportunitiesimprove,whichprotectstheinterestofcurrentshareholders.Clearly,thisdecisionreducesthelikelihoodofrequiringfurtherfundingthatwouldbenefitoutsideinvestors,hencepreventingtheunder-investmentproblempresentinmorelikelytoincreasedividendswhendebtlevelsarehighandlesslikelytoomitdividendswhendebtincreases,whichisequivalenttoawealthtransferfromdebtholderstoshareholderssinceitdecreasestheamountofcollateralbackingthefirm’sdebt.
Overall,theanalysisofthedividendadjustmentdecisionprovidessomereasonsforthelowerpayoutassociatedwithownershipconcentration.Moreimportantly,perhaps,theresultssuggestthatasinthecaseofmanycorporatedecisions,dividendpolicyisheavilydeterminedbyagencyconflictsbetweenmajorityshareholdersandotherstakeholders.Inparticular,theemblematicdebtholder-shareholderconflictappearstobeexacerbatedbythepresenceofdominantplayersabletocoordinatetheactionsofshareholders.
Therestofthearticleisstructuredasfollows.Section2articulatesthehypothesesregardingtherelationshipbetweenownershipstructureanddividendpolicy.Section3
Describesthesampleanddatesources.TheempiricalresultsarepresentedinSection4.Section5concludes.
Relationshipbetweenownershipanddividends
2.1Positiverelationship
AccordingtoShleiferandVishny(1986),ownershipconcentrationcreatestheincentivesforlargeshareholderstomonitorthefirm’smanagement,whichovercomesthefree-riderproblemassociatedwithdispersedownershipwherebysmallshareholdershavenoincentivestoincurmonitoringexpensesforthebenefitofothershareholders.Becauseofstrictfinancialdiscipline,firmsimprovetheircapitalallocation,reduceunprofitableinvestmentsandultimatelyexhibithigherperformance.Indeed,severalstudies(e.g.,ClaessensandDjankov,1999)showthatconcentratedownershipcontributestohigherprofitabilityandmarketvaluation.
Therelevantconsequenceoffinancialdisciplineisthatfewerresourcesareconsumedinlowreturnprojectsandmorecashflowscanthusbedistributedasdividends.Insupportofthisinterpretation,Mitton(2005)showthatfirmswithbettercorporategovernancepayhigherdividendsinemergingmarkets.Likewise,LaPortaetal.(2000)showthatincountrieswithbettershareholderprotection,liketheUS,firmspaymoredividends.Easterbrook(1984)suggeststhatdividendpaymentscanbeasubstituteformonitoring.
Largeshareholdershavethepowertoconstrainfirmstodisgorgeexcesscashflowsinordertoreducemonitoringexpenses,resultinginthesamepositiverelationship,butwithreversedirectionofcausality.Thisinterpretationissupportedbythelowercashholdingsofbetter-governedfirmsandfirmswithconcentratedownership(Dittmaretal.,2003).
Followingthesearguments,itispossibletoformulatethehypothesisthatownershipconcentrationisassociatedwithhigherdividendpayments.
2.1Negativerelationship
Theoppositeviewisthatwellgovernedfirmsdonotneedtopayhigherdividendstoincreasefinancialdisciplineorenhancethealignmentofinterestbetweenmanagersandshareholders.Intheabsenceofagencyconflicts,shareholderscanbeconfidentenoughthatthefirm’scashflowsareproperlyused.Hence,thehigherdividendpayoutadvocatedbyEasterbrook(1984)doesnotappeartobeessentialtodiscipliningmanagement.
Consistentwiththisview,Jensenetal.(1992)showthatinsiderownershipisassociatedwithsignificantlylowerdividendpayoutamongUSfirms.Farinha(2003)documentsasimilarnegativerelationshipintheUK.Chenetal.(2005)provideevidencethatsomeindicatorsofgovernancequality(existenceofauditcommitteeandpercentageofindependentdirectors)negativelyaffectdividendpayoutsinHongKong.Thesestudiesstronglysuggestthatthehigheralignmentofinterestbetweenmanagersasagentsandshareholdersasprincipalsshouldactuallyresultinlowerdividendpayments.
What'smore,agencytheoryhasrecentlyhighlightedpossibleconflictsbetweenlargeandsmallshareholders.ShleiferandVishny(1997)emphasizethatlargeshareholdersprefertogenerateprivatebenefitsofcontrolthatarenotsharedbyminorityshareholders.Johnsonetal.(2000)giveseveralexamplesofcontrollingshareholdersexpropriatingminorityshareholdersofprofitablebusinessopportunities.ClaessensandDjankov(1999)explaindownward-slopingfirmvalueathighlevelsofownershipconcentrationbythepotentialriskofexpropriationbycontrollingshareholders.
GuglerandYurtoglu(2003)showthatthelowerdividendpayoutofmajority-controlledfirmsinGermanyisrelatedtotheprobabilitythatcontrollingshareholdersextractprivatebenefitsattheexpenseofminorityshareholders.Indeed,theyfindthatincreasesindividendpaymentsareassociatedwithsignificantlypositiveabnormalreturnsamongfirmswhererentextractionismostlikelygiventhediscrepancybetweencashflowrightsandcontrolrights.Furthermore,thepresenceofasecondlargeshareholdercontributestoincreasethedistributionofprofits,asitdecreasesthescopeofexpropriation.
MauryandPajuste(2002)documentasimilarnegativeassociationbetweenownershipconcentrationanddividendpaymentsinFinland,aswellasevidenceofthemitigatingroleofanotherlargeshareholder.
Inasimilarway,wecanhypothesizethatfirmswithconcentratedownershipareassociatedwithlowerdividendpayments.
Ownershipconcentrationanddividendpayout
Inthissection,weexaminetheeffectofownershipconcentrationondividendpayoutcontrollingforotherfirmcharacteristicsthatcouldinfluencepayoutpolicy.
Table3showthatthecoefficientsontheHerfindhalindex(LHH)anditsassociateddummy(Q2H)arebothsignif
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