外文翻译模板.docx
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外文翻译模板.docx
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外文翻译模板
杭州电子科技大学
毕业论文外文文献翻译要求
根据《普通高等学校本科毕业设计(论文)指导》的内容,特对外文文献翻译提出以下要求:
一、翻译的外文文献可以是一篇,也可以是两篇,但总字符要求不少于1.5万(或翻译成中文后至少在3000字以上)。
二、翻译的外文文献应主要选自学术期刊、学术会议的文章、有关著作及其他相关材料,应与毕业论文(设计)主题相关,并作为外文参考文献列入毕业论文(设计)的参考文献。
并在每篇中文译文标题尾部用“脚注”形式注明原文整理及出处,中文译文后应附外文原文(全文,格式为word)。
不能翻译中国学者的文章,不能翻译准则等有译文的著作。
三、中文译文的基本撰写格式
1.题目:
采用小三号、黑体字、居中打印;段前二行,段后二行。
2.正文:
采用小四号、宋体字,行间距一般为固定值20磅,标准字符间距。
页边距为左3cm,右2.5cm,上下各2.5cm,页面统一采用A4纸。
四、外文原文格式
1.题目:
采用小三号、TimesNewRoman、居中打印;段前二行,段后二行。
2.正文:
采用小四号、TimesNewRoman,行间距一般为固定值20磅,标准字符间距。
页边距为左3cm,右2.5cm,上下各2.5cm,页面统一采用A4纸。
五、封面格式由学校统一整理(注:
封面上的“翻译题目”指中文译文的题目),并按“封面、封面、译文、外文原文、考核表”的顺序统一装订。
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译文
管理者过度乐观与债务、股权融资之间的选择
本文采取了一家成长较快速的公司作为样本,比较债务融资和股权融资后的长期股票业绩。
如果管理者过于乐观的预测他们将获得的资产,那么他们更有可能通过债务融资来增加资本而不是股权融资。
然而他们通过债务融资获得的资本与股权融资后的长期的业绩相比将会更差。
但是,从另一方面来说,管理者利用“机会窗口”发行股票,我们认为会比发行债券有更差的业绩。
伴随着管理者过度的乐观假设,我们发现,债务融资比股权融资后的股票业绩更差。
管理者过度乐观对于选择债务或股权融资还有之后的股票业绩有着显着的影响。
关键词:
过度乐观、过于自信、债务融资、股权融资、长期的股票表现
一、前言
股价低和经营业绩差的表现导致了一个假说,即利用高股价和投资者的过度乐观的时期,销售定价过高的股票。
这个“机会之窗”假说认为,管理者存在时间股权的问题时,他们公司的股票会被高估(Ritter[1991])。
然而,这一假说,不能用来解释股票表现不佳的问题(Spies,Affleck-Graves[1999]和Datta,Iskandar-DattaandRaman[2000])。
绩效差带来的债务融资问题表明必须要有一种替代假说可以解释这些发现。
……
外文原文
ManagerialoveroptimismandtheChoicebetweenDebt
AndEquityFinancing
Thispapercompareslong-runstockperformancefollowingdebtfinancingandequityfinancingforasampleofrapidlygrowingfirms.Ifmanagersaresubjecttooverlyoptimisticpredictionsfortheirassetacquisitions,theyaremorelikelytofinanceassetgrowthbydebtratherthanbyequity.Themanagerialoveroptimismhypothesispredictsworselong-termperformancefordebt-financedassetacquisitionsthanequity-financedassetacquisitions.If,ontheotherhand,managerstakeadvantageof“windowsofopportunity”forissuingequity,weexpectworseperformancefollowingequityissuancethanfollowingdebtissuance.Consistentwiththemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesis,wefindthatdebtfinancingisfollowedbysignificantlyworsestockperformancethanequityfinancing.Managerialoveroptimismseemstobeasignificantfactoraffectingthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpost-financingstockperformance.
Keywords:
Overoptimism,Overconfidence,Debtfinancing,Equityfinancing,longrunstockperformance
Introduction
Evidenceofpoorstockandoperatingperformancefollowingequityissueshasledtothehypothesisthatmanagerstakeadvantageofperiodsofhighstockpricesandinvestoroveroptimisminordertoselloverpricedequity.This“windowsofopportunity”hypothesissuggeststhatmanager’stimeequityissueswhentheirfirm’ssharesareoverpriced(Ritter[1991]).Thishypothesis,however,cannotbeusedtoexplainpoorstockperformancefollowingdebtissuesdocumentedbySpiesandAffleck-Graves[1999]andDatta,Iskandar-DattaandRaman[2000].Underperformancefollowingdebtfinancingindicatesaneedforanalternativehypothesisthatcanexplainthesefindings.
Wesuggestthatmanagerialoveroptimismisafactorthatcanexplainpoorlong-termstockperformancefollowingstockand,especially,bondissuance.Recentstudiesshowthatmanagerialoveroptimismaffectscorporatedecisions(e.g.,Heaton[2002],Gervais,HeatonandOdean[2003],MalmendierandTate[2003and2005]).Asmanagersaremoreaffectedbytheper-formanceoftheirfirmthanarewell-diversifiedshareholders,moderatemanagerialoveroptimismcanhelptoensurethatmanagersbehaveinthebestinterestofshareholdersbycounteractingtheeffectofmanagerialriskaversion;however,strongmanagerialoveroptimismcanresultintheundertakingofnegativenetpresentvalueprojectsanddestructionofafirm’svalue(Gervais,HeatonandOdean[2003]).Anexcessivelyfavorableestimateoffutureoutcomesforinvestmentsisthecruxofthismanagerialoveroptimismhypothesis.Whenmanagershaveoptimisticpredictionsofinvestmentoutcomes,theyaremoreinclinedtofinancewithdebtratherthanequity.Confidenceaboutthesizeoffutureoutcomesmakesmanagersunwillingtosharefutureprofitswithnewequityinvestorsandmakethemmorewillingtoissuedebtratherthanequity.
Thisstudyteststhemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesisbyexaminingpost-financingstockperformanceforbothdebtandequityfinancing.Ifmanagerialoveroptimismhasamoresignificanteffectonthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpostfinancingperformancethanmanagerattemptstotimethemarketandtakeadvantageofwindowsofopportunityforissuingequity,weexpectworsestockperformancefollowingdebtfinancingthanfollowingequityfinancing.
Wefocusonasampleoffirmswithrapidgrowthinassetsandacorrespondingneedtofinancethoseassets.Byfocusingonfirmsthatrequireassetfinancing,securityissuanceforotherpurposescanbelargelyeliminated.Furthermore,sincestudyinglong-termperformancedoesnotrequireidentifyingaparticularissuancedate,ourstudyisnotlimitedtofirmswithexplicitannouncementsofsecurityissuance.Ratherthanlimitingthestudytofirmsthatannouncenewissuesofdebtorequity,weincludeallformsoffinancingandmeasurefinancingbythechangeindebtorchangeinequity.Inthismanner,implicitsecurityissuancesuchasstock-for-stockmergerscanbeincorporatedinthesample.Anotherreasonforfocusingonhighgrowthfirmsisourexpectationofstrongermanagerialoveroptimismamongthesefirms.Allelsebeingequal,overoptimisticmanagersperceivethattheyhavemoregoodprojectsavailablethanothermanagers.Asmanagersshouldtakeallprojectstheybelievetohavepositivenetpresentvalue,overoptimisticmanagerswouldundertakemoreprojectsresultinginthefastergrowthoftheirfirms.
Therearetworeasonswhyitisimportanttofocusonasampleaffectedbystrongmanagerialoveroptimisminastudyexaminingwhethermanagerialoveroptimismaffectsthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpoorpost-financingperformance.First,thewindowsofopportunityhypothesisandthemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesisarenotmutuallyexclusive.Itispossiblethatwhilesomemanagerschoosebetweendebtandequityfinancingtotakeadvantageofwindowsofopportunity,othermanagersaresignificantlyaffectedbyoveroptimismwhenmakingsecuritychoicedecisions.Eventhesamemanagercanbeaffectedbybothfactorsatthesametime:
anoveroptimisticmanagermayattempttotakeadvantageofsharemispricings.Becauseofmarkettimingtoselloverpricedshares,equityfinancingwillbefollowedbyworsepost-financingstockperformancethandebtfinancing.Becauseofthemanagerialoveroptimismeffectonthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancing,debtfinancingwillbefollowedbyworsestockperformance.Asthesefactorsworkinoppositedirections,theeffectofmarkettimingcancanceltheeffectofmanagerialoveroptimisminasampleofalldebtandequityissues.Thesecondreasonforfocusingonasampleaffectedbystrongmanagerialoveroptimismisrelatedtothemarketoveroptimism.Poorpost-financingstockperformanceindicatesthatthemarketisoveroptimisticaboutthefirmobtainingexternalfinancing.Overoptimisticmanagerspreferdebtfinancingtoequityfinancingwhentheyperceivetheirsharestobeunderpriced,whichhappenswhenmanagersaremoreoveroptimisticabouttheirfirm’sfuturethanisthemarket.Asthemarketisoveroptimisticaboutfinancingfirms,overoptimisticmanagerpreferencefordebtfinancingwillbeobservedonlyforthemostoveroptimisticmanagerswhoseoveroptimismexceedstheoveroptimismofthemarket.Consequently,ifwewouldexaminethewholepopulationoffirmsobtainingexternalfinancing,itislikelythatwewouldfindnoevidenceofworsestockperformancefollowingdebtfinancingthanequityfinancing,evenifmanagerialoveroptimismsignificantlyaffectsthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpost-financingstockperformance.ThisexpectationisconsistentwiththeJung,KimandStulz[1996]studythatcomparesstockperformanceafternewbondissuesandprimarystockofferingsand,whencontrollingforthecharacteristicsofissuingfirms,findnosignificantdifferenceinthepost-issueperformance.
Weexamineasampleofhigh-growthfirmsthatincludesthetop10%offirmsintheCompustatdatabase,basedontheirone-yearpercentagetotalassetgrowth.Theresultingsamplecontainsfirmswithsignificantfinancingduringtheexaminedyear.Westudytwosubsetsofthehigh-growthsample:
asampleoffirmsthatprimarilyusedebttofinanceassetgrowthandasampleoffirmsthatprimarilyuseexternalequitytofinanceassetgrowth.Ifmoreoverlyoptimisticmanagersusedebtfinancing,thenwewouldfindworseperformanceforthesamplethatprimarilyusesdebtfinancing.Worseperformanceforthesampleofequityfinancingfirmscouldprovidesupportforthewindowsofopportunityhypothesis.Wefindthatdebtfinancingisassociatedwithsignificantlyworsepost-financingone-tofive-yearstockperformance.Forexample,inthefirstpost-financingyear,ourdebt-financingsampleunderperformsourequity-financingsampleby8%to10%,dependingonthemethodologyusedtocontrolforrisk.Wecontrolforriskusingthematched-sampleapproachadvocatedbyBarberandLyon[1997]andafour-factormodel,includingthethreeFamaandFrench[1993]factorssupplementedbyamomentumfactor.
Wealsoexaminetheeffectofthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingonpost-financingperformanceusingacontinuousvariabletomeasureafirm’srelianceondebtfinancingandcontrollingforfirmcharacteristics.Furthermore,wetesttherobustnessofourresultsusingrestric
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