小额贷款在帕恰斯墨西哥通过集体贷款减少贫困外文翻译.docx
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小额贷款在帕恰斯墨西哥通过集体贷款减少贫困外文翻译.docx
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小额贷款在帕恰斯墨西哥通过集体贷款减少贫困外文翻译
外文翻译
原文
MicroCreditinChiapas,Me´xico:
PovertyReductionThroughGroupending
MaterialSource:
JournalofBusinessEthics,September2009,Volume88,Supplement2,p283-299,DOI:
10.1007/s10551-009-0286-7;
Author:
GustavoBarbozaandSandraTrejos
Introduction
GeorgeAkerlof(1970)broughttheissuesofasymmetricinformationandmoralhazard(adverseselection)totheforefrontofeconomictheory.WhileAkerlofreliesontheexampleoftheusedcarmarkettoillustratetheexistenceofsuchinformationalproblems,asymmetricinformationexamplesarefoundineverydaylifesituations,includingthefunctioningoffinancialmarkets.Ingeneral,riskierborrowerspayhigherinterestratestocompensatefortheirhigherprobabilityofdefault,whereassaferborrowerspaylowerinterestrates.Financialmarketsusecreditratingstoassesstheborrowers’probabilityofdefaultandtherefore,determinethecorrespondinginterestratetobecharged.Collaterals,suchasleansoncarsormortgagesonlandproperty,securetheloanincaseofdefault.Whenneithercollateralnorcreditratingisavailable,nolendingtakesplace.Thelackofcollateralorcreditratingsinhibitstheabilityoffinancialinstitutionstointernalizepossibleinformationasymmetries,andlimitstheprospectsforeconomicactivitytodevelop.
Unfortunately,theabove-mentionedscenariodescribestherealityofabouthalfoftheworld’spopulation.Thelackofcreditratingand/orcollateralleavesabouttwotothreebillionpeoplewithnoaccesstoformalcreditmarkets.Theyareunabletoobtainloansforeconomicactivities.Thislackofaccesstofinancialmarketsisamajorproblemwhentryingtoreducepovertyaroundtheworld.
The2006NobelPeacePrize2wasawardedtoMohammedYunusandtheGrameenBankinBangladeshfortheirpioneerworkondevelopingMicroCredit3(MC)asamethodtoreducepovertythroughtheprovisionoffinancialresourcestothepoorestofthepoor.MCprogramshaveemergedinmanycountriesandareaviableoptionforpeoplewithentrepreneurialskillsandpromisingbusinessprojects.Undertheneworganizationalmodel,Non-GovernmentalOrganizations(NGOs)managingMCprogramsreceivefinancialsupportfromdonors,grants,orborrowedmoneyfrominternationalorganizationsatpreferentialinterestrates4(sometimesinterestratefree),tothenlendtoimpoverishedpeople.Theseprogramsbridgethegapbetweennoaccesstofinancialmarketsandinstitutions,andone-timelumpsumgovernmentaidprograms.
PovertyandMicro-credit
TherecentriseofMicroCreditisadirectresponsetothefailureoftheformalfinancialmarketstoincludethepoorasdifferentanduniqueeconomicagents.Governmentshavetriedtoimprovethismarketfailurebyprovidinglumpsumaid.Butthissolutiondoesnotcorrectthesituationinwhichthepoorlackaccesstoloanfunds.Intheearly1970s,MohammedYunusinitiatedtheGrameenBankproject,anMCprogramthatprovidedsmallloansforpoorpeoplewholackedcollateral.TheGrameenBankcurrentlyhassimilarandderivedprogramsoperatingaroundtheworld.MCisaninnovativeapproachtolendfinancialresourcestothepoor,withoutmakinguseofcollateral,bycreatinganetworkoftrustwherefamilies,neighbors,friends,orevenstrangerscometogethertosupporteachotherfinancially.MCprogramsfocusonthepoorestofthepoor,thosethatareshunnedawayfromformalfinancialmarketsopportunities.
HowdoMCprogramswork?
MCprogramsreceivefinancialsupportfromsociallyresponsibledonorsandinternationalorganizationsbecauseoftheirpositiveimpactonpovertyalleviationwhilepromotingeconomicdevelopment.FinancialviabilityofMCprogramsiscrucialtocontinuingtheprovisionofresourcestothoseinthelowestincomebracket.Achievingandconsistentlymaintaininghighrepaymentratesonoutstandingloansis,hence,centralnotjustforsurvivaloftheorganization,buttoachievethegoalsofdisseminationofwealthandintegrationintomodernsociety.Alternatively,lowrepaymentratesorhighdelinquencyonoutstandingloanswouldmostlikelycreateanadverseeffectonthewillingnessofdonorstosupportMCprograms.
MCprogramsaretailoredtothespecificneedsoftheclienteletheytarget.Forinstance,someprogramsfocusonurbanareasandprovidefinancialresourcesexclusivelytothepoor.OtherMCprogramsconcentratetheiroperationsinruralareas,andprovideaccesstofinancialresourcesandrelatedservices,suchaseducationalprogramsandhealthservices.Furthermore,someprogramsusetheindividualgrouplendingmodel,whileotherslendtogroups,orlendmoneyindividuallyunderjointliabilitycontracts.Theunifyingfactoroftheseprogramsisthattheirfinalgoalistoliftthepooroutofpoverty,notthroughcharity,butthroughtheefficientuseofscarceresourcesandthedevelopmentoffeasibleentrepreneurshipprojectsthatallowtheborrowerstousetheircapabilitiestowardsreachingtheirpotential.Inthisregard,someprograms,suchasBancoSol,aredefinedasfor-profitorganizations,whilemostothersareoperatedbyNGOswithaclearnon-profitstatus.
TheempiricalresultsofMCperformanceandimpactsaregenerallyveryimpressive.AccordingtotheUnitedNations’HighLevelEventfactsheet,65%ofallGrameenBankborrowers‘‘havemanagedtoliftthemselvesoutofextremepoverty.’’However,thereisstillworktodogiventhatagreatproportionofpeoplearoundtheworldstillliveonlessthan$1.25aday(purchasingpowerparityin2005prices).Usingthisthreshold,theWorldBankestimatesfromAugust2008revealthat1.4billionpeopleliveinextremepoverty.
PerhapsthebestknownMCprograminMe´xicoisCompartamos,whichisactiveinover26Mexicanstatesandprovidesservicesmainlytoruralborrowers.Compartamos,likemanyotherMCprograms,lendsmostlytowomen,thoughrecentlyitsserviceshasbeenextendedtomen.CompartamosisoneofthefirstMCinstitutionstobelistedontheMexicanStockExchangeanditbecameacommercialbankin2006(SenguptaandAubuchon,2008).However,CompartamosisdifferentfrommostMCprogramsbecauseMCprogramsoperateatamuchlowerscalethantheformer.
VerylittleresearchhasbeenconductedontheimpactofMCprogramsonpovertyinMexico.OneMicroCreditinChiapas,Me´xico285studyreportsthatpeoplewhohavebeenmicrofinanceclientsformorethanoneyeararefinanciallybetteroffthannewclients(WoodworthandHiatt,2003).Thestudyreportedthatnonclientsearnedonly$1.69adayand22%ofthenonclientsearnedlessthan$1aday.MCsofferthesepoorestofthepooraclearandfeasiblealternativethatisalreadyyieldingpositiveeffectsforthoseinmostneed.
AmodelofMicro-creditlending
First,lenderscaneitherloanmoneydirectlytoborrowersoruseafinancialintermediary.AccordingtoPrescott(1997),lendingtothefinancialintermediary,undertheriskierreturnprojects,istheoptimalsolutionforindividuallenders.Themainreasonsarethehighmonitoring,screening,andadministrativecoststhatthelenderwouldhavetoincurtosecureafullrepayment.Thefinancialintermediaryhasacomparativeadvantageintheseregards(Prescott,1997).
Second,lenderscanprovideindividualloans,grouploans,orindividualloansundergroupjointliability.
Third,lenderscanlendwithoutmonitoringbutwithliquidation,lendandmonitor,orlendtogroupsandhavethemself-monitor.
Fourth,MCinstitutionslendingtosmallborrowersalsoneedtoconsiderprivateinformationonborrowers’returns,liquidationcosts,costlymonitoring,andcostlyscreening(Prescott,1997).Theexistenceofprivateinformationontheborrowersis
typicallyunknown,whichisoneofthereasonswhyformalfinancialmarketsdonottolendtopoorpeople.Borrowerscanlieandclaimbadperformancewhichthelendinginstitutionisnotabletoverify.Findingmechanismstoamelioratetheexistenceofprivateinformationisthefirsttaskforthelendinginstitution,bothfromthegenerationofrevenueperspectiveandtheuseoffundstoguaranteehighrepaymentrates.Theselectedmechanismswill,inturn,dictatethelendingapproach,loanstructure,andcorrespondingcoststructureontheMClendinginstitutionside.
Fifth,theoperatingmechanismsofMCinstitutionsprecludethemfromreceivingdirectdepositsfromsavers.
Sixth,loansfromsociallyresponsiblelendersanddonors,andotherfinancialresourcesfromdonors,canbeusedeithertolendtoborrowersortocoveradministrativeexpenses.Themostcommonpracticeisforsociallyresponsiblelendersanddonorstoearmarkthatthemoneybeallocatedforspecificuses.
Methodology
Ourobjectiveistoprovideempiricalevidenceonpovertyreduction,repaymentrates,andgroupdynamicstodeterminetherolethatdonorscanplayinassuringthefinancialviabilityofMCprograms.TodeterminetheimpactMCprogramshaveonpovertyalleviation,repaymentrates,andapproximateoverallprogramsustainabilitywereestimatedusingdatafromtheALSOLMicroCreditPrograminChiapas,Me´xico.TheofficialtransactionrecordsofweeklypaymentswereexaminedfromJuly2000toJuly2001foratotalof2151participants.
ALSOLprovidesloanstourbanborrowersata30%flatinterestrateandruralborrowersata20%flatinterestrate.Undertheprogressiveloanstructure,loansaregivenoutinsixlevels.Borrowersmovetothenextloanleveluponsuccessfulcompletionofthepreviousloan.
Findings
Thefindingsreportedbelowareorganizedbasedonthefollowinganalysis:
(1)overallloansample,
(2)activeloansversusinactiveloansfortheoverallsample,(3)ruralloansversusurbanloansfortheoverallsample,(4)activeru
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