组织结构和企业文化外文文献翻译中英文.docx
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组织结构和企业文化外文文献翻译中英文.docx
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组织结构和企业文化外文文献翻译中英文
组织结构和企业文化外文翻译中英文2019-2020
英文
Watercoolerchat,organizationalstructureandcorporateculture
JonathanNewton,AndrewWait,SimonAngus
Abstract
Modelingfirmsasnetworksofemployees,occasionalcollaborativedecisionmakingaroundtheofficewatercoolerchangeslongrunemployeebehavior(corporateculture).Theculturethatemergesinagiventeamofemployeesdependsonteamsizeandonhowtheteamisconnectedtothewiderfirm.Theimplicationsofthemodelfororganizationalstructureareexploredandrelatedtotrendsinthedesignofhierarchies.
Keywords:
Collaboration,Teams,Hierarchies,Delayering,Networks,Evolution
Appleisaverydisciplinedcompany,andwehavegreatprocesses.Butthat'snotwhatit'sabout.Processmakesyoumoreefficient.Butinnovationcomesfrompeoplemeetingupinthehallwaysorcallingeachotherat10.30atnightwithanewidea... –SteveJobs,founderofAppleInc.
Introduction
Peopletalk,shareideas,andcollaboratewhenitismutuallyadvantageoustodoso.Workersbringtheircollaborativenaturewiththemtotheworkplaceandtotheirdealingswiththeircolleagues,withwhomtheyinteractonshopfloors,inmeetings,onproductionlinesandduringcoffeeandlunchbreaks.Inthispaperweconsidercollaborativedecisionmakinginthesocialenvironmentoftheworkplaceand,usingasimplemodelofadaptivedecisionmaking,showthatthiscanhavedramaticandfarreachingeffectsoncorporatecultureandtheoptimalinternalstructureoforganizations.
Ourmodeltakesthewelldocumentedfactthathumansareparticularlygoodatmutuallybeneficialcollaboration(Tomasello,2014),andincorporatesthisfactintoanoisyvariant(Young,1998)ofthebestresponsedynamicthathasbeenthebreadandbutterofeconomicmodelingsince Cournot(1838).Wemodelfirmsasnetworksofemployees,eachofwhomcanchoosea‘safe’actionora‘risky’action.Theriskyactionrepresentsinnovative,evenspeculative,behaviorwithinthefirm.Anemployeewillonlyfinditinhisinteresttotaketheriskyactionifenoughofhisneighborsinthenetworkdolikewise.Withinfirms,employeesaredividedintoteams.Ateamisagroupofemployeeswhointeracttogether,althoughtheymayalsointeractwithothersoutsideoftheteam.Theteamrepresentsanemployee'sworkgroup,department,orevenacorporateboardorseniormanagementcommittee.
Theabilityofemployeestoengageincollaborativeactionchoiceismodeledbytheideaofawatercooler,aroundwhichsmallgroupsofemployeeswithinateamcanchatandformcollaborativeintentions.Iftherearenowatercoolers,sothatemployeescannotshareintentions,themodelreducestothecanonicalmodelof Young,forwhichtheactionprofileinwhicheveryplayerchoosesthesafeactionisalwaysalongrunequilibrium(Peski,2010).Thisresultnolongerholdswhensmallgroupsofplayerscanoccasionallymeetatthewatercoolertoformsharedintentions,coordinatingtheiractionchoicetotheirmutualbenefit.Instead,byincorporatingthisbasicfacetofhumannatureintothemodel,weobtainadiversityofbehavior,dependentonnetworktopology.
Wefindthatinorderformembersofagiventeamtoplaytheriskyactioninlongrunequilibrium,someconditionsmustbesatisfied.(i)Firstly,theteammustnotbetoolarge.Thelargerateamis,thelesslikelythatafixedamountofcollaborativedecisionmakingaroundthewatercoolerwillhaveanimpactonlongrunbehavior.(ii)Secondly,sufficientnumbersofemployeesmustbeabletocoordinatetheirstrategicchoiceatthewatercooler;thatis,communicationwithintheteammustbestrongenoughtogenerateenoughcollaborationtoovercomethesystemicbiasinfavorofthesafeaction.(iii)Thirdly,theteammustnotbesosmallthattheinfluenceofitsmembers'externalconnectionscancausethemtoplaythesafeaction,or,iftheteamisindeedthatsmall,thenallmembers'connectionsoutsideoftheteammustbetoteamsthatplaytheriskyaction.Inotherwords,theexternalinfluencefromthoseoutsideoftheteamwhoplayitsafemustbelimited.Theseconditionsprovideguidancefororganizationaldesign:
theycanbeusedtopromoteorpreventdifferentbehaviorsindifferentpartsofanorganization.Section 5 providesexamplesrelatedtodelayeringandjobrotation.
Eachoftheseconditionshelpstoexplainempiricalfacts.Condition(i)providesanexplanationforwhycompaniesseekingtopromoteinnovationcreateorganizationalstructuresbasedaroundsmallteams(Cook,2012; Stross,1996).Condition(ii)helpsexplaintheeffortsthatfirmstaketoincreasespontaneousinteractionandfacilitateinformalcommunicationbetweenworkers;thatis,tocreatelargerwatercoolers(Evans,2015).Condition(iii)helpsexplainwhyorganizationsseektofosterindependencewithinteamsandevenisolateresearchunitsfromotherpartsoftheorganization(Sloan,1964).
Relatedliterature
Thispapercontributestoseveralstrandsofliterature.Thepracticalcontributionistotheliteratureontheimportanceoftheworkplacesocialenvironment–thenatureandpatternsofinteractionbetweenworkersinafirm(see,forexample Bandieraetal.,2005; GibbonsandHenderson,2013; KandelandLazear,1992).Wedemonstratehowthefacilitationofcollectiveagencybytheworkplacesocialenvironmentcanhaveasignificanteffectoncorporateculture.Like Kreps(1990)and Hermalin(2001),wemodelcorporatecultureasanequilibriumoutcomeplayedinacoordinationgame.Todothisweturntotheliteratureonadaptivedecisionmakingandevolution,whichallowsustodevelopasimpleexplanationofsomeaspectsofcorporateculture,providinganalternative,evencomplementary,theorytothesharedbeliefsmodelof VanDenSteen(2010).Evolutionarymodelsoftenfocusonlongrunequilibria.Thisissimilartohowtherelational-contractingliteratureadaptslongrunfolktheoremstostudyfirms(Bakeretal.,1999; Levin,2003; Lietal.,2017),thedifferencebeingthatevolutionarymodelsimposeverylowrationalityrequirementsonagents.Suchlowrationalitymodelshavehadsuccessatexplaininglaboratorydata(Chongetal.,2006)aswellasempiricalphenomenaasdiverseascrop-sharingnorms(YoungandBurke,2001)andthewearingoftheIslamicveil(Carvalho,2013).Thecurrentpapershowshowtheincorporationofcollectiveagencyintosuchmodelscanleadtoevenricherempiricalpredictionswhilstretainingthesimplicityandeleganceofevolutionarymethodology.
Theincorporationofcollectiveagencyintoperturbedevolutionarydynamicsisarelativelynewandrapidlygrowingliterature(Newton,2012a, Newton,2012b; NewtonandAngus,2015; Sawa,2014; SerranoandVolij,2008),althoughconsiderableworkhasbeendoneinthecontextofmatching,wherepairwisedeviationsrepresentintentionalbehaviorbycoalitionsofsizetwo(JacksonandWatts,2002; Klausetal.,2010; KlausandNewton,2016; NaxandPradelski,2014; NewtonandSawa,2015).Theproclivityofhumanstoengageincollectiveagencyiswelldocumented andrecentresearchindevelopmentalpsychologyhasshownthattheurgetocollaborateisaprimalone,manifestingitselffromagesasyoungas14months(Tomasello,2014; Tomaselloetal.,2005; TomaselloandRakoczy,2003).Recenttheoreticalworkhasshownthattheabilitytoactasapluralagentwillevolveinawidevarietyofsituations(AngusandNewton,2015; Newton,2017; Rusch,2019).Theauthorsofthecurrentpaperbelievethattheevidenceinfavoroftheincorporationofcollectiveagencyintomodelsofhumanbehaviorisoverwhelming.Furthermore,adaptive/evolutionaryframeworksareidealforthisas,incontrasttostaticanalyses,theyexplicitlymodelbehaviorbothinandoutofequilibrium.
Finally,wenotethatworkoncollectiveagencyinevolutionarydynamicsbuildsonabroaderliteratureoncoalitionalbehavioringame-theoreticmodels.Theconceptofjointoptimizationunderpinscooperativegametheory(see PelegandSudholter,2003,forasurvey)andalsomotivatesasmallbutestablishedliteratureattheintersectionofnoncooperativeandcooperativegametheory(see,forexample Ambrus,2009; Aumann,1959; Bernheimetal.,1987; KonishiandRay,2003).However,despitethenotedlimitationsofmethodologicalindividualismineconomics(Arrow,1994),theuseofcoalitionalconceptsineconomicshasnotattainedthesamelevelofpopularityas,forexample,theuseoftheconceptofbeliefs,exceptinsofarastheconceptsofthehouseholdandthefirmassumeasharingofintentionsonthepartoftheindividualswithinthosestructures.Thecontrastisinteresting,asdevelopmentalstudiesofchildrenindicatethattheycollaborateatearlieragesthantheycanunderstandbeliefs.Oneofthegoalsofthecurrentpaperistoshowhowaweakeningofmethodologicalindividualismcanleadtosimpleandstrikingeconomicpredictionsthatflowfromsomeofthedeepestcurrentsofhumannature.
Firmstructureanddesign
Socoalitionalbehaviorcanleadtoheterogeneouschoicesbyteamswithinafirmdependingontheirsize.Thiseffectisnotnecessarilymonotonic.Largeteamsplaythesafeaction,medium-sizeteamstheriskyaction.Intheabsenceofneighbors,smallteamscaneasilysolvethecoordinationproblemandplaytheriskyaction,butthepresenceofneighborsplayingsafeisenoughincentiveforverysmallteamstochoosethesafeaction.
Byexploitingtheinternalandexternalpressuresthatdrivetheseresults,afirmownerormanagercanmanipulatethestructureofthefirmtoachievedesiredoutcomes.Ifthemanagerwouldlikethesafeactiontobetakenbyasmallworkgroup,shewillensureithasstronglinkstoadivisionthatwilldefinitelybeplayin
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